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Comments on PhD thesis of Katherine J. Reynolds entitled: Beyond the information 
given: Capacity, context and the categorization process in impression formation 
This was an excellent thesis which is without question worthy of being awarded a PhD. 
The work is admirable on a number of levels, both theoretically and empirically. I was 
particularlJ: impressed with the theoretical insight and the knowledge and depth of 
understandmg With respect to the relevant literature. The literature review was very 
detailed and took nothing for granted. The critical analysis of the previous literature, 
and of how 1t has often been presented or understood was almost worthy of a PhD in 
itself, in my view. I hope that this work is not wasted and can be used in some 
published form, as it would be a shame for such an insightful analysis not to reach a 
wider audience than the readers of this thesis. My worry is that such a lead up would 
form too much by way of introduction to the empirical papers when published. Indeed 
the review/theoretical chapters were so thorough and extensive, that I admit to a bit of 
impatience in having to wait to get to the empirical rewards waiting at the end as it were 
(but this is meant more by way of compliment than criticism). 
The empirical chapters were well worth waiting for. I was already familiar with some 
of the data form conferences, but here together they form a very nice series of 
integrated studies, flowing logically from the theoretical critique and analysis. The data 
were generally strong and well interpreted and once again, I can find very little fault 
here. I detected what might be considered as one slight tendency to over-interpret 
however. On p. 260 (top) it is stated that "as predicted there was also a significant 
interaction between identity and dimension ... " That is subjects rated themselves as most 
different from the target on dimensions inconsistent with the identity manipulation. I 
could not find this precise prediction in the preceding text (e.g. p.247). Rather, my 
understanding was for a more complex predicted interaction involving the intragroup 
(group) versus interpersonal manipulation. Indeed this is made explicit on the following 
page (261) when we find out that the pattern of differentiation in interpersonal 
conditions is consistent with predictions. This is basically the same interaction as the 
overall two way interaction including the intragroup condition described above (i.e. that 
is subjects rated themselves as most different from the target on dimensions 
inconsistent with the identity manipulation). This is fine, but as the pattern of means 
from table 9.2, and the absence of a reported significant 3-way interaction make clear, 
the interaction is basically the same (or not significantly different) in the intragroup 
condition and as I understand it, this was not predicted. In other words it seems that 
self-target differences were accentuated (on inconsistent dimensions) in both 
interpersonal and intragroup/group conditions, whereas this was only clearly predicted 
in interpersonal conditions (and in my view that is indeed what the theory would 
predict). Even if this pattern is still present for the intragroup conditions, surely we 
would expect it to be significantly less evident here than in the interpersonal conditions 
(resulting in a three-way interaction)? The fact that the (predicted?) three-way 
interaction is not mentioned, and that the two way interaction (excluding the 
interpersonal group factor) is described as predicted, rather glosses over this fact in my 
opinion. I think some attention to this point will be necessary before this research is 
published. 
One additional minor point: In the final study I found the labelling of conditions as 
interpersonal versus intragroup slightly confusing, given that these terms are sometimes 
equated within SCT. I though simply referring to group versus interpersonal conditions 
might have been simpler and clearer in this regard. 
Overall however I thought the data were very nice and formed the perfect complement 
to the theoretical critique and analysis. Indeed my brevity here should be taken as a 
general endorsement for the high quality of this work, and that little by way of criticism 
is warranted. I also thought the discussion chapter was excellent with very interesting 
ideas for theoretical development and future directions of research. On top of all this the 
thesis was extremely clear and well written, with first class presentation and minimal 
typos or other minor errors. All in all then. I have absolutely no hesitation is 
recommending that the candidate be awarded PhD for what· is a first class piece of 
work. 
If it is of any help, I list a few minor typos that I picked up through the text below. 
p.49, top. Shouldn't Neuberg & Fiske (1990) be Fiske & Neuberg? (or the date 
changed to 1987?). 
p.60, last para. Delete comma after "Research, ... "? 
p.lOO, 2nd para, 8th line: devises> devices? 
p.l57, 5lines from bottom: a accentuation> an accentuation. 
p.l83, end 1st para: Why give p>.lO rather than p<X? 
p.l86, 4 lines from bottom: insert comma after manipulated? 
p.232 top para: Is warm (also friendly?) not also stereotypic of the female stereotype? 
p.285, 2nd para, 7th line: exit> exist. 
Report of examiner: Dissertation of Katherine J. Reynolds 
Beyond the information given: Capacity, context and the categorisation 
process in impression formation. 
For almost two decades, social cognition has constituted one of the major 
theoretical references for the study of impression formation, person 
perception, and stereotyping. In this excellent piece of work, Kate 
Reynolds provides a critical analysis of the major assumptions underlying 
the social cognition research endeavours. She questions a view in which 
categorisation is seen as an unfortunate data reduction and information 
distortion process. Supposedly, perceivers would be forced to rely on such 
faulty processes whenever they lack the cognitive resources or the 
appropriate motivational set of mind. From the social cognition 
perspective, stereotypes and individuating perception, error and truth, are 
two ends of the same continuum. Kate Reynolds then convincingly sets the 
stage for an alternative approach in which categorisation would be at work 
in every aspect of perception. Building upon self-categorisation theory, 
Kate argues that there is no such thing as one true characterisation of 
others but that perception always entails a context-dependent accentuation 
of differences from a relevant target of comparison. 
After a well-documented review of the early person perception research, she 
details the critical aspects of the debate opposing elemental and 
configura! models of impression formation. I must say that I was very 
pleased to read some very interesting comments concerning Anderson's 
sceptical reactions regarding the contemporary interpretation of his own 
early research. In Chapter 4, Kate endeavours to present in more detail the 
major assumption underlying the social cognition approach: people 
categorise when cognitive resources are scarce and when they are not 
motivated to be accurate. This chapter is, in my opinion, slightly weaker 
than the rest of the dissertation. A series of studies could have been 
included in the discussion. Also, it seems to me that the text does not 
provide a thorough analysis of the process of inconsistency resolution and 
the attributional work that sets on upon encounter of unexpected evidence. 
If I were to advise some development of the current text, I would 
definitely suggest Kate to enrich the discussion by integrating this 
important facet of social cognition work. In fact, this is a potentially 
fruitful line of research because I believe that closer examination of what 
people actually do when they deal with the information about others would 
provide supportive and hardly questionable evidence for the theoretical 
perspective defended in the present work. Chapter 5 offers a nice summary 
of the self-categorisation perspective on impression formation. This 
chapter sets the stage for the four following empirical chapters. 
In Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9, Kate presents a succession of very original, 
extremely thought-provoking and most competently performed studies. 
Although all the findings are not always entirely compatible with the 
current formulation of self-categorisation theory, they are very clearly at 
odds with the dominant social cognition dogma. Notably, they show that 
limited cognitive resources or the absence of vested interest may not 
provide a satisfactory account of people's tendency to rely on group-level 
perception. Most importantly, the various studies provide striking support 
for the idea that individuation and stereotyping are not to be taken as 
distinct impression formation processes but rather stand as two instances 
of the basic process of categorisation. In my opinion, Kate Reynolds makes 
a true contribution to the field by unifying two aspects of social 
perception under the same umbrella of categorisation and by questioning the 
traditional dichotomy between accurate individuation and errorful 
stereotyping. Given the level of sophistication of Kate's analysis, I have 
every reason to believe that it will exert a sizeable impact on the way 
researchers may come to study social perception. For all these good 
reasons, I consider that the present dissertation is an excellent piece of 
;vQrk and that Kate fully deserves to become a colleague. 
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Comments on Kate Reynolds's PhD Thesis 
How do people form impressions of others whose group membership is known? The 
question of stereotyping is a pressing issue in multicultural societies like Australia. In the 
current political and social climate, the importance of this topic could hardly be 
overemphasized. And I welcome the emergence of this exceedingly promising researcher, 
Kate Reynolds, as a bright hope in our quest for understanding the complex issue of social 
stereotyping. I congratulate both Ms Reynolds and her supervisor on this excellent work, 
and recommend that Ms Reynolds be unconditionally admitted to the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
The thesis is at once a metatheoretical critique, a theoretical exposition, and an empirical 
examination of the impression formation process. Ms Reynolds examines currently popular 
models of social stereotyping (dual process and continuum models), and brings out the 
fundamental assumption that there are two distinct processes, group membership based 
impression and individuated perception. She set out to evaluate this assumption, in 
contradistinction with the implications of self-categorization theory. The thesis addresses a 
major empirical question, why impressions appear to be more or less group membership 
based depending on the context. The four experiments convincingly show that the 
comparative context (interpersonal, intragroup or intergroup) plays the most important 
role in producing stereotyped or individuated impressions. The dual process and 
continuum models must contend with the results of the experiments, which at most 
present some difficulty to the theories, and at least present a major problem in generalizing 
these currently popular North American models to Australia. The result is a significant 
contribution to the field of person impression formation. 
Impressive the thesis may be, I would like to engage in some constructive discourse in the 
interest of further development of the field, and perhaps to stimulate further thoughts on 
the part of the candidate. Some are comments and observations, some are suggestions, 
and some are friendly criticisms. I hope Ms Reynolds finds them useful. 
The use of Jim Bolger's comments in Chapter 1 cleverly sets up the main point of the 
thesis. It points to the cultural belief in "abstract individual" pervasive in the English 
speaking part of the world. The notion of"abstract individual" posits that there exists an 
individual who is equipped with a fixed set of abilities and desires. The individual is then 
capable of calculating the utility of an action based on his or her own desires. This notion 
underlies social contract theories of social organization and governance, which roughly 
takes the following form. A social order is formed as a result of a contract among utility 
maximizing individuals, so that the individuals can avoid the Hobbesian natural state of"all 
against all". 
This conception of the person also underlies much of the past and curent discourse on 
stereotypes and stereotyping as Ms Reynolds pointed out in Chapters 2-4. When she 
lamented that the traditional discourse on stereotypes often fails to recognize the "reality 
of groups" (Chapter 2), she was probably reacting against this element of individualism. 
Indeed, the notion of abstract individual takes the individual as the building block of 
sociality; a group is a sheer aggregate of multiple individuals. It follows then that there are 
significant individual differences within a group; if a characteristic attributed to the grouo 
is applied to an individual, it is bound to be an overgeneralization. Scientific discou(se by 
necessity reflects cultural discourse. The structure of the traditional arguments about 
stereotypes in social psychology echoes this line of reasoning. 
In Chapter 3, Ms Reynolds gave an historical sketch of the elemental vs. configura! 
process debate and the meaning change controversy, and how these themes recur in the 
current models of person impression formation. I should comment that the whole debate is 
in a way a specific instantiation of the larger debate about the meaning of meaning (to 
borrow Ogden and Richards's famous title). On the one hand, the British empiricism (most 
clearly by Hume) advocated that meaning is basically learned associations among ideas. 
On the other hand, Kant and his successors such as Gestaltists argued that meaning is not 
just associations, and that there are possibly innate "categories" in the mind, including 
such basic ideas as time, space, and causality. The associationist position turned up in the 
form of elemental process models, and the Kantian-like position was taken by Asch and 
others who took the configura! perspective. 
As Ms Reynolds correctly pointed out, the debate was not settled, and probably could not 
have been settled within the framework in which the researchers were operating at the 
time. The researchers often took a simplistic perspective that the entire meaning of an 
adjective was exhausted by its evaluation, one aspect of connotative meaning. This is at 
best a rather impoverished conception of "meaning". Surely, the meaning of meaning goes 
far beyond an evaluative connotation of a concept. 
At present in social psychology, the notion of meaning demands serious consideration. As 
I understand it, a central assumption of self-categorization theory (and indeed the social 
identity approach in general) is the human propensity for "effort after meaning". I do not 
call myself a social identity researcher, but I strongly endorses this view, and I too attempt 
to examine its implications ill social processes. At one !eve~ Ms Reynolds's thesis clearly 
showed that impressions of a person are dependent on the meaning of the context in which 
the person is perceived. What is this "meaning" then? The kind of meaning she examined 
in the thesis is interpersonal and intergroup comparisons. Do they exhaust the meaning of 
meaning? I suppose not. What other kinds of meaning would affect person perception? I 
hope Ms Reynolds's future endeavour may be directed at refining the concept of meaning. 
I was encouraged to see her concern about the notion of consistency in Chapter 1 0 
(section 10.4.2), a sign of her interest in a wider conception of meaning. 
The experiments were well designed and conducted. However, I wish to make one 
methodological comment, which generally applies to the experiments reported in the 
thesis. Ms Reynolds did not report the pretests she conducted when she constructed her 
experimental materials. She should mention how these pretests were done when she writes 
them up for publication. I also wonder whether a pretesting of stimuli is possible in 
principle from the perspective that the meaning of a stimulus is in flux. There is no need to 
justifY this in the thesis. Most researchers do this anyway. Still, this is something we all 
need to reflect on. I will return to this point later. 
In Chapter 6, Ms Reynolds reports an interesting experiment in which she finds an effect 
of comparative context, but not an effect of interdependence. Two comments are in order. 
First, this experiment confounds target type (lateral versus logical style) with comparative 
context. That is, the target was a lateral problem solver in the interpersonal context, but a 
logical problem solver in the intergroup conditions. This is rectified in Experiment 2, and 
therefore it is not a major problem. However, it needs to be acknowledged. From the self-
categorization perspective, nonetheless, the subjects' own self-categorization should also 
be important. Therefore, this experiment can be interpreted as controlling for the subjects' 
self-categorization, and as such, it serves an important purpose despite the confound. My 
second comment relates to the finding of no effect of interdependence. The implication of 
this is strengthened by the fact that the manipulation was successful. One more point to 
consider, however, is the statistical power of this experiment. It is possible to argue that 
the sample size was too small to detect an effect. To counter this, I suggest Ms Reynolds 
to conduct a power analysis. If she can show that the power is not too small, and yet she 
failed to detect an effect of interdependence, this would further strengthen her finding. 
Chapter 7 reports what I take to be a strong finding forMs Reynolds's position. One 
technical point is her use of protected t-tests here and elsewhere in deciphering complex 
interaction effects. Protected t-tests are perhaps conservative, but simple effects analyses 
should give more interpretable results in general. This is because the latter uses the same 
error term as the main analysis. In future, Ms Reynolds may wish to consider the latter 
option. 
In Chapters 8 and 9, Ms Reynolds attempted to show the existence of an accentuation 
effect in both interpersonal and intergroup contexts. She successfully showed that, and 
corroborated her earlier findings that a more individuated impression is obtained in the 
interpersonal context than in the intergroup context. Nonetheless, I think her conclusion is 
overdrawn when she interprets the result as showing the operation of categorization 
process in the both contexts. I believe Ms Reynolds is right when she said categorization 
implies accentuation (proposition p). However, this does not mean that accentuation 
implies categorization (proposition q). The two propositions are not equivalent. Note that 
by the standard propositional logic, proposition p implies that the lack of accentuation 
implies the absence of categorization, but does not imply that accentuation implies 
categorization. To assert the latter is to commit a logical fallacy. 
Having said that, Chapter 8 nonetheless reports fascinating results. Setting aside the main 
findings of accentuation, the results of Table 8.4 are intriguing. Although the interaction 
effect of comparative context and dimension on difference scores was only marginally 
significant, the results seem interpretable in the following manner. Let us start with the 
way in which the targets were constructed in the experiment. Ms Reynolds made it so that 
target 1 was more stereotypical of arts students than target 2, but they were roughly 
equally female stereotypical (Table 8.1). In the interpersonal context, the subjects' ratings 
reflected the difference that Ms Reynolds constructed. However, in the intergroup 
contexts, the subjects' ratings did not reflect this. Rather, the targets were seen to be 
equally similar on both female and arts/engineering dimensions in the intra[!fouu context 
and equally different on both dimensions in the intergroup context. - · ' 
What is intriguing is this. The female and arts/engineering dimensions behave as if they are 
highly correlated dimensions in the arts/engineering intergroup context (both intra and 
inter), but the dimensions appear to behave as separate dimensions in the interpersonal 
context. I suspect the female dimensions such as communicative and St!nsitive (p. 236) 
describe a more "arts" than "engineering" type in general. The intergroup context in a way 
coalesce the two dimensions into one. However, in the interpersonal context, the two 
dimensions are separated. The individual targets who are created so that the 
arts/engineering dimension differentiates them (and therefore the dimension is meaning 
producing) are in fact perceived to be different on that differentiating dimension, but the 
targets are perceived not to differ on the female dimension on which the targets were not 
differentiated. The net result is that the meaning of"female" and "arts/engineering" 
dimensions changed as a function of their ability to differentiate the targets! 
This raises two issues. First, how can Ms Reynolds interpret her pretest results of some 
statements used for the experiment as stereotypical of"female" or "arts" or "engineering"? 
The subjects appear to behave as if they are "accurately" reflecting the difference between 
the target individuals as created in accordance with Ms Reynolds's pretest results. This 
sounds as if the results can be interpreted in a way consistent with the Fiske-Neuberg 
model. Yet, I think this interpretation is wrong. A better interpretation is that the subjects 
in the interpersonal context made ratings in the manner similar to those in the pretest 
condition, that is, the pretest condition in fact reflects a kind of interpersonal context. I 
wonder what this means (remember I suggested before Ms Reynolds should think more 
about the pretest condition). Would this mean that the subjects' default comparative 
context is something like the interpersonal context? 
Second, what implications would this have on the question of meaning change? I believe 
first of all Ms Reynolds should try to replicate this finding perhaps using somewhat 
different dimensions and groups. If she can obtain a conceptual replication, it seems to me 
the results can be interpreted as strong evidence for a meaning change. Furthermore, the 
results would imply that at least one central mechanism for the production of meaning is 
differentiation. This reminds me of de Saussure' s notion of meaning. But, this finding 
points to a more dynamic notion of meaning, not the meaning fixed in langue but a 
meaning produced in parole. I think this interpretation is in line with self-categorization 
theory. I hope Ms Reynolds pursue this line of work further. 
In Chapter 9, Ms Reynolds showed some context effects on person perception. She clearly 
shows that there is some variability in perceptions of an individual, and therefore there is 
no single fixed and "accurate" perception at the individual level. Her claim that individual 
perceptions are as variable as group perceptions is well taken. Does this really contradict 
the assertion made by the currently popular models that the individuated impression 
.: 
T 
reflects the actual? If they mean that "the actual" is "the fixed", then Ms Reynolds's 
conclusion holds that her findings contradict their assertion. And I suspect she is right 
about this. The notion of"abstract individual", which I mentioned earlier, is extremely 
strong in the current literature of social psychology. I think Fiske and Neuberg implicitly 
assumed that the actual is the fixed, and the fixed and stable is the actual. However, I am 
sure those theorists would argue that they didn't really mean it, and that context effects on 
individual person perception are well known. Ms Reynolds is likely to face some fierce 
opposition from these theorists when she tries to publish the results. I suggest that she 
reads up on the literature of assimilation and contrast effects in person perception. She 
may find it useful in anticipating potential counterarguments. 
In the final chapter, Ms Reynolds nicely concludes the thesis by going back to Jim Bolger, 
and the first question she posed, bringing a satisfactory closure to this narrative. 
All in all, this is an excellent thesis. I welcome the arrival of a new colleague in the field! 
As a post script, let me make some minor points. 
On p. 114, the second paragraph criticizes Neuberg and Fiske's interpretation of their 
results. Ms Reynolds argue that the mean ratings are not negative, and therefore cannot be 
taken as evidence of category-based impression formation. I understand her frustration 
about their perhaps too flexible a style of interpretation. Nonetheless, this is a moot point 
from their perspective. They claim the category-based and the individuated impressions 
are two extremes of a continuum. Their claim is only that the mean is more negative in the 
high motivation/neutral condition relative to the other conditions. It is unfortunately not a 
strong criticism. 
On p. 140, the 3rd line from bottom. "bought" should be "brought". 
On p. !80, paragraph!. The F value for the main effect of comparative context is reported 
as F(1,52), but isn't this F(2,52)? 
P. 200, paragraph 3. "Subjects where" should be "Subjects were". 
P. 2 I 0, line 12. "would agreed" should be "would agree". 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis exammes the impression formation process, with 
particular reference to the distinction between individuated and 
stereotypic impression formation. The emphasis is on issues such as: 
What factors influence our impressions? When are impressions based 
on a person's individual qualities? When do we form stereotypic 
impressions of others? What processes underpin the formation of more 
individuated or stereotypic impressions? Two theoretical perspectives, 
social cognition and self-categorization theory, offer divergent 
explanations of the impression formation process and are the 
theoretical and empirical focus of the thesis. The argument developed 
in recent impression formation models based on the social coguition 
approach is that there are two impression formation processes. 
Categorization is defined as the process used to form stereotypic 
impressions, and a categorization-free process is thought to underlie 
individuated impression formation. Whether one process or the other 
operates is determined by motivational factors which impact on the 
level of attention allocated to impression formation, such that 
increased attention is inversely related to stereotyping. Alternatively, 
self-categorization theory argues that the types of impressions we form 
of others are the product of the relational, comparative and context-
dependent aspects of social perception. The same categorization 
process, but operating at different levels of abstraction - interpersonal 
or intergroup - is argued to underlie variations in impression 
formation. Historical and contemporary developments related to both 
perspectives are outlined. 
There are four theoretical chapters which address: 1) the early 
person perception and stereotyping literature (Chapter 2); 2) key 
models of impression formation (Chapter 3); 3) the social cognition 
analysis of the categorization process (Chapter 4); and 4) social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory (Chapter 5). Based on 
the theoretical analysis two main points of distinction between self-
categorization theory and the social cognition approach emerge: 1) 
whether attentional capacity or the salient level of categorization can 
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best account for variations in impression formation; and 2) whether 
both stereotypic and individuated impressions are formed through the 
same categorization process. These issues frame the empirical work of 
the thesis. 
Four experiments are reported. Experiments 1 and 2 (chapters 
6 and 7), directly examined whether variability in impression 
formation is due to different levels of attentional capacity or the 
defining social comparative context - interpersonal or intergroup. In 
these studies interdependence (Experiment 1) and accuracy goals 
(Experiment 2) together with the salient comparative context were 
manipulated. Overall, there was no systematic evidence that subjects 
formed more individuated impressions under conditions thought to 
motivate the allocation of attentional resources (in interdependent and 
accuracy goal conditions). However, results suggest that more 
individuated impressions were formed in interpersonal contexts and 
that stereotyping increased under conditions where ingroup-outgroup 
categorizations were salient. 
The role of categorization m impression formation is then 
examined in experiments 3 and 4 (chapters 8 and 9). Is it the case, as 
self-categorization theory would predict, that all impressions are 
formed using the same categorization process? It is argued in these 
chapters that if it can be shown that self-other similarities and 
differences are accentuated when both individuated and stereotypic 
impressions are formed, then this would provide evidence of 
categorization. In these two experiments, the findings suggest that 
self-other context-dependent accentuation is the basis of impression 
formation in interpersonal and intergroup contexts. The results of 
Experiment 4, in particular, indicate that individuated impressions 
are as much based on relative self-other interpersonal judgements as 
stereotypic impressions are based on relative intergroup comparisons. 
The results of these studies enable us to draw some conclusions about 
the relative accuracy of individuated and stereotypic impressions and 
the role of the categorization process in impression formation. In the 
final chapter future directions for research are outlined. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
OF THE THESIS 
1.1 The problem examined in the thesis 
At the end of September 1996, the then Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, Mr. Jim Bolger, was interviewed on an Australian current 
affairs program. At this time racism was, for several reasons, a front 
page issue in Australia and Bolger was asked to comment. He said: 
There are certain politicians, I guess, all around the world, your 
country and mine included who can't handle the race issue. 
They always go to extremes ... There are people who can't seem 
to understand that you judge people on who they are, not which 
country they've come from, what the colour of their skin is or the 
culture of their origin. (cited in The Australian. 2 October, 1996, 
emphasis added) 
Bolger's response to the race debate, then, is to repeat this piece 
of conventional wisdom - the idea that group affiliations mislead us in 
our dealings with others. He shares with many other well-meaning 
social commentators the basic premise that we should always treat 
people as individuals, on the basis of "who they are", rather than in 
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terms of their group memberships. This approach to the race issue 
certainly has political advantages and popular appeal, but what are 
the social psychological implications? Does the political efficacy of this 
emphasis on the individual translate straightforwardly to social 
psychological processes? Are individuated impressions inherently 
more accurate, valid and reality-oriented than group-based 
impressions? This is the issue addressed in this thesis. 
The impressions we form of others clearly impact on our 
attitudes and behaviour and shape social life. Consequently, 
impression formation has been and remains a core topic within social 
psychology. Research has focused on problems such as: How do we 
define what others are actually like - "who they are"? How do we 
recognise emotion and other characteristics? What are the qualities of 
a "good" judge of others? What is the impact of our impressions? How 
do we, as perceivers, integrate the complex information available 
about others? 
More recent emphasis on the impression formation process has 
stimulated interest in the variability of our impressions. Clearly, our 
impressions of others fluctuate all the time. During the course of a 
conversation the way we perceive others can shift from being based on 
their individual, unique characteristics to being shaped by features 
they share with other group members and vice versa. Impressions can 
also vary within these broad types, such that the specific nature of 
perceived personality and perceived stereotypicality change with 
context. There has been a recent surge in journal articles which have 
variability as one of their themes; "Perceiving persons and groups" 
2 
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), "Category-based versus person-based 
perception" (Brewer, 1996), "Forming impressions from stereotypes ... " 
(Kunda & Thugard, 1996). 
This thesis aims to examine further not only how the impression 
formation process is understood but also how variations in the types of 
impressions we form of others are explained. What factors influence 
our impressions? When are impressions based on a person as an 
individual and when are impressions based on their salient group 
memberships? What processes underpin the formation of more 
individuated or stereotypic impressions? Current theoretical 
explanations of why and how our impressions vary contradict each 
other in important meta-theoretical, theoretical and empirical ways. 
Two main perspectives are investigated in detail in this thesis: the 
social cognition perspective, and an analysis derived from self-
categorization theory. 
In the social cognition literature, the prevailing view is that 
stereotypic and individuated impressions arise from different 
impression formation processes. Current and influential embodiments 
of this perspective are Brewer's (1988) dual process model and Fiske 
and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model. Both these models argue that 
stereotypic impressions are formed through categorization, where a 
category label or stereotype is used to shape impressions. A 
categorization-free process, through which independent traits are 
summed in isolation in an attribute-by-attribute way, is proposed to 
explain how we form individuated impressions. Thus, we either use 
the predetermined knowledge "in our heads" (categories), or the actual 
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attributes and idiosyncratic information about the person "out there", 
to form particular impressions. Both models draw on the influential 
work of two prominent impression formation researchers, Solomon 
Asch and Norman Anderson, and related research to support the use 
of distinct processes in impression formation. 
Alternatively, self-categorization theory maintains that one 
process - categorization - underlies all impression formation (Oakes, 
Haslam & Turner, 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). 
Individuated and stereotypic impressions are differentiated in terms of 
the level of abstraction at which the categorization process operates -
either interpersonal or intergroup. Where interpersonal comparisons 
are relevant individuated impressions are formed whereas m 
intergroup contexts, where we perceive ourselves and others as 
interchangeable members of social groups, stereotypic impressions 
predominate. Stereotypes are not interpreted as fixed, stable 
representations but as dynamic products of the contextual relationship 
between groups. 
In self-categorization theory the ~ of impressions formed of 
others is directly related to self-perception, how we perceive ourselves 
in a given situation. All impression formation is, therefore, 
comparative. Whether we use conventionally defined attributes (e.g., 
intelligent, arrogant, friendly) or category labels (e.g., French, sexist 
male, yuppie) as the basis of our impressions, these judgements are 
comparative judgments and comparison is the basis of categorization 
(Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1987). 
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Clearly, there are conflicting explanations of the impression 
formation process. Are individuated and stereotypic impressions 
formed through the same process or different processes? The answer 
to this question has direct implications for how variations in our 
impressions are explained. In models where two impression formation 
processes are advocated it is argued that a person ideally should be 
exclusively defined in terms of their idiosyncratic characteristics. 
However, it is seen as much easier and cognitively efficient to form 
group-based impressions of others because individuation consumes 
precious resources. Variations in the type of impressions we form of 
others are explained in terms of the amount of cognitive effort 
allocated to the impression formation process. Motivational factors, 
such as the goals of the perceiver, impact on how much attention 
perceivers are willing to invest at any given time. 
In self-categorization theory variations in impressions are 
explained through the fluid and context-dependent nature of self-
perception. The impressions we form of others are seen as relative to 
self-categorization as either a unique, differentiated individual or 
interchangeable, group member. Importantly, self-categorization is 
argued to vary in a lawful and rational way given variations in the 
comparative context and the way these variations are explained. 
Consequently, what a person is like, "who they are", is a relative, 
rather than an absolute, judgement. 
The way the impression formation process and variations in 
impressions are explained in social cognition research and self-
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categorization theory offer fundamentally different interpretations of 
social perception. This thesis endeavours to both examine and make a 
contribution to resolving these divergent accounts. 
In summary, the theoretical and empirical substance of this 
thesis is expressly defined in terms of the self-categorization theory 
and social cognition accounts of impression formation and is framed by 
the questions: 1) how is variability in impression formation explained? 
and 2) are stereotypic and individuated impressions formed through 
use of the same process or different processes? The conclusions 
contribute to the ongoing debate in social psychology regarding how 
human perceivers process information and make sense of the world 
around them. 
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
Impression formation is social perception. It concerns how 
people come to understand and think about others - the manner in 
which we judge others. Much of social psychological research could at 
some level be related to the issue of impression formation. In the 
interests of addressing the aims of the thesis as outlined above, 
research related to the self-categorization theory and the social 
cognitive analysis of impression formation is the central focus. 
Traditionally, impression formation research has been divided 
into two main areas. Personalised, individuated impressions have 
been the focus of the person perception literature and group-based 
impressions have been the focus of work on intergroup relations and 
stereotyping. Research in both these areas of social perception is 
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reviewed in Chapter 2. It becomes clear that the separation of this 
research into two largely distinct areas has restricted the examination 
of important questions regarding the role of the perceiver in social 
perception. 
The key assumptions of this early research are that: 1) accurate 
person perception is defined in terms of the formation of individuated 
impressions and 2) stereotypic impressions are inherently "distorted", 
"inaccurate" and "contrary to fact". These same assumptions are 
reflected in more recent social cognition models of impression 
formation (chapters 3 and 4). Only a minority of researchers, Asch 
and Sherif included, challenged the view that "we can best achieve a 
correct view of a person by ignoring his [sic]l group relations" (Asch, 
1952, p. 238). Asch and Sherif explicitly argued that groups are real 
and that stereotypes may reflect the relationships between groups in 
society. This alternative view of stereotypes offers a group-based 
approach which has been further developed in social identity theory 
and self-categorization theory (Chapter 5). 
Since the 1950s and 1960s the emphasis has been on the 
impression formation process. Theoretical developments have meant 
that person perception and stereotyping research have increasingly 
come together in the models that have evolved. Brewer (1988) and 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) make important contributions by 
attempting to integrate both person perception and stereotyping 
research in their impression formation models. Ironically, perhaps, 
1 In this thesis the use of non-sexist language is endorsed but in the interests of readability the 
practise of noting such language in future quotations will be discontinued. 
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substantive differences in the conception of the person perception 
process across the individual and group-based literatures, have been 
made more explicit through attempts at integration and have resulted 
in the postulation of two different impression formation processes. 
Chapter 3 examines in detail not only the arguments developed in 
these influential models but also the evidence they draw on to support 
the existence of their controversial categorization-free, attribute-by-
attribute, elemental process. 
In Chapter 4, the other impression formation process recruited 
by these models - categorization- is closely examined. Understanding 
categorization from the perspective of these recent models, and the 
broader social cognition literature, is the focus. Categorization is seen 
to conserve cognitive resources and through this process information 
becomes simplified but also overgeneralized. Stereotypic impressions, 
which are formed through categorization, are interpreted as being 
distorted compared to more accurate, person-based impressions. The 
relationship between categorization, use of stereotypes and resource 
preservation directly affects the way variations in the impressions we 
form of others are explained. When perceivers are motivated to 
allocate attention and cognitive resources to the impression formation 
process more accurate, individuated impressions are possible. 
A fundamental criticism of much of the person perception, 
stereotyping and impression formation research is that it is 
individualistic. An explicit assumption is that to perceive others as 
individuals is inherently real, valid and accurate. In Chapter 5, an 
alternative view is articulated where the individualistic analysis 
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inherent in the social cognition literature is rejected. 
The structural and psychological reality of both individuals and 
groups are recognised in social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory. Rather than emphasising one or the other "the primary reality 
of individual and group" are recognised as "the two permanent poles of 
all social processes" (Asch, 1952, p. 250-251). Self-categorization 
theory endeavours to understand the relationship between individual 
behaviour and group behaviour, the self and the group, and a 
completely different understanding of the categorization process has 
emerged. 
Importantly, it becomes clear in Chapter 5 that it is the way 
categorization is interpreted in current impression formation models 
and self-categorization theory which fundamentally leads to different 
interpretations of the impression formation process and to different 
explanations of the variability inherent in our impressions. These 
different theoretical approaches shape the empirical work of the 
thesis. 
In chapters 6 to 9 the empirical work is outlined. Experiments 1 
and 2 directly investigate different explanations of why the 
impressions we form of others vary - why do we sometimes form 
impressions of others as individuals and at other times as group 
members? Is the variability in impression formation due to different 
levels of attentional capacity or to variations in the defining 
comparative context - interpersonal or intergroup? Naturally, the 
results of these studies have implications for the way categorization is 
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conceptualised from the different perspectives. 
In experiments 3 and 4 the focus shifts to examination of the 
impression formation process. Is there any evidence that 
categorization may underlie the formation of both individuated and 
stereotypic impressions? There is general agreement that evidence of 
categorization is accentuation of similarities and differences. It is 
argued in these chapters that if it can be shown that self-other 
similarities and differences are accentuated when both individuated 
and stereotypic impressions are formed, then this would provide 
evidence of categorization. Therefore, both experiments focus on the 
pattern of accentuation when different types of impressions are formed 
of others. The results of these studies enable us to draw some 
conclusions about the relative accuracy of individuated and stereotypic 
impressions and the role of the categorization process in impression 
formation. 
In Chapter 10, a recapitulation of the argument developed 
throughout the thesis is provided. Conclusions from the present 
research are integrated and theoretical implications are discussed. 
Future directions for research are also outlined. It is possible in the 
concluding chapter to make some final comments regarding the social 
psychological validity of Jim Bolger's comments on racism. However, 
the analysis begins with an assessment of the early social perception 
research and the assumptions which have shaped contemporary 
models of impression formation. 
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Chapter2 
EARLY APPROACHES TO SOCIAL PERCEPTION: 
"IN THE CHARACTER OF THE BEHELD" 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses historical developments in our 
understanding of impression formation. How do we form impressions 
of others? Are our impressions accurate? Should we always perceive 
the same person in the same way? Are those we form impressions of 
static and constant? How do we assess impression formation? These 
questions are fundamental to understanding impression formation and 
many of them have been the focus of past and present research. 
Taking an historical perspective we can assess where there has 
been progress and inertia in our understanding of the impression 
formation process. Traditionally, there has been a dichotomy in the 
impression formation literature. Personalised, individuated 
impressions have been the focus of the person perception literature and 
group-based impressions have been the focus of work on intergroup 
relations and stereotyping. Both areas address the question of how 
people come to understand and think about others. The separation of 
social perception research into these two largely distinct areas has 
restricted the direction of research and the examination of important 
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1ssues. As will be seen in the progression of this thesis, models that 
address both person perception and group perception, the formation of 
individuated and stereotypic impressions, and the use of attributes or 
categories, have recently flourished. 
To appreciate the context in which current theoretical and 
empirical work is conducted it is necessary to examine early 
approaches to person perception and stereotyping. Many of the 
assumptions inherent in current work can be traced to historical 
developments in the field. For example, the premise that individuated, 
person-based impressions are more accurate and less variable than 
group-based perceptions has been dominant throughout person 
perception and stereotyping research. In this chapter the aim is to 
make these assumptions more transparent and to focus on issues of 
direct relevance to the thesis (see Tagiuri, 1968 for a detailed review). 
The chapter begins with an examination of how person 
perception is defined. It is only very recently that person perception 
has been considered to have features distinct from object perception. 
The way in which person perception has been differentiated from object 
perception shaped not only the direction of research but also the 
theoretical assumptions on which it is based. 
A chronological review of significant developments in person 
perception research is then provided. Early person perception research 
is divided into three main sections: recognition of emotion, ability to 
judge others, and Cronbach's critique. First, researchers were 
interested in whether recognition of emotion was an inherent, generic 
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ability. Evidence that some people were better able to recognise 
emotion than others led to the second area of research where more 
general questions about the ability to judge others were investigated. 
To assess judges' ability to form accurate impressions it was necessary 
to measure how the perceiver assessed and evaluated the target. 
Techniques also needed to be developed to measure the target of 
judgement so a criterion could be established. One of the most 
interesting aspects of this research is the way in which the "correct" 
answer was defined. 
The third area of the person perception literature outlined in 
this chapter focuses on Cronbach's 1955 article. Cronbach's impact is 
significant because he suggested that aspects of accuracy measurement 
rendered most of the early person perception research invalid. An 
analysis of Cronbach's work provides clear insights into how the role of 
the perceiver was understood in early person perception research. He 
argued that individual variability in perception should be measured, 
controlled and understood. The aim was to identify those aspects of 
the perceiver which led them to make a judgement about the target 
that differed from that made by other perceivers. It would then be 
possible to understand the reasons why all perceivers did not view the 
inherently stable stimulus -the individual person- in the same way. 
A large focus of the person perception literature was on the 
question of forming accurate impressions of others. A similar theme 
develops in the final section of this chapter where the "other half' of 
early social perception research, the stereotyping literature, is 
reviewed and discussed. Initial investigations of stereotyping were 
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also concerned with the extent to which stereotypes were accurate. An 
assumption that stereotypes were inherently distorted challenged 
researchers to determine the actual extent of their (in)accuracy. The 
goal from the outset was to explain potential distortion, and the role of 
the perceiver received explicit attention in the theories that developed. 
Two directions for research emerged. On the one hand, some 
researchers argued that stereotypes were distorted and based on faulty 
cognitive processes, whereas others suggested that stereotypes were 
valid and reflected the real perceived relationships between groups. 
Both theoretical contributions are outlined. 
2.2 Differences between object and person perception 
This section reviews the definition of person perception, and its 
distinction from other forms of perception. Many of the assumptions 
which have guided person perception research stem from the way 
person perception is differentiated from object perception. Up until the 
end of the eighteenth century questions about how we come to know 
the characteristics of others were mainly subsumed by philosophical 
questions, such as, how we know anything at all? However, the 
physiognomy literature, dating back to Aristotle and other Greek 
philosophers, is a clear exception. Physiognomy was primarily 
concerned with inferences made about character from physical 
qualities. For example, it was believed that courage was related to 
hair strength throughout the animal kingdom (Sarbin, Taft & Bailey, 
1960). With developments towards empiricism, assumptions about the 
relationship between cues and character were further explored. 
Darwin reported some of the first experiments related to person 
perception in 1872, but the area did not gain momentum until the mid-
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nineteenth century. As will be elaborated in the next section, Darwin's 
research had a huge impact on person perception research, influencing 
the type of questions asked and how they were investigated. 
It is not entirely clear why it is only relatively recently that 
there has been a keen interest in questions regarding impression 
formation. In part, it was not until recently that potential differences 
between knowing in general and knowing others were explored, and 
this stimulated interest and research in how we understand others. 
Sarbin et a!. (1960) identified four main dimensions on which person 
perception could be seen as distinct from object perception, and 
discussion of this original basis of differentiation provides insight into 
the way person perception is defined. 
The first distinction concerned complexity and stability. Person 
perception has been understood to be more complex than object 
perception with more diverse variables that are difficult to isolate. 
Objects are perceived as less likely to change across contexts so "it is 
much easier to isolate a typical thing-object from its environment than 
to isolate a person-object in order to achieve some stability" (Sarbin et 
a!., 1960, p. 13). It is widely believed that the variables of interest to 
person perception are stable characteristics that are impervious to 
environmental changes. As perceivers we "search to perceive the 
invariant properties of other people ... we focus not on his behavior, 
which is ever-changing, but on more invariant characteristics namely 
... intents and purposes" (Hastorf, Schneider & Polefka, 1970, p. 13). 
The second difference between object and person perception was 
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that values are involved in person perception, and there is more 
potential for emotional involvement. People and groups can become 
positively and negatively valued, although it is recognised that some 
non-human objects such as religious symbols and household animals 
can be equally valued. Tagiuri (1958) uses the term person perception 
in such a way that other non-human entities can be incorporated. The 
term person perception is used "whenever the perceiver regards the 
object as having the potential of representation and intentionality" (p. 
x). 
Another aspect believed to be unique to person perception is that 
the observer and the object being perceived, form part of the same 
context and can influence each other: 
Both the perceiver and his "object" have a phenomenal 
representation of the environment ... Thus through his own 
presence and behavior in the perceptual situation of the other, 
the perceiver may alter the perceptual characteristics of the 
person whose state he is trying to judge. This is, of course, 
eminently different from the way in which a rock is a source of 
cues for the perceiver! (Tagiuri, 1958, p. xi) 
Observation is seen to change the state of the object being perceived so 
attention needs to be given to the role of the perceiver and how this 
may influence the normal actions of others (Hastorf et al., 1970). 
The final and possibly the most widely researched distinction 
between object and person perception is the similarity or assumed 
similarity between the perceiver and the object being perceived - the 
person. The similarity between the perceiver and the perceived is 
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more extensive than with any other object. The perceiver can draw on 
his or her own experience to identify with the object and infer 
intentions, feelings and behaviour (Sarbin et al., 1960). The 
implication of this is that the "perceiver's repertory of categorising 
responses is somehow limited by his own personal or vicarious 
experience as a person" (Tagiuri, 1958, p. xi). 
Inevitably, the definition of person perception has been closely 
related to its distinction from other forms of perception. Indeed the 
term "person perception" has been the subject of some debate. While 
some prefer "social cognition", others endorse "social perception", which 
has come to mean general perception or cognition of social variables 
(see also Tajfel, 1968). Person perception as a term typically implies 
interpersonal person perception. As stated by Tagiuri (1968, p. 395-
396) person perception is: 
concerned with how we perceive and know the characteristics of 
others ... The observations or inferences we make are principally 
about intentions, attitudes, emotions, ideas, abilities, purposes, 
traits, thoughts, perceptions, memories - events that are inside 
the person and strictly psychological. 
Stewart, Powell and Chetwynd (1979) identified three significant 
points that emerge from this widely used definition. The first was that 
perceivers are capable of achieving a significant degree of accuracy in 
their impressions of others. Secondly, they noted that there was an 
implicit assumption that the perceiver reaches their impression in a 
covert way, accessing "events that are inside the person and strictly 
psychological". The third point was that the perceiver draws on 
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extensive and diverse information which is integrated in the person 
perception process. 
In summary, discussion of person and object perception makes 
some assumptions about person perception explicit. The first is that 
person-objects do have invariant, stable properties which can be 
known. In general the context-specific or "ever-changing" properties of 
people are distinguished from more fixed properties. It is the static 
features which should most interest perceivers. The second is that 
because the perceiver can influence the perceived in person perception 
this influence needs to be recognised and understood. These 
assumptions have had an impact on early approaches to person 
perception. 
In the definition of person perception, outlined above, it is 
possible to identify a number of research questions which have been 
examined in early person perception research. Initially researchers 
were interested in "observations and inferences" in terms of recognition 
of emotion. Research tried to establish whether the ability to recognise 
emotion was generic. The focus then shifted to how "man comes to 
know and think about others" (Tagiuri, 1968, p. 395) Questions about 
what makes a good judge dominated research from the 1930s to mid 
1950s. A brief overview of the recognition of emotion and the ability to 
judge others will be presented in this chapter. A third stage in person 
perception research followed the critique by Cronbach in the mid-
1950s. The emphasis shifted to an examination of process, which will 
be the focus of Chapter 3. 
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2.3 Early person perception research 
2.3.1 Recognition of emotion 
Interest in recognition of emotion built on Darwin's research and 
was the main empirical focus in the area of person perception up until 
the 1930s. Darwin kindled empirical interest in person perception by 
conducting experiments on the recognition of emotion. At the time the 
mainstream view was that emotion was a key factor which 
distinguished humans from other animals and the presence of emotion 
was used to defend the existence of a human soul. Darwin challenged 
these ideas with evidence that expression of emotion could be observed 
in primates. He believed that emotion was biologically determined and 
evolved because emotion benefited our primate ancestors (Desmond & 
Moore, 1991). 
In further research, Darwin observed and documented his child's 
emotional expression from birth. He also produced photographs which 
depicted the expression of different emotions and assessed how adults 
recognised emotional expression. These naturalistic but crude 
experiments were the first systematic attempts to investigate and 
document aspects of person perception. 
Darwin's method of asking people to judge a series of 
photographs of a person expressing different emotions carries with it 
the assumptions that one emotion is always expressed in the same 
way, and that all perceivers know which facial features are associated 
with which emotions (Hastorf et al., 1970). For example, if someone 
smiles this means they are happy and all perceivers will interpret this 
cue as happiness. The methodology also assumes that accuracy in 
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person perception is straightforward because there is a direct 
relationship between expression and recognition, independent of the 
• l • • perceivers own unique expenence. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, a number of studies 
were conducted which built on Darwin's assumptions and methodology. 
Much of this research focused on whether recognition of emotion was a 
general, ancestral ability. For example, Feleky (1914) also used a 
series of photographs depicting different emotions (e.g., hate, pity). 
Judges were asked to define the pose portrayed in the photographs 
either by using their own label or one provided. It was found that 
there were large variations in how accurately the expressions in the 
different photographs were judged. 
Using Feleky's data, Woodworth (1938) combined synonymous 
labels and photographs. For example, those associated with wonder, 
amazement and astonishment were combined with surprise. In this 
way he was able to demonstrate a higher level of agreement between 
the intended emotion and the judges' response. Previously if a 
photograph was designed to reflect the emotion happiness and the 
judges' response did not describe this emotion exactly, an error in 
judgement was recorded. Broader general categories were found to be 
more accurately judged. Woodworth went on to assess different types 
of judgement errors associated with the categories identified. Through 
this process it was recognised that emotions varied in their ease of 
recognition and some were harder to discriminate than others. 
A number of different methods emerged to investigate 
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recognition of emotion, and factors which mediated success were also 
identified. Typically a group of judges or experts (such as 
psychologists) was used to assess and label the expression of an 
emotion. An emotion could be depicted in a variety of ways, such as by 
a real person (e.g., Sherman, 1927), through a photograph (e.g., F. W. 
Allport, 1924, Landis, 1924), a drawing or diagram of a person (e.g., 
Boring & Titchener, 1923) or via a voice recording (e.g., Knower, 1941). 
The actual development of the emotion stimulus also varied, 
sometimes being produced naturally (e.g., Sherman, 1927), in the 
laboratory (e.g., Landis, 1929) or by combining features of the human 
face differently (Boring & Titchener, 1923). 
The results across studies varied greatly. Some studies 
supported the view that emotions could be recognised with 
considerable accuracy (e.g., Munn, 1940) while others reported results 
that would be expected by chance (e.g., Gulford, 1929; Sherman, 1927). 
The idea that emotional recognition was a general ability was 
substantially questioned. 
Findings by Landis (1924) also raised doubts about the 
homogeneity of emotional expression. Photographs taken while a 
number of subjects performed various tasks designed to evoke different 
expressions were examined. Landis was unable to identify standard 
muscle use in expressions across subjects exposed to the same task, 
and the observed variations raised doubts about the shared and 
habitual nature of expression. Cross-cultural research provided mixed 
support for Landis' findings with evidence of marked differences (e.g., 
Klineberg, 1938) and similarities (e.g., Ekman, 1972) in emotional 
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expressions across cultures. 
Such mixed evidence is typical of the recognition of emotion 
literature. There are clearly a number of factors involved which make 
the questions associated with emotion complex and difficult to 
investigate. Serious questions have been raised about whether 
recognition of emotion is a general ability. A number of factors, such 
as the type of stimulus used, the emotion being expressed, and the 
extent of contextual information incorporated into the judgement have 
moderated success at emotion recognition (Tagiuri, 1968). 
Although some clear insights into the understanding of emotions 
have been gained since Darwin's initial research, after the 1930s the 
emphasis in person perception research shifted. Evidence of 
differences across judges in the ability to recognise emotion spurred 
interest in the basis of "good" judgement. At the time psychology also 
emerged further as a discipline and there was a growth of interest in 
personality, clinical diagnosis and the role of empathy, inference and 
intuition (Sarbin et al., 1960). One product of this convergence was 
research into empathy and people's ability to judge others. 
2.3.2 Our ability to iudge others accurately 
The issue of judgement accuracy built on questions about how 
we recognise emotion and what factors may enhance the correct 
judgement of emotion. In fact the thinking behind much of the emotion 
research, that there is a criterion which is compared with a judgement, 
was transposed to the accuracy issue and person perception generally. 
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Although from the early twenties there were a number of 
researchers interested in how we evaluate others (e.g., Adams, 1927; 
Newcomb, 1931; Thorndike, 1920) it was in the forties and fifties that 
the issue of accuracy formed the basis of most person perception 
research. An assumption of this research was that some people are 
better judges than others and that there are benefits to knowing the 
qualities which define a good judge. 
Understanding the ability to infer another's attributes and 
characteristics accurately had wide appeal in clinical, educational and 
social settings. For example, questions about leadership qualities and 
whether leadership ability was associated with the accurate judgement 
of others were raised. In areas of personnel selection, the correct 
judgement of others was and remains an important issue (Tagiuri, 
1968). 
Research regarding judgement ability usually involved judges 
and others to be judged - the targets. Three important considerations 
in this research are: 1) how is the target information going to be 
presented to the judge? 2) how will judgement be made? and 3) how is 
the accuracy of the judge's response determined? Target information 
was presented in a multitude of ways. Many of the techniques found 
their origin in the emotion recognition research. Information about the 
target was controlled through photographs, handwriting and drawings 
or was relatively uncontrolled with friends and/or acquaintances 
judging each other (e.g., Dymond, 1949, 1950) or being judged by a 
teacher (Cook, 1979). Tape-recorded interviews and filmed interviews 
(Cline, 1964) were also used. 
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The diverse techniques used to present target information were 
matched by the variety of judgement techniques incorporated in the 
research (see Cook, 1979, for a more detailed discussion). Common 
ways to measure judgements were: 
1) free description where, for example, the response could be a single 
word or written description. The qualitative nature of these 
descriptions made scoring difficult; 
2) matching information about the target with other information 
provided. An example of matching was where judges had to match 
mosaic designs to the subjects who created them (e.g., Taft, 1956); 
3) ranking or rating subjects in terms of some particular trait they 
were judged to have (e.g. intelligence, extroversion). Subjects were 
also asked to rank or rate themselves on similar dimensions; 
4) multiple choice techniques where, based on the information 
available, a judgement regarding the course of action a target would 
take was required. A similar approach was to get judges to decide 
what response the target gave on a particular inventory. The question 
of whether judges are supposed to respond in the way the target should 
or would respond is a source of confusion with this measure. 
However, the most difficult and controversial aspect of this 
research was the definition of an accurate judgement. Some common 
strategies used to determine "the correct answer" were through: 1) 
rankings or ratings by a group who knew the target; 2) use of expert 
opinion (there is mixed evidence regarding whether experts have 
superior judgements); 3) comparisons between the target's self-rating 
or ranking and that of the judges; 4) use of intelligence and personality 
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tests which are interpreted as assessing "the true person". 
Vernon's (1933) study is a good example of the application of 
different research methods and the type of conclusions reached. In this 
study subjects rated on a number of different tests, themselves, others 
they knew well and strangers. Vernon believed that a variety of tests 
was necessary to assess personality and to determine the correctness of 
judgements. Tests included were intelligence, Rorschach inkblots, and 
matching of such things as character sketches, handwriting and 
artwork to photographs of strangers. Judges' ability was assessed by 
comparing their scores with the subjects' scores on the tests. The 
results revealed three types of judges, differentiated by whether they 
were judging themselves, a stranger or an acquaintance. For example, 
good judges of self had high abstract intelligence and moderate artistic 
ability, whereas good raters of friends were less intelligent and more 
artistic. Vernon concluded that "it is not possible to discuss the 
characteristics of the good and bad judge of personality in general" 
(Vernon, 1933, p. 56). 
A number of other studies revealed factors which mediated 
successful judgements. Amongst many others, factors included 
interest in the rating procedure (e.g., Conrad, 1933), the visibility of 
the trait being judged (e.g., Estes, 1938), the importance of the trait to 
the interpersonal judge/target relationship (e.g., Chowdhry and 
Newcombe, 1952), the degree of similarity between the judge and 
target (e.g., Fiedler, 1958), and confidence in the judgement. Some 
researchers concluded based on such results that there was an 
intuitive ability used to judge others which led to accurate impressions 
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(e.g., Cline & Richards, 1960) while others proposed that evidence of 
accuracy was limited (e.g., Hollingworth, 1911; Vernon, 1933). Others 
also argued that accuracy depended on the judgement task and could 
be a composite of various abilities (e.g., Allport, 1937). 
G. W. Allport (1937), in a review of the literature, drew some 
widely accepted conclusions regarding research into the ability to judge 
others (see also Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Taft, 1955). Allport concluded 
that: 
It would be unreasonable ... to expect a judge of people to be 
uniformly successful in estimating every quality of every person 
... It seems more of an error, however, to consider the ability 
entirely specific than to consider it entirely general. (p. 517) 
Allport also differentiated between predictions associated with the 
average of a group (generalised other) and individuals. A number of 
later researchers have differentiated between perceiving persons and 
groups. Gage and Cronbach (1955) argued that the difference between 
what have been termed stereotype accuracy and differential accuracy 
was that: 
the former refers to the individual's ability to predict the pooled 
responses of a given category of persons, whereas the latter 
refers to his ability to differentiate among individuals within the 
category. (p. 417) 
Cline and Richards (1960) found that judging the generalised 
other and sensitivity to individual differences were two components of 
accurate person perception but that they were independent (see also 
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Gage, 1952; Tagiuri, 1968). Being a good judge is seen to be based on 
having an "accurate stereotype", being able to "predict specific 
differences between individuals", or both (Cline & Richards, 1960, p. 5). 
Taft (1955) also expressed the view that "judgements may often be 
made correctly by using cultural stereotype responses without 
attempting to predict the responses of the particular [subject]" (p. 3). 
Stone, Gage and Leavitt (1957) found that the ability to judge 
individual differences and the ability to judge the generalised other 
were negatively correlated. In the next chapter the distinction 
between individuated and stereotypic impressions will be discussed in 
greater detail. It is clear that in terms of being able to judge others 
these two aspects of social perception are distinguished. 
Evidence that the use of stereotypes could affect the ability to 
judge others is only one of the methodological issues raised by early 
person perception work. Research of the kind reviewed in this section 
declined substantially from the mid-fifties, mainly as a result of 
methodological difficulties, and in reaction to a paper by Cronbach 
(1955), to which we now turn. 
2.3.3 Cronbach's critique of early person perception research 
Cronbach published a paper in 1955 which had a significant 
impact on the direction of person perception work. The way that 
judges' ability to perceive others was assessed - the accuracy of the 
judgement - formed the basis of Cronbach's critique. As highlighted 
above, a number of different methods were used to measure the judge's 
inference and to measure factual information about the target person 
being perceived. A composite score which combined results across 
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various judgement measures was used to determine how well a judge 
could perceive the abilities of others. The overall discrepancy between 
a target's description (the criterion) and a judge's set of predictions (the 
judgement) formed the basis of the main accuracy score (Cronbach, 
1955). Cronbach's problem with this form of measurement was that 
"any index combining results from heterogeneous items presents 
serious difficulties in interpretation ... Effects which operate differently 
on the several factors may be masked" (1955, p. 178). 
Cronbach went on to identify four components affecting the level 
and size of deviations which were ignored by the general accuracy 
score. Most of the issues concerned judges over- or underestimating a 
particular trait, generally across targets or in a constant direction. 
Cronbach (1958) stated that a number of factors needed to be taken 
into account including "the traits being perceived, the constant 
tendencies in this perceiver with respect to those traits and finally the 
effect of the particular other as a social stimulus to this perceiver" (p. 
376-7). 
Cronbach (1955) also made a number of recommendations for 
further investigation. He argued that there are two concerns in the 
study of perception - constant and variable processes. When the 
emphasis is on "interpreting the expressive cues [a person] presents 
the search is clearly for a variable process" (p. 190). The focus is on the 
judge's sensitivity to individual difference. The judge is required to 
respond to the target as a stimulus and the fact "that the perceptual 
response also depends on stereotypes in the [judge's] mind" (p. 190) is 
ignored. The constant processes are concerned with the "[judge's] 
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perceptual space, studied as a whole" which includes "information on 
his stereotype and his assumed dispersion" and also on the way "he 
organises the field of personality." (p. 191) 
Cronbach (1955) argued that in order to understand the way we 
judge others we need to be aware of the constant aspects inherent in 
the perceiver which affect her or his judgement. For example, if a 
perceiver always overestimated the degree to which the target has 
particular traits then this is a constant variable associated with that 
perceiver. These constant person specific aspects of judgement can, in 
Cronbach's view, be identified, controlled and overcome. Cronbach 
(1955) clarified his position on constant and variable processes in 
person perception when he stated that: 
Constant processes in the perceiver have potentially great 
importance because they affect all his acts of perception. 
Individual differences in constant processes need to be measured 
dependably so that their influence can be discounted in studies of 
variable processes. Moreover, identifying constant errors should 
permit training to eliminate such biases. (p. 190, emphasis in the 
original) 
In this quotation an implicit but recurring theme in person perception 
research is explicitly stated. Cronbach is discussing mechanisms to 
calibrate person perception so that the same stimulus will elicit the 
same response across perceivers. Individual variations are seen as 
"errors" and "biases" which need to be "eliminated". 
Similarities can be seen between Cronbach's argument and the 
following statement from Sarbin et al. (1960) which refers to the 
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implications of the perceiver (or analyst as described in clinical terms) 
and the perceived sharing the same context: 
Not only does the analyst have to take into account any overt 
behavior which he might have elicited by his own presence or by 
his attempt to "pull" material from the object, but he must also 
try to take into account any controls that the object-person 
imposes upon his "normal" emission of acts. (p. 14, emphasis in 
the original) 
The point is that the influence of the perceiver needs to be 
accounted for so the "normal" actions of the perceived can be observed. 
The message in both of these quotes is that factors which make human 
perception variable, perceiver-specific and situation-specific need to be 
identified, controlled and factored out of the impression formed in 
order to understand person perception. Person perception is, clearly, 
not understood as an interaction between people in a particular 
situation. Perceivers are not seen to have goals, motives or experiences 
which may form an integral part of the person perception process. 
Person perception is both theoretically and empirically interpreted as a 
process which should result in direct correspondence between the 
target and what is perceived. 
The assumption that person perception was accurate if it 
converged on one, absolute standard impression of the stimulus person 
is rarely directly identified or discussed in the early person perception 
research. The main reason for this is that this assumption was 
inextricably enmeshed with the early work on person perception itself. 
However, the following comment on methodological difficulties by 
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Tagiuri (1958) alludes to this assumption: 
even though the problem ofveridicality is fraught with enormous 
difficulties the difficulties involved in defining what the other 
person is like do not justify the complete evasion of the problem 
of specifying the nature of the stimulus person. (p. xvi, emphasis 
in the original) 
The use of validated personality and intelligence tests, expert 
judgements and ratings by those familiar to the target are also 
testimony to the belief that accuracy is defined in terms of the stimulus 
- the individual person. The assumption is that these measures will 
provide an absolute standard against which to compare perceivers' 
responses. If the judgement does not equate with the criterion then it 
is the perceiver who is considered biased and distorted. The research 
obsession with identifying a "good" judge also indicates that accuracy is 
defined as being external to the perceiver. Meanwhile, broader 
fundamental questions about the nature and role of person perception 
are neglected. It is simply assumed that the perceiver is a passive 
filter for information in the stimulus environment (Hilton & Darley, 
1991). 
The issue of accuracy raised in early person perception research 
was eventually largely abandoned because of methodological 
difficulties, and the focus shifted to an examination of the impression 
formation process (see Chapter 3). A clear message of Cronbach's 
(1955) paper, which was heeded by some, was that conclusions based 
on early person perception research needed to be interpreted with 
caution. However, research on the ability to judge others did continue 
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(e.g., Funder, 1995). Researchers used different methods of assessing 
correspondence between the judgement and criterion, such as 
standardised scores and correlations as Cronbach suggested. Others 
have developed scores such as the interpersonal accuracy score and the 
refined difference score. Research also uses correlations and ranking 
methods (e.g., Cook & Smith, 1974). Another fruitful direction of 
research involved identifying perceivers' specific implicit personality 
theories (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; see also Heider, 1958; Hamilton, 
Katz & Leirer, 1980, for a review). 
However, Cronbach's (1955) paper does enable an assessment of 
the theoretical assumptions inherent in the research after Darwin's 
first experiments. A basis of this research was that there was a simple 
correspondence between the perceived and the perceiver. Because 
accuracy was defined in terms of the stimulus, factors inherent in 
human perception such as mutual influence and individual variability 
needed to be understood and restrained. However, these assumptions 
were starting to be challenged. For example, Gage and Cronbach 
(1955) identified a need to shift from focusing on the stimulus in 
person perception. They commented, "it seems at present we shall not 
need to go far to find the perceiver rather than the stimulus 
determining the perception" (Gage & Cronbach, 1955, p. 420-421; see 
also Tajfel, 1968). Indeed, the perceiver became the central focus of the 
"New Look" tradition in perception (Bruner, 1957a, 1957b) which is 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, questions about the role of the perceiver m social 
perception were already being asked in other literatures. The focus in 
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stereotyping research, for example, was much more on the perceiver 
from the outset. Stereotypes were inherently seen as distorted 
representations which challenged researchers to explain why 
perception occurred in this way. The next section summarises the 
main developments and themes in early stereotyping research. 
2.4 Early approaches to stereotyping 
There are two significant points, from the perspective of this 
thesis, which emerge from early stereotyping research. The first is 
that it is in the stereotyping literature that significant developments 
are made regarding the role of the perceiver in social perception. The 
second point is that the stereotyping literature faces a constant 
paradox in trying to explain how stereotypes can be meaningful to the 
perceiver but also have such dramatic (usually negative) consequences 
for those that are stereotyped. A number of the early explanations 
seem to absolve the perceiver from the fact that they stereotype others. 
For example, stereotypes have been argued to be the unintentional 
product of a faulty cognitive mechanism. 
Since stereotypes were first identified and studied they have 
generally been understood as distorted and erroneous perceptions of 
others, a view which still taints current impression formation models. 
In the work of Sherif and Asch important shifts occurred in the way 
stereotypes and the stereotyping process were understood. These 
shifts were instrumental in the development of a different 
understanding of social perception which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. Given the relevance to current work, both the assumptions 
of distortion and the work of Sherif and Asch are outlined sequentially 
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in this section. 
2.4.1 Are stereotypes distorted representations? 
The notions of distortion, exaggeration and accentuation are 
common themes in stereotyping research. From the outset stereotypes 
have been seen to exaggerate reality. Lippmann, who originally 
defined stereotypes, wrote in his book Public Opinion that stereotypes: 
mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasising the 
difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, 
and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. (1922, p. 59) 
Inherent in his work was the idea that stereotypes do not reflect 
reality. Lippmann also made an early statement of a still highly 
influential idea that individual person-based perception is the ideal. 
He argued that "there is no shortcut through, and no substitute for, an 
individualized understanding" (p. 59). The theme that stereotypes do 
not reflect, but exaggerate reality, has shaped stereotyping research. 
In particular, Lippmann's view that stereotypes were influenced by the 
biases of the stereotyper fuelled research in this area. 
Initial investigations concerned the content of stereotypes and 
whether stereotypes were based on "objective" fact (see Oakes et al., 
1994, Chapter 2 for a review). As in person perception research, a 
common tool was to have subjects assess photographs and describe 
their impressions (Rice, 1926-7; Litterer, 1933). The use of 
photographs was thought to minimise the influence of the perceiver on 
the perceived. Typically subjects matched the depiction with "social 
types" and attributed personality characteristics on this basis. Rice 
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used nine photographs selected from newspapers and asked subjects to 
match each of the photographs to one of nine labels (e.g., a Labor 
leader, a European premier, a manufacturer). The findings indicated 
that subjects successfully matched the picture and the label at a rate 
better than chance. Further, even when the match was incorrect there 
was a high degree of agreement between subjects. Depictions were 
found to be rated differently depending on whether they were 
identified correctly or not. Rice concluded that the results supported 
the "existence of common stereotypes concerning the appearance of 
various classes of persons" (1928, p. 67). 
Another study which looked at the impact of stereotypes on 
impressions was conducted by Razran (1950). Subjects had to rate 
thirty photographs of ethnically ambiguous women on a number of 
personality and behavioural dimensions. The process was repeated 
two months later, but this time the photographs were labelled with last 
names which connoted ethnic group membership (surnames such as 
O'Brien, d'Angelo, Rabinowitz). The labelling of the photographs 
drastically affected the impressions of the women's character with the 
development of more stereotypic responses. 
A more "real life" technique to investigate stereotype content 
was used by LaPiere (1936) who like others was interested in whether 
objective evidence justified stereotypic beliefs. He investigated 
whether the prevailing stereotype held by Californians in Fresno 
County of the Armenians (that they were "dishonest, lying, deceitful") 
matched the "facts". Results were that Armenians' credit ratings were 
found to be equivalent to those of other groups, while they were less 
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likely to receive charity and appear in court cases. 
Evidence that stereotypes, as Lippmann had argued, did not 
reflect absolute facts about groups was also provided by studies such as 
that by Shrieke (1936). Shrieke assessed how the American Chinese 
were represented at two points in time. During the prosperous time 
following the civil-war American Chinese were represented as "'thrifty', 
'sober', 'tractable', 'inoffensive', 'law-abiding"' but later leading into the 
depression (1869-73) they were portrayed as "'clannish', 'dangerous', ... 
'criminal', 'secretive', ... 'debased' and 'servile"' (p. 11). It was suggested 
that these results indicated the inaccuracy of stereotypes because it 
was unlikely that the character of the Chinese had in effect changed so 
dramatically (e.g., Harding, Kutner, Proshansky & Chein, 1954; 
Kline berg, 1951). However, the results of studies such as Shrieke's can 
also be interpreted as reflecting the relationship between stereotypes 
and intergroup relations (see page 25 of this chapter). 
Throughout the 1950s researchers began to conclude, on the 
basis of studies like those above, that there was limited evidence to 
support stereotypes having a factual basis. The two following 
quotations are typical of the attitude at the time. Schoenfield (1942) 
stated "to the extent that a stereotype corresponds to objective facts, it 
is not a stereotype at all" (p. 12). Zawadzki (1942) made a very clear 
assertion that stereotypes do not correspond with known facts about 
groups in the following comment: 
The stereotype as a concept of what is a typical member of a 
group is a very poor device in thinking ... [T]raits are selected, 
not because they are actually most often found among members 
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of the group, but because they serve best the malicious intent of 
ridiculing or discrediting the group. (p. 130) 
The recognition that stereotypes did not "reflect objective facts " 
and were a "poor" way of thinking, motivated researchers towards 
trying to understand the process responsible for such erroneous 
representations. Stereotypes were widely considered to be the product 
of a "faulty process" (Fishman, 1956), the result of an "inferior 
judgement process" (Bogardus, 1950; Hayakawa, 1950). The typical 
view is reflected in the position of Centers (1951) who argued that 
stereotypes "constitute one of the clearest examples we have of socially 
and culturally acquired cognitive structures which shape perception 
and thought in their own distorted image" (p. 41). Also in this vein, 
Fishman (1956) stated that "the oldest and still the most widely 
ascribed attribute of stereotypes is their alleged content of error and 
distortion" (p. 28). 
Ways to counteract this faulty process became the focus of 
research. If the nature and extent of the distortion inherent in 
stereotypes could be identified, it was believed possible to develop 
mechanisms designed to overcome stereotype deficiency. There was a 
strong belief among researchers at this time that it was necessary to 
determine the "objective" characteristics of different groups. These 
facts could then provide a base from which to assess stereotype 
deficiencies and better understand the processes involved. In line with 
this new mentality Klineberg (1951) stated that "every stereotype must 
be examined in order to determine its relation to objective reality" (p. 
51). Fishman (1956) clearly articulated a need for a "scientific study of 
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national character" which would provide a mechanism "to study the 
incidence of 'kernels of truths' in the stereotypes subscribed to by 
various populations" (p. 29-30). Fishman wanted to see the 
development of reliable data concerning "the dominant personality 
clusters, the values, customs and goals of the peoples of the world, 
according to age, sex, educational, occupational, and other pertinent 
breakdowns" (1956, p. 29-30). 
So around the 1950s two messages emerged in social perception 
research. In terms of person perception, Cronbach argued that factors 
which caused perceivers to vary in their impressions should be 
identified and overcome. In stereotyping research there was a move to 
measure the objective characteristics of groups so distortions by 
perceivers, their stereotypes, could be identified and understood. At 
this time the idea of correspondence between stimulus and perceiver, 
and the associated assumption that all perceivers should see the world 
in the same way, was a major, if implicit theme in social perception. 
Researchers were trying to identify the variables which distort the 
reception of stimulus information so that these distortions could be 
minimised. 
By the 1960s there was widespread agreement that the task of 
assessing stereotype validity was far more difficult than researchers 
like Fishman had envisaged. A number of studies had generated 
mixed findings regarding the "kernel of truth" hypothesis, and 
identification of the real characteristics of groups was difficult and ill 
conceived. Some research demonstrated that stereotypes did have 
some validity and others concluded the contrary (see Oakes et al., 1994 
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for a review; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997). The research is characterised 
by conditional appraisals like Schuman's (1966) assessment that 
stereotypes have a greater chance of being accurate if they are 
favourable and refer to a group which is stable over time. Likewise, 
Triandis and Vassiliou (1967) concluded that "there is a 'kernel of 
truth' in most stereotypes when they are elicited from people who have 
first hand knowledge of the group being stereotyped" (p. 324). 
At the end of the 1960s many issues remained unresolved 
concerning the nature of stereotypes. However, there was wide 
support for the view that stereotypes were distorted images which 
misrepresented others. Stereotypes were also understood to be the 
product of a faulty process which in order to deal with complexity 
focused on simplification. Research in this vein expanded with the 
movement towards understanding cognitive processes in social 
perception (see Chapter 4). 
In this early period questions about the content of stereotypes, 
the existence of a kernel of truth and the related notion of establishing 
objective, group information were not the only focus of stereotyping 
researchers. A minority of researchers were disputing the dissociation 
between stereotypes and reality. Researchers like Asch and Sherif, 
argued that stereotypes may be valid representations. 
2.4.2 Stereotypes as valid representations 
There was some evidence that stereotypes could vary in relation 
to real world events. For some researchers, such as Asch and Sherif, 
the suggestion that stereotypes were based on the relationships 
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between groups raised questions about whether stereotypes were 
distorted. Aspects of their theoretical analyses will be outlined, 
analyses in which the role of the perceiver in the stereotyping process 
is explicitly recognised. First, a number of studies which indicated the 
dynamic nature of stereotypes and stereotype content are described. 
A relationship between the content of stereotypes and the nature 
of group interaction was observed by a number of researchers. For 
example, Seago (194 7) assessed the stereotypes Americans had of the 
Japanese, Americans, Germans and Negroes throughout the main 
years of WWII from 1941 to 1945. While the stereotypes of the 
Americans and Negroes were relatively stable over this period those of 
the Germans and Japanese changed considerably. Prothro and 
Melikian's (1955) study provided further evidence of stereotypes 
changing with changes in intergroup relations. They examined the 
stereotypes Arab students had of Americans at the University of Beirut 
at a time when American presence in the city was increasing. 
Americans were seen as more sociable and superficial while 
interestingly, the content of stereotypes associated with other groups 
did not significantly change. At a time when there was a border 
dispute between China and India there was also evidence that the 
Indians' stereotype of the Chinese in particular changed (Sinha & 
Upadhyaya, 1960). Chinese who were up until that time seen as 
artistic, industrious and friendly were then perceived as aggressive, 
selfish and cruel. 
The link between stereotypes and intergroup relations was also 
solidified through Sherifs boys' camp studies (Sherif, 1961, 1967). A 
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summer camp, attended by Grade 11 and 12 boys, was the setting for a 
number of studies. The boys were screened to be from stable families 
and of similar racial, religious and class backgrounds. As part of the 
camp activities they participated in three experimental phases: group 
formation, intergroup conflict and conflict reduction. 
At the time of arrival the boys were separated into two groups 
where norms and different cultures soon developed in each group. 
Competitive interaction between the groups was planned to facilitate 
increased levels of intergroup conflict. The groups had to compete for a 
goal which both groups valued. Negative attitudes developed quickly 
leading Sherif to conclude that the "existence of two groups competing 
for goals that only one group could attain" (1967, p. 85) was sufficient 
for the formation of negative stereotypes to develop. In the conflict 
reduction phase a number of activities were designed where the groups 
had to work together to achieve the desired outcome. Through the 
introduction of superordinate goals Sherif was able to show change in 
the content of stereotypes and a reduction of prejudice. 
Sherif formulated a theory of intergroup relations in which 
stereotypes were seen as "images shared ... by large numbers of 
persons belonging to the same human groupings" (Sherif, 1967, p. 234). 
He did not accept the view that stereotypes were false or wrong 
because he believed this "evades the issue of stereotype formation by 
definition" (p. 23). Sherifs findings suggest that stereotypes are not 
inevitably fixed or rigid but flexible, reflecting the relationship between 
groups. He also emphasised the relative nature of stereotypes when he 
argued that the stereotypes of other groups will be shaped by the way 
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people define themselves and their own group's values. 
The boys' camp studies also provided evidence that "normal" 
schoolboys could develop negative stereotypes about, and show 
prejudice towards, other people as a result of intergroup conflict. 
Sherif was not only able to provide an explanation of the way 
stereotypes are cultivated and changed but he also developed a 
theoretical understanding of stereotyping. Asch (1952) was another 
researcher at the time who developed a distinct, comprehensive theory 
of impression formation. An overview is provided here; the detail of his 
models will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Asch, like Sherif, argued against the v1ew of stereotypes as 
distorted representations. He argued that there was evidence that 
stereotypes both were and were not factually based. In some instances 
there was evidence of a "kernel of truth", and Asch suggested that to 
the extent that there is evidence of validity it is incorrect to use the 
term "stereotype" because it incorporates an intrinsic assumption "that 
every view of groups is subjective and wrong. Instead of asking how 
inadequate social ideas are formed the investigations emphasise the 
fact that they are inadequate and conclude feebly that it is the product 
of an inherent tendency in individuals" (Asch, 1952, p. 234). 
Asch, endeavoured to answer a different question about 
stereotypes which distinguished him from many of his peers. Instead 
of accepting that stereotypes were the product of a faulty process, Asch 
emphasised the need to assess the conditions that "further or hamper 
the growth of adequate views" (1952, p. 235; see also Vinacke, 1956, 
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1957). Importantly, the process of forming impressions of complex 
groups was seen to be "a process quite similar in certain respects to 
forming impressions of persons" (1952, p. 234). Asch also endorsed the 
validity of forming impressions of others based on their group 
membership: 
Observing the distortion that follows from merging individuals 
with their groups, some have counseled that it is misleading to 
judge persons in terms of group relations and that the canons of 
objectivity require of us to understand persons first and foremost 
as individuals. It is correct to urge that we should strive to see 
persons in their uniqueness. But it is wrong to assume that we 
can best achieve a correct view of a person by ignoring his group 
relations. (p. 238) 
Within the stereotyping literature from the outset there has 
been a belief that we should "understand persons first and foremost as 
individuals" and that to form impressions of others in terms of their 
group memberships is "misleading" because stereotyping is an "inferior 
judgement processes". Stereotypes have been explained as helpful 
mechanisms to deal with a complex world. The idea that simplification 
equals distortion was questioned by Asch (1952, p. 235): 
Simplified impressions are a first step toward understanding the 
surrounding and towards establishing clear, meaningful views. 
Simplification often helps us to see an entire situation clearly, to 
overcome the bewilderment and confusion of numerous detail. 
Asch's views regarding impression formation and stereotyping 
were not widely accepted and the idea that stereotypes were the 
product of a faulty process continued to be widely embraced. Research 
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examining issues of error and distortion merged with a shift in focus in 
the 1960s and 1970s towards a cognitive approach to stereotyping. A 
recognition that simplification and distortion were not the product of a 
faulty process but a necessary product of the cognitive system emerged. 
These assumptions form the basis of current impression formation 
models and will be explored in detail in the next chapter. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored early approaches to social perception, 
including both person perception and stereotyping research. Social 
perception research generally has been shaped by assumptions 
associated with the differentiation between object and person 
perception. Three areas of person perception research were discussed: 
recognition of emotion, ability to judge others and Cronbach's critique. 
Initially, research questions and methods of investigation in person 
perception built upon Darwin's theoretical ideas about recognition of 
emotion, biological determinism and the fact that the stimulus drives 
the perception process. 
Interest in the second area, our ability to judge others, and 
evidence that this ability was not homogeneous, generated a greater 
awareness of the role of the perceiver in person perception. However, 
underlying questions about "accurate" impression formation, 
particularly whether accuracy should be exclusively defined in terms of 
the individual person, were never explicitly asked or addressed. 
Instead it was argued by researchers like Cronbach that influences 
inherent in the perceiver ("biases" and "errors") needed to be identified 
so they could be controlled and factored into understanding our 
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perceptions of others. Information about the individual person, "out 
there" independent of the perceiver, is unquestionably seen as 
accurate. Person perception is defined in terms of the "character of the 
beheld". 
The issue of bias and misrepresentation is also evident 
throughout the early stereotyping work. Stereotypes themselves were 
defined as simplified representations of others, as "pictures in our 
heads that are essentially incorrect, inaccurate, contrary to fact, and, 
therefore, undesirable" (Fishman, 1956, p. 28). Stereotypes were 
clearly recognised as being "in the eye of the beholder" (Dornbusch, 
Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy & Vreeland, 1965; Miller, 1982). Evidence 
that stereotypes changed when the relationship between groups 
changed challenged the view that stereotypes were entirely "contrary 
to fact" and a different interpretation of the stereotyping process 
emerged. Perception and representation of these group differences 
were not viewed as inherently "inaccurate" but as potentially valid and 
meaningful. The challenge in social perception is to explain how 
stereotypes can be valid but at times so disagreeable. 
In summary, this chapter has reviewed evidence that accurate 
impressions are understood as those that correspond to a defined 
measure of a particular individual. The predominate view of 
stereotypes in this early research was that they were distorted and 
simplified representations of others. Both these themes reflect an 
individualistic analysis of social perception, where social perception is 
defined in terms of the individual and the reality of groups is denied. 
These themes are reflected in the impression formation models 
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detailed in the next chapter. 
In this chapter a minority v1ew regarding the validity of 
stereotypes as the meaningful representation of groups was also 
outlined. This research is revisited when an alternative view of 
impression formation and social perception is developed and elaborated 
in Chapter 5. It becomes clear that the early social perception research 
has coloured and shaped a variety of current perspectives. 
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Chapter3 
THE TURN TO PROCESS: THE CONFIGURAU 
ELEMENTAL CONTROVERSY 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, two of the three aspects in mainstream 
person perception research were outlined: recognition of emotion and 
ability to judge others accurately. In this chapter a third area, 
characterised by an emphasis on the impression formation process, is 
the focus. Importantly, subsequent to Cronbach's critique of the 
person perception literature there was a shift in the type of research 
questions that were investigated, such that the way in which we form 
impression of others and consolidate complexities into unified 
impressions became central issues. 
A number of models have been developed which attempt to 
address the impression formation process. Two of the more popular 
earlier models of impression formation were Asch's (1946) configura! 
model and Anderson's (e.g., 1974) weighted averages model. The 
central issue which differentiated these models and framed much of 
the subsequent research was whether or not information about people's 
characteristics had meaning independent of contextual factors, such as 
the other information available to the perceiver. For example, does our 
impression of the attribute "closeknit" vary depending on whether we 
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are describing an Australian or Vietnamese family? Does "polite" 
mean something different when describing a hotel employee or doctor? 
Often when we form impressions of others we take into account many 
different pieces of information, which may impact on each other. For 
example, is our impression of someone who is artistic also influenced 
by the fact that we know they are, on the one hand, unruly and rash or 
on the other, tolerant and responsible? Whether or not contextual 
factors affect impression formation is probably the most widely 
investigated question in the impression formation literature and is a 
question fundamental to how categorization and social cognition are 
understood. 
As will be seen in the progression of this chapter most of the 
impression formation research in the 1970s was directed at asserting 
either the Asch or the Anderson explanation of the impression 
formation process over the other. Eventually some researchers 
attempted to settle the debate by arguing that both models could be 
relevant to different impression formation situations. These 
developments have led to the current state of affairs where both Asch's 
and Anderson's work are generally incorporated in contemporary 
models of impression formation. These modern integrations have also 
built on some of the underlying issues and assumptions inherent in 
these earlier models. For this reason Asch's and Anderson's work is 
reviewed in detail before two contemporary impression formation 
models are outlined- Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model and 
Brewer's (1988) dual process model. 
Both of these modern integrations by Brewer (1988) and Fiske 
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and Neuberg (1990) propose two impression formation processes, one 
used when stereotypic impressions are formed and another thought to 
underlie individuated impression formation. Asch's work is drawn on 
to support the former, where a stereotype or category label is used to 
shape the impression and interpret other available information. 
Anderson initially investigated whether attributes had value and 
meaning independent of contextual factors and this aspect of his work 
has been drawn on to support the view that individuated impressions 
can be formed through the isolated summation of independent traits. 
Controversy surrounds the issue of whether such a categorization-free 
impression formation process exists, in which attributes are combined 
in isolation in an attribute-by-attribute manner. For this reason it is 
the evidence cited to support such a categorization-free process which 
receives the most detailed attention in this chapter. The chapter 
concludes with a broader analysis of whether impressions can be 
formed through the isolated categorization-free summation of 
information about others. Assumptions regarding the categorization 
process are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
3.2 Impression formation and the meaning change debate 
A large proportion of research in the impression formation area 
has focused on whether traits change their meaning in relation to the 
other traits with which they are compared. Most of this research 
draws on Asch's configura! model and Anderson's weighted averages 
model. Both Asch's and Anderson's work is reviewed prior to a 
discussion of more recent developments in the impression formation 
literature. 
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3.2.1 The Configura! model 
One of the most influential p1eces of research on social 
perception and impression formation was conducted by Asch (1946), 
and reported in an article titled "Forming impressions of personality." 
In this article three ways of describing the process of impression 
formation were highlighted: 1) the elemental view; 2) use of a general 
impression; and 3) the configura! model. 
The first, the "elemental view" is where an impression is formed 
through the summation of the independent impressions formed of 
particular traits. An impression of a person could be described in 
terms of the summation of the impression of friendly plus the 
impression of courteous plus the impression of superficial and so on 
(Asch, 1946 p. 259). In other words, the impressions from each of the 
traits are combined in isolation. The assumption underlying this 
elemental view is that friendly or courteous or superficial can have 
some sort of fixed, context independent meaning. Asch (1952) 
suggested that although the elemental position was important in the 
thinking of the time it was "doubtful that any psychologist would at 
present defend this position in its strict form" (p. 207). 
The second method of impression formation outlined by Asch 
(1946) was also fundamentally elemental in nature. In addition to the 
summation of individual traits it included the influence of a general 
impression. The general impression is seen as an "affective force 
possessing a plus or minus direction which shifts the evaluation of the 
several traits" (p. 259). So the general impression can affect the 
direction of the impression and therefore can influence how particular 
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traits are interpreted. Asch points out that the general impression in 
this model is often interpreted as a source of error in the impression 
formation process which "should be supplanted by the attitude of 
judging each trait in isolation" (p. 260). This model is underpinned by 
an assumption that the true impression of a particular trait is one 
made in the abstract and in isolation. 
The third model Asch (1946) described was labelled the "Gestalt 
formulation" or "configura! model", and was clearly distinct from the 
elemental position. From this perspective an impression is based on 
the relationship among traits and the final impression goes beyond the 
information given, beyond impressions formed from the separate traits: 
"we see a person consisting not of these and those independent traits ... 
but we try to get to the root of the personality. This would involve that 
the traits are perceived in relation to each other" (p. 259). There is an 
emphasis on forming an holistic impression of the entire person. Asch 
was interested in the Gestalt perspective, specifically how one 
developed an integrated impression of a person formed from several, 
perhaps discordant, characteristics. Later Asch emphasised that the 
premise underlying all impression formation was a belief that people 
are psychological units and that resolving conflict or discordant 
information only made sense in terms of this background of anticipated 
unity (Asch & Zukier, 1984; see also Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). 
Asch's (1946) research supported the configura! model and the 
methodology he used has been widely replicated in a range of 
impression formation studies. A typical method is to provide subjects 
with a list of adjectives which supposedly describe a particular person 
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or group. The use of trait lists is often disassociated from the message 
of Asch's research that the "characteristics forming the basis of an 
impression do not contribute each a fixed, independent meaning, but 
that their content is itself partly a function of the environment of the 
other characteristics, of their mutual relations" (p. 268). 
In Asch's (1946) studies subjects were asked to listen carefully as 
the list of adjectives was read aloud and to form an impression of the 
person described. The characteristics read to the subjects were 
systematically varied across conditions and comparisons were made 
between the impressions formed by each of the groups. Asch commonly 
used two kinds of tasks to assess the impact of traits on the impression 
formed of a particular person. One task involved subjects writing a 
characterisation of the person in a few sentences. The other task used 
a checklist of eighteen opposing adjective pairs (e.g., shrewd-wise) of 
which subjects had to select, from each pair, the adjective which was 
consistent with their impression of the person. 
In one of Asch's (1946) studies one group of subjects was given 
the trait list: intelligent, skilful, industrious, warm, determined, 
practical, cautious. Another group, in the same study, was given an 
identical list except the word "cold" was substituted for the word 
"warm". In another experiment exactly the same trait list was 
presented to subjects except in one condition the traits were given in 
the reverse order. In conditions where "warm" was included as a 
descriptive trait, impressions were more positive both in terms of the 
written descriptions and the traits selected from the trait list. Asch 
concluded that "these results show that a change in one character-
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quality has produced a widespread change in the entire impression" 
(1946, p. 264). Asch also found that the order of word presentation 
affected the overall impression; "the first terms set up in most subjects 
a direction which then exerts a continuous effect on the latter terms" 
(p. 271, emphasis in the original). 
Kelley (1950) replicated Asch's (1946) "warm-cold" study, 
replacing the trait lists with an actual person. A class of students were 
given information about a new instructor. This information was held 
constant, except that the instructor was described as a "very warm 
person" to half the class and to the other half of the class he was 
described as "rather cold". The instructor then engaged in a 20 minute 
discussion with the subjects. After the discussion subjects had to write 
a description of the instructor and complete a checklist compiled from 
15 traits. The results supported Asch's (1946) results with very 
different descriptions being formed by the two groups. The instructor 
was described in more positive terms as more sociable, polite and 
humorous by those subjects who had received the description "very 
warm person" compared with those who had received the description 
"rather cold". 
The findings from these types of studies led Asch to believe that 
there were central and peripheral traits and that some traits could 
influence the interpretation of others. For example, and based on 
results from a number of studies, warm and cold were argued to be 
central traits. Additional findings can be summarised as follows: 1) 
subjects attempt to integrate the characteristics to form an impression 
of the whole person; 2) the integration of traits leads to an impression 
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which is more than the sum of its parts (i.e., the words provided); 3) 
not all the traits weight equally in the impression formation process; 4) 
central traits set the direction of the impression and shape the 
interpretation of the peripheral traits; 5) the same trait could be 
central for one impression and peripheral for another, indicating that 
context affects the impression formation process (Asch, 1946). 
The most controversial finding based on Asch's (1946) configura! 
analysis was that forming an impression did not involve an assessment 
of each trait separately but that some traits - central traits - were used 
to make sense of other traits - peripheral traits (see also Asch & 
Zukier, 1984). The configura! model is supported by these findings and 
at the same time they are inconsistent with the elemental perspective. 
The issue of meaning change is fundamental to how the person 
perception process is understood. What does it mean to say someone is 
tough - does it mean they are physically strong and brutal or does it 
mean that they are able to make hard decisions? Would the perceiver 
be wrong if they interpreted tough as meaning "brutal" if they also 
knew that the person was aggressive, or to mean "making hard 
decisions" if they also knew the person was a company director? The 
answers to these questions depend on whether impression formation is 
seen as: 1) a matching process between an abstract definition and the 
impression the perceiver forms or 2) a dynamic interaction between the 
perceived and perceiver where meaning is derived from relative 
judgements dependent on contextual factors. 
The evidence presented by Asch is consistent with the latter 
answer and suggests that impression formation is a dynamic process. 
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However, although some authors support Asch's "shift in meaning" 
explanation, others have developed alternative analyses to account for 
meaning change. For example, "attention decrement" (Stewart, 1965), 
"discounting" of information (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965) and the halo 
explanation, where meaning is affected by the positivity or negativity 
of former words (Anderson & Lampel, 1965), have been proposed. 
Many of these alternative perspectives stem from the work of N. H. 
Anderson and are associated with the development of information 
integration theory. Information integration theory incorporates a 
weighted averages model which can be seen as a more modern 
incarnation of the elemental perspective articulated by Asch (1946). 
3.2.2 Information Integration theory 
Information integration theory builds on the elemental model 
and offers an alternative mechanism of impression formation to Asch's 
configura! approach. Anderson's work is used to support the view that 
impressions can be formed in a non-categorical attribute-by-attribute 
way. Statements like "people form impressions by combining (adding, 
averaging or otherwise) the isolated characteristics of the individual" 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1989, p. 83) are followed by reference to Anderson's 
work. 
Information integration theory v1ews the perce1ver as an 
integrator of information where stimuli are combined or integrated to 
produce a response. Much of the research associated with the theory 
has involved person perception because it provides a good example of 
the integration process (Anderson, 1974). Three basic aspects of the 
model are valuation, integration and assemblage. Valuation refers to 
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the processes associated with defining the stimulus parameters. 
Integration, as its name suggests, involves the process of combining 
stimuli to form an overall response (Anderson, 1974). Information 
attained through valuation and integration are combined through a 
process of construction known as assemblage (Anderson, 1988). 
Algebraic models are used to describe the integration process and 
predictions made by the model are compared with subjects' actual 
responses. Generally, mathematical models are not intended to 
describe what people are actually doing when they form impressions 
but may be best understood as predicting the outcome of a particular 
psychological process (Kashima & Kerekes, 1994). 
Anderson (1965) initially used algebraic models to compare two 
methods by which trait information could be combined to form 
impressions of others, through summation or averaging. The "additive 
model" equates with Asch's elemental model and involves the 
summation of traits. Each trait has a particular value which it 
contributes to the impression regardless of the other information 
available. Because the model is additive, when more information is 
available to the perceiver, the impression of the target should be more 
favourable. 
The "averaging model" involves the averaging of trait 
information so a trait can influence the overall impression differently 
depending on the other information available. If a trait is added which 
is more or less favourable in comparison to other traits the overall 
impression will be affected. For example if the traits "intelligent", 
"humorous" and "friendly" were all rated as being highly favourable 
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and were combined with the trait "aggressive" which was rated as less 
favourable the overall impression of the target would be less positive 
(Zebrowitz, 1990; see Kashima & Kerekes, 1994, for a more recent 
discussion of the averaging phenomena). 
Anderson (1965) developed a model to test both these accounts of 
impression formation. Two highly favourable traits (HH) were 
evaluated with two mildly favourable traits (M+M+). The additive 
model would predict that the evaluation of HHM+M+ would be more 
favourable than the HH evaluation because there is more positive 
information being used in impression formation. The averages model 
would predict that HHM+M+ would be evaluated less favourably than 
HH because the average value of the stimulus information would be 
reduced (Anderson, 197 4). The results supported an averages model 
and the effect has been widely replicated (e.g., Anderson & Lampel, 
1965; Kaplan, 1971). 
However, Anderson also found that a stimulus person described 
by four positive traits (HHHH) was not evaluated as positively as a 
person described by two positive traits (HH). This finding does not 
support the averages model because the average of four positive traits 
should be the same as the average of two positive traits. Anderson 
explained this finding by arguing that people start with an initial 
impression which becomes more positive or negative depending on the 
average of positive and negative stimuli (Hastorf et al., 1970). Asch 
(1946) as outlined above, also pointed out that in addition to the 
elemental summation of traits some researchers argued that a "general 
impression" could affect the direction in which particular traits are 
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evaluated. The initial or general impression is argued to influence the 
interpretation of traits which describe a particular stimulus person. 
In order to further investigate the averages model Anderson 
(1971) used the likeability ratings of 555 traits which he had published 
in 1968 and examined the contribution of traits to the overall 
likeability of a particular impression. The results indicated that the 
favourableness of a particular trait was not constant across 
presentation situations. In response to such findings Anderson 
extended the role of the initial impression to develop the weighted 
averages model. The contribution of a particular trait to the 
impression was argued to be weighted according to the trait's context-
free likeableness scale value and the overalllikeability of the stimulus 
person (Hamilton & Zanna, 1974). 
The weighted averages model reflects a significant development 
in the impression formation literature because there is evidence from 
both Asch's and Anderson's research which refutes the pure elemental 
model. Both models recognise that the overall impression can impact 
on the component trait information. The meaning a particular trait 
will have is determined by the overall impression in the configura! 
approach, and the overall impression determines part of the trait 
weight in the weighted averages model. In effect, both Asch and 
Anderson argued that attributes cannot be summed or averaged in 
isolation and that contextual factors do impact on the way an attribute 
is evaluated. 
However, there is still a major distinction between the configura! 
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and weighted averages models. Asch (1946) argued that the actual 
meaning of a particular trait could change depending on the other 
information available and the overall impression of the person. In 
contrast, the weighted averages model suggested that the trait weight 
could increase or decrease in value on a single dimension depending on 
the overall impression (Hinton, 1993). The weighted averages model 
maintains that traits have context-free value and that the overall 
impression only influences the generallikeability. 
A stream of articles in the 1970s pitted Anderson's and Asch's 
work against one another trying to discover how we form impressions 
of others and whether there is such a phenomenon as meaning change. 
Titles of papers like "weighted averages versus the meaning-change 
formulation", "two more tests against meaning change", and "further 
evidence for meaning change" express the research atmosphere 
(Ostrom, 1977). Change in connotative meaning was clearly the issue 
which differentiated the two models most and was the basis of much of 
the research. Because of the central role of the overall impression in 
both models researchers experienced immense difficulty devising a 
critical test to distinguish these theories empirically. 
Changes in the extent to which a particular trait was liked has 
been the main measure of whether there is actual meaning change or 
not in impression formation (for an exception see Hamilton & Zanna, 
1974). Researchers like Wyer and Watson (1969) and Kaplan (1971) 
reasoned that there would be more evidence of context effects and 
meaning change for traits which had a variety of meanings. Traits 
which had a high variability in their likeability ratings were compared 
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with those traits with less variability. Anderson's (1968) ratings of 
traits were used to determine variability in these studies. Kaplan 
(1971) reported that traits high and low in variability were affected by 
context in the same way. 
Another method used to compare the meanmg change and 
weighted averages model was to get some subjects to write a 
description of their impression prior to rating component traits on 
likeability (Anderson, 1971). Subjects who documented their 
impression were argued to have a more integrated impression than 
those subjects who were not required to do so. An enhanced context 
effect was expected in the former condition but in fact no differences 
were found across conditions. This may indicate that subjects can form 
integrated impressions without written description or, alternatively, it 
may provide support for the weighted averages interpretation because 
similar impressions were formed across conditions (Hamilton & Zanna, 
197 4). The lack of manipulation checks makes it difficult to interpret 
the findings. Anderson (1971) also increased the size of the context, 
comparing likeability ratings with six or two traits. The context effect 
was larger when there were more traits, a finding which potentially 
can be interpreted as providing support for meaning change or the 
weighted averages models. 
Research focused on meamng change petered out, in part 
because it had "failed to establish either one as preferable, for both 
theoretical and methodological reasons" (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986, p. 
169). After concentrated research comparing predictions from each 
model the evidence was inconclusive. Hamilton et al. (1980) argued 
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that research associated with Asch's and Anderson's theories focused 
on different questions. Asch was interested in how we form an 
integrated impression of another person. Anderson's focus was on 
evaluating mathematical models of information integration and 
dependent measures such as the likeability of traits reflected this aim. 
Although Asch's initial methodology provided a framework in which to 
assess algebraic models the overall aims of Asch's and Anderson's work 
were very different. 
Ostrom (1977) also concluded that the models focused on 
different aspects of the impression formation process, and that the 
adversarial approach was futile. However, he did argue, that a case 
could be made for summation/averaging and configuration operating in 
different circumstances where different information was available. 
This suggestion by Ostrom that both models had something to offer 
understandings of the impression formation process contributed to the 
argument that impressions may be based on two methods of social 
information processing. Fiske and Pavelchak (1986), citing Ostrom, 
concluded that "both models are applicable under certain specifiable 
circumstances" (p. 169). 
In summary, the idea that there are two distinct methods by 
which we can form impressions of others originated in Asch's 1946 
article. The issue of whether we form impressions in a configural, 
Gestalt fashion or in an elemental manner was not resolved despite a 
decade of intense research. The research itself was shaped by different 
research aims and agendas, but the influence of the initial or overall 
impression was recognised and made explicit in Anderson's weighted 
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averages model and Asch's research. In current models of impression 
formation it is argued that there are two impression formation 
processes, one based on the tradition of Asch's work and the other on 
the elemental model subsequently developed by Anderson. We next 
turn to an overview of these modern integrations, in particular the 
emphasis on a categorization-free, elemental process and related 
research. 
3.3 Elemental and configura! models: Modern integrations 
Two of the current models of impression formation, Fiske and 
Neuberg's continuum model and Brewer's (1988) dual process model, 
combine elemental and configura! perspectives. The unresolved 
differences between these earlier perspectives have merely been 
transferred to the current models as an argument for two distinct 
impression formation processes. Fiske (1988) stated in reference to the 
continuum model that it "proposes that people engage in both holistic 
and elemental processing, proposing a continuum between them" (p. 
65) and in response to the question "Do people form impressions based 
on the overall Gestalt of the person or based on the attributes as 
isolated elements?" Fiske (1988) argued that "people do both" (p. 65). 
Both Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) and Brewer's (1988) model 
describe impression formation processes which originate in research by 
Anderson and Asch. Asch's work is used to support the idea of 
category-based impressions where the category shapes the meaning of 
available information. The elemental model where traits are combined 
in isolation, in a categorization-free manner, is argued to be the 
process responsible for attribute-based individuated impression 
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formation. The elemental stage of Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) 
continuum model is termed piecemeal integration or attribute-based 
processing. Brewer (1988), in her dual process model, refers to this 
stage as personalization or bottom-up processing. 
Importantly, in current impression formation models a further 
link is made between, on the one hand, Asch's work, categorization and 
stereotyping and on the other, Anderson's work, a categorization-free 
process and individuation. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer 
(1988) use category-based or top-down processes as synonyms for 
stereotyping. Also importantly, when they argue for attribute-based or 
bottom-up impressions in terms of the piecemeal integration and 
personalization stages of their respective models they mean 
individuated impressions. This line of argument is explicit and 
integrated with their theoretical interpretation of the categorization 
process. 
In an article by Fiske and Neuberg (1989) where the continuum 
model is discussed, they refer to processes "that heavily utilise social 
category information to the relative exclusion of an individual's other 
characteristics - as stereotype-oriented or category-based processes" (p. 
83, emphasis in original). Further processes which "heavily utilize an 
individual's characteristics to the relative exclusion of an individual's 
social category" are referred to "as attribute-oriented or individuating 
processes" (p. 83, emphasis in original). In the context of discussing 
the dual-process model and early incarnations of the continuum model 
Brewer (1988) stated that the distinction between top-down and 
bottom-up processing parallels that "made by Fiske and Pavelchak 
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(1986) between category-based and piecemeal-based affect" she adds 
that the "present [dual-process] model also expands on the basic 
distinction between category-based and piecemeal processing by 
postulating different stages of category-based processing" (p. 6). 
Further in reference to both the continuum and dual process 
models Fiske (1988) argued that "each model proposes that perceivers 
can form impressions both in stereotypic, category-oriented ways and 
in more individuated, attribute-oriented ways" (p. 65). This same 
argument is reflected in more recent work. In a 1993(b) paper Fiske 
stated that "category-based or stereotypic responses contrast with fully 
individuated, attribute-by-attribute considerations of another person" 
(p. 623). 
The remainder of this section describes both models in detail and 
outlines the evidence drawn on to support the controversial elemental 
stages of each. There is consensus in the literature that impressions 
can be formed through categorization processes. What is contested 
though, is whether a distinct categorization-free process is used when 
we individuate others. For this reason a closer examination of the 
research relied on to support personalization and piecemeal integration 
is provided. 
Overall, the continuum and dual process models seem to be more 
directed at first impressions rather than how we sometimes perceive 
others we know well in more stereotypic or individuated ways. In fact 
the impression formation literature generally could be characterised as 
theory and research based on one-off impressions of strangers. A point 
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to consider is whether impression formation does concern the whole 
person or whether it is the explanation of specific behaviours which 
focuses our thinking about others (see Hampson, 1988). The perceiver 
is also typically characterised in these recent models as a passive 
information processor in much the same way as the early person 
perception literature characterised the perceiver (Ellemers & van 
Knippenberg, 1997; Jones, 1988, 1990). 
3.3.1 Dual process model 
Brewer (1988) m her dual process model proposes "an 
alternative model of social cognition that incorporates top-down 
processing as well as data-driven constructions" (p. 2). She draws a 
clear distinction between these two forms of social information 
processing by proposing a dichotomy that represents category-based 
and person-based perception as mutually exclusive. The model begins 
with initial identification which is seen as an automatic categorization 
process; "the process is one of placing the individual social object along 
well established stimulus dimensions such as gender, age and skin 
color" (p. 6). There needs to be a degree of relevance between the 
stimulus person and the perceiver for impression formation to continue 
through more controlled and conscious processes. 
If the stimulus person is relevant to the current needs and goals 
of the perceiver then there are two alternative branches through which 
the perception process can progress. One branch involves category-
based perception, which involves theory-driven or top-down processing, 
and the other branch comprises person-based perception which 
involves bottom-up or data-driven processing. As will be seen, the 
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processes which operate at each branch of the dichotomy are distinct. 
If the perceiver does not feel self-involved with the target the 
category-based branch is pursued and the basis of impression 
formation is categorization. Through the categorization process a 
match is made between the person being perceived and information 
stored in memory about particular "person types". The category 
matching process operates from the general to the specific and 
motivation and attention can influence the process (Brewer, 1988). 
The activation of a particular category stored m memory IS 
determined by three factors: the accessibility of the category, 
contextual cues and the perceiver's goals. If no fit is established, that 
is, when stimulus information is inconsistent with category prototypes, 
the category-based process moves through to an individuation stage. 
At the individuation stage the process involved is still categorization 
but the information is stored as a special instance of a category. A 
special instance is where the stimulus characteristics do not fit into the 
general category but are more like that category than any other 
category. The individuation stage is still category-based because 
features are defined and understood in terms of the general category 
(Brewer, 1988). 
If the perceiver feels involved with the stimulus person, for 
example "the perceiver feels closely related to or interdependent with 
the target person" (Brewer, 1988, p. 9), then perception will be person-
based or personalised. Person-based perception encompasses the other 
branch of the model and is a separate and unrelated process to 
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category-based perception. This branch represents personalization and 
the difference between this stage and category-based perception is that 
categorization is not the underlying process of impression formation. 
The individual rather than the category forms the framework for 
information organisation. Brewer (1988) argued that the category 
membership information is integrated as an aspect of the individual. 
Information characteristic of the individual in a particular category 
role is integrated, not the general category features. Brewer draws a 
distinction between the use of person categories and other categories. 
Basically, because information is categorized in terms of a person, and 
not the pre-existing stored category information, a different 
categorization-free process is argued to be used to form impressions. 
The evidence provided to support this aspect of the model will be 
outlined. 
3.3.2 Evidence for personalization in the dual process model 
Brewer (1988) conceptualised personalization as a different type 
of cognitive structure in which "the individual becomes the basis for 
organization of all relevant information" (p. 22). Brewer drew upon a 
broad range of social cognitive literature, including research regarding 
the integration of inconsistent information and information processing 
mechanisms, to support the existence of a distinct personalization 
process. There are four main grounds on which categorization and 
personalization are differentiated: 1) inconsistent information is 
integrated into personalized impressions but is ignored or used to form 
sub-types when category-based impressions are formed; 2) there are 
differences in the order of information recall when personalization 
compared to categorization is the basis of impression formation; 3) the 
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type of information recalled varies depending on whether impressions 
are category- or person-based; and 4) personalization occurs when the 
target person is similar to the perceiver. Each of these will be 
addressed in turn (see McCauley, 1988, for a more critical discussion). 
The first area Brewer (1988) elaborates on in her discussion of 
personalization is how new information, in particular inconsistent 
information, is assimilated with existing knowledge structures. When 
forming category-based impressions it is argued that inconsistent 
information is ignored or used to form sub-categories, but with person-
based impressions inconsistent information is "processed extensively 
and incorporated into the person representation" (p. 23). In his 
analysis of the dual process model McCauley (1988) commented that 
this contention is challenged by the results of studies like that by 
Haire and Grunes (1950) reported in Asch (1952, p. 220). Haire and 
Grunes had two lists, Form A and Form B, which subjects were told 
contained a brief description of a "working man". The lists were 
identical except the word "intelligent" was added to Form A. The 
information included in the forms was not just attributes but 
statements like "works in a factory", "reads the newspaper" and 
"cracks jokes". 
Haire and Grunes findings suggested that the impressions 
formed by subjects who received Form A differed from those who 
received Form B in two main ways. First, subjects tended to modify 
the term intelligent to fit the trend of the description, as in "he is 
intelligent, but not too much so, because he works in a factory" or "he is 
intelligent, but doesn't possess initiative to rise above his group" (Asch, 
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1952, p. 220). The second finding was that some subjects altered the 
group to which the person described belonged, such as from working 
man to foreman. The results of the Haire and Grunes study indicate 
that where subjects are given a category "working man" the 
inconsistent information is not ignored or necessarily used to form a 
sub-category but is processed extensively and incorporated into the 
. . 1mpresswn. 
Some interesting comparisons can be made with a study by Asch 
and Zukier (1984) where the direct focus was on discordant attributes, 
characteristics which are not congruent with others and may impede 
the formation of a unified impression. The characteristics read to 
subjects were usually discordant word pairs (e.g., sociable-lonely). 
Congruent word pairs were also included for comparative purposes. In 
addition, to writing a characterisation, subjects also had to document 
how the two attributes could be related. Interestingly, one of the 
words in the pair became dominant and the other subordinate, so that 
the dominant word in the pair constrained the interpretation of the 
other word. For example with the word pair "sociable-lonely", "lonely" 
influenced the interpretation of "sociable", with "sociable" being 
interpreted as a temporary characteristic (e.g., "He puts up a facade"; 
Asch & Zukier, 1984, p. 1238). The meaning that different words have 
is shaped by contextual features such as the other information 
available. These two studies are informative about the role of 
inconsistent information in impression formation. In one study a 
category label was provided (e.g., working man) and in the other only 
attribute information was available, and inconsistent information was 
differentiated or modified in both cases. In these studies inconsistent 
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information was dealt with in similar ways regardless of whether the 
processing was category-based or person-based. 
These findings raise questions about whether the way new or 
inconsistent information is processed can differentiate between 
categorization and categorization-free processes. Discounting 
inconsistent information or sub-typing are not the only options. 
Information, as shown by Haire and Grunes, can be re-interpreted. 
Fiske & Neuberg (1990) provided a more recent example of how 
inconsistent information can be reconciled, commenting that: 
perceivers often confirm the category by interpreting 
attributes that had pretested as category-inconsistent to be 
consistent instead. Thus, the attribute "strong" was generally 
perceived by subjects to refer to physical strength when the 
category label was "construction worker" although strong was 
interpreted as meaning "strong-minded" when the label 
provided was "professor". (p. 26) 
It is also possible, given that numerous group memberships can 
characterise a particular person, that inconsistent information can be 
used to form a different category-based impression (e.g., foreman; see 
also Jones, 1988). The fact is that inconsistent information can be 
"processed extensively and incorporated into the person 
representation" (Brewer, 1988, p. 23) and category-based impressions 
are still formed. At the very least, then, the role of inconsistent 
information in impression formation is complex and not as 
straightforward as Brewer would suggest (see also Rojahn & 
Pettigrew, 1992; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Vonk, 
1994). More general questions such as, what inconsistent information 
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actually is, also need to be addressed (see Chapter 10). 
The second point raised by Brewer (1988) in support of the 
position that person-based and category-based perception involve 
different information processing mechanisms concerns the order of 
information recall. According to the dual process model category-based 
information is initially categorised at the less inclusive stages of 
individuation and sub-typing. The opposite is argued to be true of 
person-based processing where information can be processed from the 
more inclusive to less inclusive. Brewer stated that "recall of 
information about an individual in a category-based structure should 
begin with specific individuating features and progress to subtype 
identification, with superordinate categorization occurring last ... Free 
recall of personalized individuals, however, should begin with 
superordinate traits and progress to more specific attributes or 
behaviors with additional retrieval effort" (p. 24; see also Srull & Wyer, 
1989; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
Brewer (1988) referred to Hampson's (1983) research to support 
this order of recall hypothesis. Hampson conducted a study in which 
she asked subjects to describe one person who they either knew well or 
hardly knew at all. The overall findings indicated that traits were 
more often used to describe people who were well known to the 
perceiver compared with those who were known less well. This 
preference for trait terms is seen by Brewer (1988) to support the 
position that for person-based perceptions trait information would be 
recalled first. McCauley (1988) pointed out that this evidence could 
also support a category-based model of impression formation, because 
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traits could represent more specific category features. This position is 
consistent with Hampson's argument that trait terms can represent 
cognitive categories. Brewer's order of recall argument does not 
explain or clarify whether traits are being used as a category label, a 
feature of a category label or a more specific attribute (see Anderson & 
Cole, 1990; Anderson & Klatzky, 1987; Park 1986). How do we know 
whether intelligence, for example, is being used as a category label or 
attribute? What is the difference between a category label and an 
attribute? The order of recall hypothesis is limited by unclear answers 
to these types of questions (see also Hampson, 1988). 
The third aspect of bottom-up processing which was used by 
Brewer (1988) to support the view that there are two impression 
formation processes was associated with the type of information 
recalled. Brewer stated that with personalization both the trait and 
behaviour information influence memory-based judgements. However, 
with category-based processing only the category-consistent 
information can be recalled and not the specific information used to 
categorize the individual in the first instance. Consequently, 
subsequent judgements of the individual will be based entirely on the 
category information. 
Brewer (1988) draws on the work of Lingle (1983) to support the 
argument that different types of information are recalled depending on 
the type of processing. Lingle investigated whether subjects used 
remembered events (person-based information) or remembered 
inferences (category-based information) to make social judgements. 
The results were that "events are activated in addition to (not instead 
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oD earlier inferred categorizations" (p. 494). This means that person-
based information and category-based information are both used in the 
recall of events. 
A second finding by Lingle (1983) supports Brewer's (1988) 
predictions about category-based processing. Lingle found that 
behaviours consistent with the trait category were better remembered; 
"descriptors relevant to the inferred categorization are more likely to 
be activated than category-irrelevant descriptors" (p. 494). However, 
there were mixed results regarding whether category consistent 
information is recalled better than category inconsistent information 
(e.g., Stangor & McMillan, 1992) which complicates Brewer's analysis 
that with category-based impressions category-consistent information 
is recalled. 
The fourth point made by Brewer (1988) to support the position 
of two modes of processing revolves around similarity. Brewer argued 
that person-based representations are more likely to be formed of 
individuals who are similar to the perceiver; "we are more likely to 
form person-based representations of individuals who are similar to 
ourselves than who are distinctly different" (Brewer, 1988, p. 25). The 
research drawn upon to support this position relates to the outgroup 
homogeneity effect where outgroup members are perceived as less 
heterogeneous and more similar to one another than ingroup members. 
The basic phenomenon was characterised by Hamilton and Trolier 
(1986) as "they're all alike but we're all different" (p. 127). Judgements 
of ingroup members are argued to be less extreme and more variable 
(e.g., Jones, Wood & Quattrone, 1981; Linville & Jones, 1980). Also, 
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more individuating features have been found to be remembered about 
ingroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982). 
The confusing aspect of Brewer's (1988) analysis is the argument 
that when we are similar to others we form more differentiated 
impressions. If similarity means familiarity then clearly it needs to be 
recognised that it is possible to stereotype people that we know well. 
For example, it is possible to perceive a colleague as a "radical 
feminist" or husband as a "sexist male". So stereotypic impressions 
can be formed of others who are seen as similar to the perceiver. 
Further, judgements of similarity have been shown to be dependent on 
the perceivers frame of reference in a given context (e.g., Eiser & 
Stroebe, 1972; Haslam & Turner, 1992; Hensley & Duval, 1976; Wilder 
& Thompson, 1988). Whether others are considered to be similar or 
distinctly different is relative and depends on contextual factors. 
Haslam, Oakes, Turner and McGarty (1995a, 1995b) observed 
that impressions of ingroup members are not always more 
heterogeneous and that the traditional outgroup homogeneity effect 
may be a product of the judgement task (see Simon, 1992; Wilder, 
1986, for reviews). It was argued by Haslam et al. (1995a, 1995b) that 
when judgements of outgroups are made there is an implicit intergroup 
comparison which leads to similarities within both the ingroup and 
outgroup being accentuated. However, when judgments of the ingroup 
are made there is often no contrasting outgroup, which leads to within-
group interpersonal comparisons where differences between members 
of the same group are accentuated. For this reason impressions of the 
ingroup are more heterogeneous than those of the outgroup. This leads 
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to the prediction that if judgements of the ingroup and outgroup are 
both made in intergroup contexts, both ingroups and outgroups will be 
seen as homogeneous and the respective members as more similar to 
one another. These predictions have been supported in several studies 
(Haslam et al., 1995a, 1995b). 
This alternative interpretation of the outgroup homogeneity 
effect developed by Haslam et al. (1995a, 1995b) is based on self-
categorization theory (e.g., Turner et al., 1987) which is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5. The general issue of similarity and interpersonal 
differentiation is an important element of self-categorization theory. 
For now, however, we would simply note that the fact that a target is 
similar to the perceiver may not guarantee more differentiated, 
complex impression formation processes as defined by Brewer (1988; 
see Brewer, 1993 for a more recent discussion of ingroup homogeneity 
and the optimal distinctiveness model; also Kashima & Kashima, 
1993). 
McCauley (1988) also pointed out in relation to similarity that 
"more complex and differentiated impressions are not necessarily 
associated with bottom-up processing" (p. 117). Brewer (1988) does not 
explicitly link complex and differentiated impressions and bottom-up 
processing. It may also be possible to have more complex impressions 
through the individuation stage of category-based processing. The 
implications of these arguments are that evidence of outgroup 
homogeneity does not necessarily support one form of processing over 
another. 
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In summary, there are four major points made by Brewer (1988) 
to support the existence of person-based or bottom-up processing as 
separate from category-based or top-down processing. Support for 
person-based processing is fundamental to the dual process model 
which is based on the assumption that there are two processing 
mechanisms. The preceding review of some of the work cited by 
Brewer throws considerable doubt on the view that personalization can 
be clearly differentiated. The hypothesis that there are two modes of 
processing social information was not unambiguously supported by the 
literature. 
The dual-process model is not alone m arguing for a 
categorization-free impression formation process. Fiske and Neuberg 
(1990) in their continuum model also argued that distinct processes are 
used when we form individuated and stereotypic impressions of others 
which are respectively based on categorization-free and categorization 
processes. In the next section the continuum model will be outlined 
along with the evidence drawn on to support the categorization-free 
process developed in this model. 
3.3.3 The continuum model 
The continuum model of impression formation developed by 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argued that impressions of others are 
formed using a number of different processes which lie on a continuum. 
At one end of the continuum impressions are formed using information 
about the groups or categories to which another belongs. At the other 
end of the continuum impressions are formed from person-specific 
attribute information. 
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The notion of a continuum suggests that the two types of 
information are separable but not mutually exclusive as in the dual 
process model. As a shift occurs from the category-based towards the 
individuating end of the continuum, impressions will be based less on 
category information and more on individuating information and vice 
versa. That is, pure category and pure individuating information 
cannot jointly be used in the person perception process (although there 
has been some recent suggestion that category-based and piecemeal 
processes are considered to be parallel processes that can occur 
simultaneously; Fiske, Goodwin, Operario & Stevens, 1996). 
The model involves a number of initial assumptions. The main 
ones are that: 1) category-based processes have priority over attribute-
based processes; 2) movement along the continuum between attribute-
based and category-based perception depends on the ease with which 
the perceived attributes fit a category; 3) for more individuating 
impression formation attention is necessary; 4) motivation can 
influence the point on the continuum at which impressions develop; 5) 
attention can mediate the influence motivation has on the impression 
formation process (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Fiske and Neuberg 
basically argue that perceivers will initially categorize others and form 
stereotypic impressions. The structure of the information available 
(category-consistent or category-inconsistent) and the amount of 
attention allocated to these different types of information will 
determine whether the impression remains category-based or becomes 
more individuated and piecemeal. 
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The continuum model involves five possible stages. The first 
stage called "initial categorization", is the immediate categorization 
that occurs once enough information is obtained to cue a particular 
category. When a category is cued the behaviours and affect associated 
with that category are also activated. Typically this involves 
categorizing the person in terms of fairly immediately available 
information - sex, skin colour, occupation and so on. 
Progression to the second stage is dependent upon whether the 
target is "minimally interesting or personally relevant enough to 
warrant further processing" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 4). As with the 
dual process model if there is a degree of personal relevance the 
perceiver attends to the target and begins an information gathering 
process. The information is used to judge whether the initial 
categorization was appropriate and whether progression to stage three, 
a recategorization, is necessary. 
Recategorization mms to find an alternative category or 
subcategory which best fits the target's characteristics If the 
recategorization process is successful the conditions associated with 
that category are activated. If the target cannot be recategorised 
people can go beyond their categorizations and form impressions of 
others on the basis of "piecemeal integration". 
Fiske (1988) outlines similarities between the personalization 
stage of the dual process model and the piecemeal integration stage of 
the continuum model. Like personalization, piecemeal integration 
results in impressions which are more individuated and not based on 
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categorization. The outcome is argued to be more complex, rich 
impressions that are not oversimplified. 
Piecemeal integration is purported to be non-category based, 
that is "the perceiver considers the target's attributes with minimal 
influence of any category" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 8). For 
piecemeal integration categorization is not the underlying process of 
social perception and impression formation. The outcome of piecemeal 
integration is argued to be impressions free from the distortion and 
over-generalizations associated with categorization and category-based 
perception. The process is "uncontaminated by category-based 
generalizations" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 8). 
Attribute-based perception is achieved by combining attributes 
without the influence of category information. When discussing 
piecemeal integration Fiske and Neuberg (1990) stated that; 
"responses are indeed impressively well predicted by averaging the 
isolated evaluations of the attributes, without interactions among the 
attributes and without inferences that might be category-based" (p. 
32). Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) piecemeal integration stage is more 
aligned with Anderson's averages model than his later weighted 
averages model where the overall impression could influence the 
valence of component traits. The evidence used to support such a 
process will be outlined. 
3.3.4 Evidence for piecemeal integration in the continuum model 
Two main studies are usually taken as supporting the existence 
of a piecemeal integration process: Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie and 
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Milberg (1987) and a study by Pavelchak (1989). The former was 
referred to in order to support the position that "when perceivers are 
confronted with the target attributes in the absence of any category 
label, and these attributes do not easily elicit an implied category label, 
perceivers necessarily must form impressions of the target in a 
relatively individuating manner" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 31). 
Piecemeal integration and associated use of attribute information is 
purported to result only if the categorization process is unsuccessful, 
that is, when no category label is available or a category label is 
difficult to elicit. Therefore, these two main studies aim to show that 
when categorization is difficult a different information processing 
mechanism is used. Given that these findings are central m 
supporting the idea of a distinct impression formation process m 
addition to categorization it is worthwhile reviewing them in detail. 
In Fiske et al. (1987) there is a strong emphasis on the structure 
of the information available to the perceiver and how well particular 
attributes "fit" particular categories. It was predicted that if the 
attribute information "fits" or is consistent with the category label then 
impressions would be based on categorization processes. When a label 
plus category-consistent attributes were provided the attributes were 
largely seen to be used to confirm the category. So it was argued that 
when category information was available along with category 
consistent attributes impressions would be formed through 
categorization. To the extent that attributes were presented in the 
absence of category information, or attributes which contest category 
information were available, more non-categorical, attribute-by-
attribute or individuated impressions were predicted. 
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The notion of "fit" is understood as a matching process between 
the information in the stimulus environment and pre-existing 
categories stored in our heads; "when a label is explicitly provided or 
immediately generated by the perceiver, the perceiver presumably 
checks the fit between this initial label and the available attributes, on 
the basis of a category prototype or exemplar stored in memory" (Fiske 
eta!. 1987, p. 403). It is the success or failure of this matching process 
which is seen to determine whether impressions will be more 
stereotypic or individuated. When a category label is available we use 
the stored information and categorize. If a category label is not 
available we have to independently sum the information available in 
the stimulus environment. Categorization is seen as the use of stored 
information that corresponds with particular category labels (the role 
and nature of categorization as conceptualised in the continuum model 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
In order for Fiske et a!. (1987) to develop stimulus materials 
consistent with these predictions regarding the "fit" of information, 
subjects completed a pre-test questionnaire in which they had to rate 
the likeability of 13 occupation labels and 14 sets of five traits. The 
majority of subjects who completed the pre-test completed a second 
session where six occupation labels and associated attributes were 
selected. For example the occupation doctor and consistent attributes 
like practical, educated, scientific, skilful and observant were used in 
the second stage of the study. 
The occupation labels and trait lists were arranged to form four 
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different types of stimulus configurations. The category labels and 
attributes were combined to create four different conditions: 1) the 
consistent condition, where the attributes were fairly typical of the 
label (e.g., loan shark category label with loan shark traits); 2) the 
label-focus condition, where the category label was provided but the 
attributes were meant to be uninformative (e.g., artist category label 
with neutral traits like brown-haired, television viewer, adult); 3) the 
inconsistent condition, where the attributes were based on a different 
category label (e.g., doctor category label with housemaid traits); 4) the 
attribute-focus condition, where the label "person" was used to be 
uninformative but one of the attribute lists was included (e.g., person 
category label with doctor traits). 
The main predictions were that attribute information should be 
used more when categorization is difficult (in the inconsistent and 
attribute-focus conditions) than when it is easy (in the consistent and 
label-focus conditions), and that affective responses would be based on 
the category label when categorization is easy but on attributes when 
categorization is more difficult. Subjects were also expected to make 
separate judgements of the typicality of the attributes for the category 
label (Fiske et a!., 1987). 
The main dependent measure in the first study was likeability 
ratings. The ratings subjects made of the category labels and 
attributes when they were initially presented, independently and in 
the abstract, were compared with their overall ratings made when the 
labels and attributes were presented in various combinations. A high 
correlation between the likeability of the category label when judged in 
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isolation and the overalllikeability rating of the target made when the 
category labels and attributes were combined was interpreted as 
evidence of category-based processing. Similarly, a high correlation 
between independent ratings of the attributes and the overall rating of 
the target was taken as evidence of piecemeal processing. 
Significant correlations were found between the rated likeability 
of the attributes and overall likeability ratings in all conditions. So 
there was evidence based on Fiske et al.'s (1987) measures that 
attributes were used as a basis for likeability judgements in conditions 
where use of the category label only was predicted. In the consistent 
condition this finding was explained by reference to the consistency 
between the category label and the attributes. In the label-focus 
condition the unexpected correlation with the attributes was 
interpreted as being indicative of an intermediate impression 
formation process. It was suggested that the label-focus condition 
evoked processes further along the continuum from the category-based 
end-point towards the attribute-based end-point, than the consistent 
condition. The correlations between the prior category ratings and the 
combined likeability ratings were significant in the consistent and 
label-focus conditions, and contrary to predictions a negative 
correlation was found in the inconsistent condition. 
A second study was designed to address a number of issues 
raised by the first study, the most substantial being that the results 
"do not address ... greater use of the attribute information in the 
inconsistent and attribute-focus conditions" (Fiske et al., 1987, p. 414). 
The second study was a replication of the first study with a few 
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variations. Most importantly, while thinking about their impression of 
the target person, subjects were asked to verbalise their thoughts. 
This procedure was designed to make the processes involved in 
reaching an impression more transparent. 
It was predicted that to the extent that the stimulus person was 
typical of the occupation category subjects would spontaneously 
comment on typicality. It was also expected, that the attributes would 
be mentioned more in the hypothesized attribute-based conditions - the 
inconsistent and attribute-focus conditions. As in the first experiment 
it was predicted that the overall likeability ratings of the stimulus 
person would be correlated with the pre-test category ratings in the 
consistent and label-focus conditions and with the attribute ratings in 
the inconsistent and attribute-focus conditions. 
The correlation data in the second experiment yielded only two 
significant results. In the inconsistent and attribute-focus conditions 
the pre-test ratings of the attributes correlated with overalllikeability 
ratings. The pattern of results was argued to be similar to those in 
Experiment 1 but with the significance levels affected by a smaller 
sample. Two judges assessed the protocols for comments on the 
typicality of the attributes and labels and the number of times the 
attributes and labels were mentioned. Subjects in the consistent, 
label-focus and inconsistent conditions all spontaneously commented 
on the typicality of the attributes. This was not found to be the case in 
the attribute-focus condition where the authors questioned the role of 
"person" as a category label. 
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The number of times the attributes were mentioned was divided 
by 5 to provide an average number of utterances so direct comparisons 
could be made with category label usage. Subjects were reported to 
have made more category label utterances in the consistent, label-focus 
and inconsistent conditions. The attributes were found to be 
mentioned more in the inconsistent and attribute-focus conditions than 
the consistent and label-focus conditions. 
It is interesting to note the relative extent to which attributes 
and labels were mentioned across conditions. In the consistent 
condition where category-based processes (evidenced by use of the 
category label) were predicted, there was very little difference between 
the mean number of attribute and category label mentions (.66 
compared to .94, respectively). In the inconsistent condition where 
attribute-based processes were predicted (evidenced by use of the 
attributes), the mean rate at which attributes and category labels were 
mentioned was .93 and 1.28, respectively. The fact that more category 
utterances were made in the inconsistent compared to the consistent 
condition contradicts the central theoretical prediction that attributes 
would be used more under conditions where categorization is supposed 
to be more difficult. Also the finding that attributes and labels are 
used to a similar extent in consistent conditions suggests that subjects 
may use all available information to shape impressions. 
A more detailed analysis of the types of processes subjects used 
when forming impressions was achieved by a closer examination of the 
talk-aloud data. Basic conclusions of the qualitative analysis can be 
summarised as follows: 1) in the consistent and label-focus conditions 
85 
there was evidence that subjects used both the category and the 
attributes; 2) subjects generated new categories and subcategories in 
the inconsistent condition; 3) in the attribute-focus condition subjects 
sometimes developed their own category to fit the attributes and 
"formed their impressions by comparing the stimulus person to 
themselves" (Fiske et al., 1987, p. 421). These methods are interpreted 
as indicative of intermediate processes on the continuum between the 
attribute-based and category-based end-points. 
The Fiske et al. (1987) article is used to support the position that 
if categorization is difficult, impressions will be formed through 
piecemeal integration. Piecemeal integration is clearly described as 
the isolated summation of attribute information. However, in this 
study the essence of piecemeal integration is not investigated 
empirically. In other words, there is no evidence that attributes are 
summed in an attribute-by-attribute way. What the evidence suggests 
is that both attributes and labels are used to varying degrees 
depending on structural properties of the information available to the 
perceiver. 
The empirical work does make explicit a number of inherent 
assumptions in the continuum model- some of which will be elaborated 
and discussed in Chapter 4. Essentially it is argued that: 1) the 
likeability of an attribute or category label is constant and unaffected 
by the other information with which it is presented (hence the 
assumption that "use" of an attribute or label can be ascertained 
through the correlation in likeability ratings across the two different 
pre-test and experimental contexts); 2) we have stored category labels 
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defined by constant features which are used to determine "fit" and to 
categorize others; 3) categorization is the same as use of a category 
label or stereotype; and 4) use of attributes will lead to individuated 
impressions. 
Many of these same assumptions are evident in the second study 
outlined by Fiske and Neuberg (1990) to support piecemeal integration 
and hence two methods by which social information can be processed. 
Pavelchak (1989) built on the work of Fiske (1982) and Fiske et al. 
(1987) and confirmed the conclusions highlighted above by stating that 
these studies had not provided clear empirical support for the idea that 
piecemeal and category-based are two distinct processes. Pavelchak 
stated in reference to Fiske et al.'s (1987) results that "subjects in the 
various conditions all used both types of information: the 
manipulation only influenced the relative weight placed on each type" 
and further that "the main principle behind the two-mode model - that 
piecemeal and category-based processes are distinct processes - has yet 
to receive clear empirical support" (p. 356). 
In Pavelchak's study, subjects were asked to complete a 
trait/academic major evaluations questionnaire. Subjects had to rate 
the likeability of 35 academic majors and 50 separately presented 
personality traits. These evaluations provided comparisons for the 
second part of the study. Subjects were then re-contacted and asked to 
participate in a supposedly unrelated study. In this study subjects 
were randomly assigned to what was called a piecemeal or category 
condition. Subjects were told they would be reading descriptions about 
six targets, each of which was described using four personality traits. 
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In the category condition subjects were asked to guess the 
target's academic major from the personality characteristics provided 
and then indicate how typical the target was of others who also had the 
same major and how likeable the target was on a 10 point scale. The 
piecemeal condition differed in that subjects rated the likeability of the 
six stimulus targets first and then guessed their major and made 
typicality judgements "so that evaluations would not be influenced by 
categorization" (Pavelchak, 1989, p. 358). 
The difference between the piecemeal and category conditions 
was whether subjects evaluated the likeability of the target person 
before or after assignment of a category label (by explicitly inferring 
their academic majors). It was predicted that in the category condition 
the academic major would influence the way subjects rated the 
likeability of the target. In the piecemeal condition subjects were 
expected to make their judgements of the target on the basis of their 
trait characteristics. 
These predictions were assessed by comparing subjects' 
likeability judgements of the targets with the ratings from the 
trait/academic majors questionnaire. Subjects in the category 
condition should like the targets to the same extent as they liked the 
relevant majors and subjects in the piecemeal condition should like the 
targets to the same extent as the average of the four personality traits 
used to describe them. An assumption of this kind of method is that 
the attribute, "boring", for example, will be equally likeable when 
presented in isolation as when presented with the attributes, 
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"studious", "cultured", and "level-headed", or with the academic major 
!'history''. 
Consistent with predictions, it was found that for subjects in the 
category condition, the category model was a better predictor of liking 
than the piecemeal model and the reverse was true for the piecemeal 
condition. The fact that these results did not eliminate the possibility 
of both category and attribute information being used led Pavelchak to 
conduct some further regression analyses. The results were not clear 
cut with evidence that both attributes and labels were used with three 
of the six targets. 
Pavelchak's (1989) research seems more directed at whether a 
category label is or is not used in impression formation. It becomes 
clear that categorization is equated with the use of stored, memorized 
information related to a particular category. A crucial point is that 
there is no evidence in the study conducted by Fiske et al. (1987) or the 
study by Pavelchak (1989) for the fundamental feature of piecemeal 
integration - the idea that attributes are summed in isolation. None of 
the evidence which is used to support the notion of piecemeal 
integration deals with whether attribute information is summed in 
isolation to form individuated impressions. To resolve this issue and 
clarify further whether there is a categorization-free process it is 
necessary to revisit research related to Asch's and Anderson's theories 
of impression formation. 
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3.4 The elemental process revisited 
Both Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988) argued that 
there is a distinct categorization-free impression formation process 
where impressions are formed based on the summation of attributes in 
isolation. However, the evidence cited in both models to support the 
existence of an elemental process does not focus on whether attributes 
can be summed in isolation. Instead research is simply designed to 
show that either attributes or labels are used in impression formation. 
The problem is that evidence that attributes are being used to form 
impressions does not mean that a distinct piecemeal integration 
process is the basis of impression formation. The argument that use of 
attributes or use of a category label reveals that perceivers utilise 
different impression formation processes is ambiguous and based on a 
very narrow definition of the categorization process. 
Although research cited by Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and 
Brewer (1988) to support the notion of piecemeal integration and 
personalization, does not indicate whether attributes can be summed 
in isolation or not, a study by Hamilton and Zanna (1974) can be used 
to deduce whether such a process is possible. The results of their study 
indicated that both the connotative meaning and the likeability of 
attributes was affected by other specific information with which they 
were presented. Hamilton and Zanna (1974) looked specifically at 
changes in the meaning of attributes by presenting test attributes 
which varied in desirability (e.g., proud, excitable, undecided) with 
another word which was highly likeable (e.g., happy, friendly), 
moderately likeable (e.g., righteous, objective), moderately undesirable 
(e.g., dissatisfied, critical) or highly undesirable (e.g., boring, rude). 
90 
The results basically showed that an attribute was rated as less 
likeable if the information it was presented with was less likeable. 
Importantly, subjects also rated the meaning of attributes on 
scales labelled by synonyms which differed in desirability. For 
example, the attribute proud was rated on a scale framed by the words 
"confident" and "conceited". The connotative meaning of the attribute 
was seen to change in a similar way to the likeability ratings. The less 
desirable the other information provided with the attribute the less 
desirable the connotative meaning. So, for example, it was found that 
the word daring could imply "courage in one context and reckless in 
another" (Hamilton & Zanna, 1974, p. 654). Clearly both the 
connotative meaning and likeability of the attribute varied depending 
on other information provided (see also Asch & Zukier, 1984). 
It is surpnsmg m light of evidence like that provided by 
Hamilton and Zanna (1974), that researchers such as Fiske and 
Neuberg (1990) would explicitly argue that attributes can be summed 
in isolation. The existence of an elemental impression formation 
process is undermined by evidence that contextual factors can affect 
the connotative meaning and likeability of attributes. If the likeability 
of attributes varies depending on the other information available then 
clearly impressions are not based on the "isolated evaluations of 
attributes" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 32). 
The two main implications of research like that reported by 
Hamilton and Zanna (1974) can be summarised as follows: 1) if the 
likeability of an attribute changes depending on the other information 
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with which it is presented then clearly attributes are not being 
summed in isolation to form impressions; and 2) if the likeability of an 
attribute does change depending on contextual factors then the use of 
correlations with abstract likeability ratings to assess whether 
attributes or category labels are used most in impression formation 
may not be appropriate. 
In relation to the first point it is clear that both Asch and 
Anderson explicitly argued that information could not be summed in 
isolation. As outlined previously Asch argued that the meaning of 
particular attributes was shaped in a dynamic context-dependent way. 
However, Anderson (1974) also argued that the overall impression 
could influence how a trait was evaluated. For example, Wyer (1974) 
stated in relation to Anderson's model that "once a set of adjectives is 
considered as a collective, the judged favourableness of one of these 
adjectives (the test adjective) increases with the favourableness of 
those accompanying it (its context)" (p. 829). With the development of 
the weighted averages model Anderson argued that "averaging is itself 
a form of stimulus interaction ... this reflects the Gestalt character of 
the averaging rule, in which the role of each part depends on the 
whole" (1974, p. 296). Anderson, then, explicitly argued that attributes 
cannot be summed in isolation. The fact that he agrees that the overall 
impression can impact on the evaluation of component information 
raises doubts about a pure elemental process where attributes are 
summed or averaged in isolation. 
The fact that Anderson (1974) argued against the notion that 
attributes could be evaluated in isolation is significant because Fiske 
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and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988) extensively cited Anderson in 
relation to the elemental aspect of their models. For example, in Fiske 
et al. (1987) it is stated that "the attribute-oriented approach is well 
developed in Anderson's averaging model of impressions" (p. 401). 
However, Anderson explicitly argued that Brewer and Fiske were 
wrong. He stated that "Brewer and Fiske both assert the integration 
models are piecemeal, data driven, and disallow top-down or semantic 
processing. This is fundamentally incorrect." (Anderson, 1988, p. 45). 
The argument that the likeability of a particular attribute can 
change depending on the other information with which it is presented 
has further implications. Most of the research which has examined the 
relationship between the structure of the information available and 
impression formation has mainly relied on likeability ratings (an 
exception is Fiske et al., 1987, Experiment 2). Evidence that the 
likeability of attributes changes with context undermines the validity 
of attempts to correlate likeability ratings made when the information 
is presented in the abstract and then in various combinations. 
In summary, both Asch and Anderson argued that the 
evaluation of an attribute can and does change depending on the 
overall impression. It is possible that the overall impression acts in 
the same way as a category. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) defined a 
category as the "feature that the perceiver uses to organise and 
understand the remaining features" (p. 9). Based on this definition it 
is possible that attributes are not summed in isolation but are 
categorized in terms of the overall impression. Attributes are, 
therefore, given meaning in relation to the other available information. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The central feature of this chapter has been discussion of the 
impression formation process. Several theoretical models regarding 
how we form impressions of others, both historical and current, have 
been outlined. The main issue to emerge from the critique of the 
empirical literature is that there is no direct evidence cited in either 
the continuum or dual process model that shows attributes are 
summed in an isolated, elemental way to form individuated 
impressions. Most of the research seems to focus on use of attributes 
and use of category labels, where the former is related to individuation 
and the latter to categorization and stereotyping. However, depending 
on the way categorization is understood, use of attributes does not 
necessarily mean that the impression formed is not based on a 
categorization process. 
In current impression formation models it is basically assumed 
that if a category label is not used in impression formation then the 
process used is categorization-free. However, results from research 
such as Hamilton and Zanna (1974) and the argument developed by 
Anderson (1988) indicated that the overall impression can affect the 
likeability of component information and act as a category label. If the 
overall impression is used to shape the likeability and meaning of 
attributes then clearly impressions are not based on the isolated 
summation of component information. Clearly, if someone is perceived 
as "friendly" or "courteous" or "superficial", "these are essentially 
comparative judgements which could hardly be made in a vacuum of 
absolute assertions" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 9 of the English manuscript; see 
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also Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Baron, 
1995). The use of attributes themselves relies on comparison. 
There are clear inconsistencies regarding the elemental process 
in impression formation. There is no direct evidence for the idea that 
attributes are combined in isolation in an attribute-by-attribute 
elemental way. The fact that an elemental process has been 
consistently featured in current impression formation models therefore 
seems more of a theoretical issue than a product of clear empirical 
evidence. As will be seen in the next chapter it is the way 
categorization and stereotyping are understood theoretically in these 
impression formation models which creates the impetus for a 
categorization-free process which can lead to accurate, valid and "real" 
individuated impressions. 
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Chapter4 
CATEGORIZATION AND THE CONSERVATION 
OF COGNITIVE RESOURCES 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the focus on process was examined and 
two current impression formation models, Brewer's (1988) dual process 
model and Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model, were 
described. One of the most significant features of these models is that 
both person perception and stereotyping are addressed concurrently. 
These models attempt to explain how we form individuated and 
stereotypic impressions of others. 
Chapter 3 concentrated on the controversial attribute-by-
attribute, categorization-free process which is argued to be used when 
individuated, person-based impressions are formed. There was no 
evidence in either model which directly supported the proposition that 
individuated impressions are formed in a categorization-free, 
elemental, piecemeal fashion. 
In this chapter the emphasis is on categorization, the alternative 
impression formation process, outlined in Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) 
and Brewer's (1988) models, used when stereotypic impressions are 
formed. The way categorization and stereotyping are conceptualised in 
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these models is shared by the broader social cognition literature in 
which they are located (see Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994, for a 
review). In fact, the way in which stereotyping and categorization are 
understood in social cognition research can be traced back to claims 
made by Walter Lippmann in his book Public Opinion (1922; also see 
Chapter 2) that stereotypes were exaggerated representations and "a 
very partial and inadequate way of representing the world" (p. 72). 
Categorization has historically been interpreted as a process which 
simplifies information, but which also introduces error because 
category-based generalizations are often preferred over more 
elaborated individuated perception. 
More recently, the human perceiver has been characterised as a 
"cognitive miser" (after Fiske & Taylor, 1984) or "mental sluggard" 
(Macrae, Hewstone & Griffiths, 1993, p. 78). The perceiver is 
understood to have limited cognitive capacity and to be fundamentally 
motivated to preserve precious cognitive resources. Stereotyping is 
described as the central mechanism through which resources are 
preserved, so that "when the information-processing gets tough, 
stereotypes (as heuristics structures) get going" (Macrae et al., 1993, p. 
79). Categorization saves time and effort but leads to overgeneralized 
representations of others. 
If impressions based on categorization are thought to be 
overgeneralized this distortion must be defined with reference to a 
non-distorted base line- there must be a mode of impression formation 
which is not distorted. In social cognition research individuated 
impressions fulfil this function. They are defined as more accurate, 
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real and valid and, importantly, based on a process other than 
categorization. 
In the second section of this chapter the focus shifts from how 
we form individuated and stereotypic impressions of others to when 
these different types of impressions are anticipated. How is variation 
in the type of impressions formed of others explained? Essentially, 
because the formation of stereotypic impressions is seen as efficient 
and designed to preserve cognitive resources, whether or not we 
stereotype is seen as inversely related to the amount of attention and 
cognitive resources allocated to the impression formation process. 
Two factors have been identified to explain when stereotypic or 
individuated impressions will be formed: 1) whether a motivation to 
be accurate exists or not and 2) the availability of cognitive resources. 
Research related to both of these factors is reviewed in detail because 
through examination of the way variables are operationalized and the 
conclusions drawn from particular results the theoretical assumptions 
inherent in the research become more transparent. 
4.2 Social cognition and categorization 
Brewer's (1988) dual process model and, in particular, Fiske and 
Neuberg's (1990) continuum model predict that when available 
information about a person matches information stored in memory, 
stereotypic impressions will predominate. Categorization involves the 
application of stored prejudged responses through the use of category 
labels and related information. If a match between what is stored and 
what is perceived cannot be found then more individuated impressions 
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based on the integration of attribute information are predicted (see 
Chapter 3). As will be seen in this section it is also argued throughout 
these models, and the social cognition literature generally, that 
categorization is a process used to preserve limited coguitive resources 
but which also leads to overgeneralization. 
The way in which stereotyping and individuation are understood 
in social cognition research is interwoven with how stereotyping and 
categorization have been conceived historically. The way 
categorization is conceptualised has been shaped by a research 
tradition which has tried to explain largely negative stereotypes and 
the process responsible for such impressions. Stereotypes have been 
largely characterised as negative but necessary, as overgeneralizations 
inversely related to perceivers' cognitive effort. Lippmann (1922, p. 59) 
commented that: 
There is no shortcut through, and no substitute for, an 
individualized understanding ... but modern life is hurried and 
multifarious. There is neither time nor opportunity for intimate 
acquaintance. Instead, we notice a trait which marks a well 
known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the 
stereotypes we carry in our heads. 
Allport made a similar point (1954, p. 20-21): 
We like to solve problems easily. We can do so best if we can fit 
them rapidly into a satisfactory category and use this category 
as a means of prejudging the solution ... So long as we can get 
away with coarse overgeneralizations we tend to do so. Why? 
Well, it takes less effort, and effort, except in the area of our 
most intense interests, is disagreeable. 
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Two important themes regarding stereotyping and the 
categorization process emerge from the above quotes: 1) the use of 
category labels saves time and effort; 2) the use of categories leads to 
overgeneralization. Not much has changed in over half a century of 
research. In current social cognition literature the categorization 
process and stereotyping are understood in very similar terms. Each 
of these themes will be briefly elaborated in terms of current 
impression formation models and associated theory and research. 
4.2.1 Use of category labels saves time and effort 
Currently, a widely held view is that perceivers have limited 
cognitive capacity and categorization is primarily an information 
reduction mechanism. Perception is seen as bounded by limited 
cognitive capacity, so we "categorize people into groups as a means of 
reducing the amount of information we must contend with" (Hamilton 
& Trolier, 1986, p. 128). Categorization and stereotyping are, 
therefore, understood as energy saving devices which "spare perceivers 
the ordeal of responding to an almost incomprehensively complex 
social world" (Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994, p. 37). As Fiske 
and Neuberg (1990) succinctly put it we "have neither the cognitive 
capacity nor time to deal with all the interpersonal information ... For 
reasons of cognitive economy, we categorize others as members of 
particular groups" (p. 14). 
Conversely, forming individuated impressions is argued to 
consume cognitive resources and to be a "time consuming and effortful 
affair" (Macrae et a!., 1994, p. 37). It is argued to be "both simpler 
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(requires less effort) and more efficient (requires less time) for the 
perceiver to use stereotypic information to make inferences about 
individuals ... than it is to analyze each person on an individual basis 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 14). Individuation can be summarised as, 
effortful, resource consuming and inefficient. 
Given that use of category labels saves time and effort it is 
increased attention and the availability of cognitive resources which 
drives whether more individuated or stereotypic impressions will be 
formed. This position is clear in the continuum model and related 
research where attention is a core theoretical and empirical feature. 
Attention enables movement along Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) 
continuum: "the model proposes that attention is a necessary mediator 
through which the different types of impression formation take place" 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 2). Stereotypic or category-based 
impressions are argued to occur when "perceivers have only limited 
attentional resources" (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990. p. 33) and the 
allocation of attention precedes individuated impression formation. 
Riley and Fiske (1991) stated that "increased attention IS a 
prerequisite for individuating impression formation" (p. 176). In a 
more recent discussion of the role of power in stereotyping Fiske 
(1993b) focuses on the role attention plays in stereotyping, arguing 
that "powerful people can be discouraged from stereotyping by getting 
them to pay attention" (p. 621, see also Fiske et al., 1996). 
There is a relatively new and growing body of empirical 
literature testing the prediction that stereotypic impressions are 
formed when there is a greater load on the cognitive system or less 
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opportunity to allocate attention to the impression formation process. 
Aspects of this work are discussed in detail in section 4.3 of this 
chapter. But first it is necessary to examine the position that 
stereotypes are biased and inaccurate relative to individuated 
perception. 
4.2.2 Use of categories leads to overgeneralization 
Also reflected in the quote by Allport above, is the belief that at 
the same time that categorization conserves resources it creates 
distortion and overgeneralization. Macrae et a!. (1994) argued that 
stereotypes are used because they afford the perceiver "the luxury of 
constructing an abbreviated, though sometimes erroneous, conception 
of social reality" (p. 37). Stereotypes, therefore, allow "potentially 
erroneous, target-based impressions at very little cognitive cost" 
(Macrae et a!., 1994, p. 45, emphasis added). Hamilton, Stroessner 
and Driscoll (1994) in a chapter titled "Social cognition and the study 
of stereotyping" also argued that group perceptions were 
overgeneralized and erroneous but that such impressions could be 
formed without intent or awareness (see also Stephan, 1985). 
The relationship between categorization and distortion is also 
clearly reflected in the continuum and dual process models. In an 
article by Neuberg and Fiske (1987) it was stated that "one can 
reasonably conceptualise category-based impression formation as a 
type of potentially biased cognitive strategy used by perceivers to limit 
cognitive load and increase cognitive efficiency while forming 
impressions of others"(p. 433, emphasis added). Fiske and Neuberg 
(1990) also stated that "categorization by definition generalises beyond 
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the individual case and thus introduces error" (p. 62, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Brewer (1988) argued that categorization "is problematic to 
the extent that relevant information about an individual is either lost 
or misinterpreted in the categorization process" (p. 28, emphasis 
added). 
The whole notion of overgeneralization implies that stereotypic 
impressions must be distorted relative to a less overgeneralised level of 
perception - individuation. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) explicitly and 
unequivocally endorse the view that categorization distorts perception 
away from a preferable and more accurate individual level. They 
acknowledged in the conclusions of their 1990 article that "in effect, we 
have implied throughout this effort that individuation is preferable to 
categorization" (p. 62). Further, "we have emphasised individuation 
also because using a single category is inherently likely to be less 
accurate than using the individual's whole range of noticeable 
attributes" (p. 62). 
In the penultimate paragraph of a 62 page article Fiske and 
Neuberg (1990) did attempt to highlight circumstances where "an 
approximately accurate category-based answer may be better than a 
more accurate but less efficient individuated answer" (p. 62). 
Interestingly, even in this discussion of potentially, "approximately 
accurate" category-based impressions the "individuated answer" 
remains "more accurate". In this one paragraph the emphasis is on a 
cost benefit analysis where category-based impressions may be 
understandable in some situations. However, the overriding message 
is that individuation is more accurate than stereotyping. 
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Fiske and Neuberg (1990) explicitly argued that their "analysis 
has focused primarily on cases of unjustified and potentially injurious 
category-based responses" (p. 62). A major issue with the continuum 
model is reflected in this statement. The continuum model was 
developed to account for the use of "unjustified and potentially 
injurious" stereotypes and to understand how these stereotypes could 
be overcome through increased attention and individuation. These 
comments capture how stereotyping is understood in the social 
cognition literature generally. Stereotyping is seen as undesirable, 
based on overgeneralization and distortion, whereas individuation is 
seen as accurate and more desirable. 
The position that use of categories leads to overgeneralization 
provides insights into understanding why distinct impression 
formation processes are advocated in contemporary models. The 
reasons for two impression formation processes, are interconnected 
with stereotypes being seen as distorted, mistaken representations of 
others and a desire to formulate an explanation for such erroneous 
impressions. Stereotypes are seen to be based on categorization, a 
process argued to limit information, which inadvertently distorts 
information and is generally characterised as "a necessary, if 
unfortunate, byproduct of our cognitive makeup" (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990, p. 14). Based on this conceptualisation of the categorization 
process, there clearly needs to be a separate categorization-free process 
which affords more accurate, non-distorted, reality based impressions 
of others. 
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A particularly pertinent issue for those who argue that there are 
two impression formation processes is the question of what determines 
when one or the other impression formation process will operate. In 
the next section factors which mediate the formation of individuated or 
stereotypic impressions are outlined. Based on the way categorization 
is understood in contemporary impression formation models and social 
cognition generally, it comes as no surprise that increased 
individuation is widely seen to be positively correlated with 1) accuracy 
motivations and 2) the allocation of cognitive resources. Research 
which concerns both motivational and attentional factors is discussed. 
4.3 When do we stereotype and individuate others? 
A number of factors have been identified which are seen to 
influence whether perceivers will form stereotypic or more 
individuated impressions. Included are outcome dependence (e.g., 
Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; 
Ruscher, Fiske, Miki & Van Manen, 1991); anticipated interaction 
(e.g., Devine, Sedikides & Fuhrman, 1989; Srull, Lichtenstein & 
Rothbart, 1985); cognitive load (e.g., Macrae et a!., 1993); perceived 
accountability (e.g., Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Kim, 1987); accuracy 
goals (Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987 Experiment 3); 
availability of particular individuating information (e.g., Krueger & 
Rothbart, 1988; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993); group identity 
and expectancies (e.g., Brewer, Weber & Carini, 1995); the perceived 
judgeability of the target (e.g., Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens and Rocher, 
1994) and self-presentation to third parties (e.g., Freund, Kruglanski 
& Schpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Many of these 
factors are interpreted as affecting the perceiver's motivation to form 
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accurate impressions. In studies investigating motivational factors, 
such as interdependence or accuracy goals, and in studies of cognitive 
load, an explicit theoretical and empirical link is drawn between the 
formation of more accurate individuated impressions and increased 
attention. 
4.3.1 Motivational factors 
Importantly, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) specify a very specific 
role for motivation in their continuum model (see also Kunda, 1990). 
Generally, it is predicted that when a motivation exists to predict or 
truly understand another's behaviour, attention or cognitive resources 
will be allocated so an individuated impression can be formed (Erber & 
Fiske, 1984; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Riley & Fiske, 1991; note that 
perceivers are not thought to be able to truly understand another's 
behaviour in terms of their group membership and the relationship 
between groups). Motivational factors influence which information is 
attended to and whether perceivers will allocate resources to the 
impression formation process or not (Fiske, 1993a; see also Pendry & 
Macrae, 1996). 
Given the dominant and significant role of motivation in the 
continuum model much of the associated research endeavours to 
manipulate perceivers' motivations. But the important point is that 
motivation is manipulated to increase attention and therefore to 
reduce stereotyping. Of particular relevance to this thesis are a series 
of studies by Neuberg and Fiske (1987) and Ruscher et al. (1991), 
which use different motivation manipulations to examine when 
stereotypic and individuated impressions are formed of others. In 
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Neuberg and Fiske (1987) cooperative interdependence and accuracy 
goals are used and in Ruscher et al. (1991) competitive 
interdependence is manipulated. 
However, before these studies are discussed it is important to 
consider what constitutes evidence of individuation. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there is no direct evidence that impressions can be formed 
in an attribute-by-attribute, elemental fashion. How, then, do we 
know when impressions are not category-based? Ruscher et al. (1991) 
recognised the role of attributes and inconsistent information in 
individuation. The way in which competitively interdependent 
perceivers form impressions of their opponent was described as follows: 
For interdependent perceivers, attending to each other's 
idiosyncratic attributes aids prediction and control because 
success depends partly on the partner's behavior ... As 
interdependent perceivers incorporate these idiosyncratic 
attributes into their impressions by means of attention, they 
simultaneously refine and supplement their initial expectancies, 
making individuation possible .. . Expectancy inconsistent 
information in particular yields greatest gains in supplementing 
an initial expectancy ... Not surprisingly, it is precisely to 
inconsistent information that interdependent perceivers attend. 
(p. 597) 
Consistent with the view that initial expectations are based on 
categorization and are therefore distorted, individuation is only 
possible when these initial expectations are supplemented and refined. 
In line with Ruscher et al. (1991) individuation is typically evidenced 
by increased attention to, and use of, idiosyncratic attributes and 
expectancy-inconsistent information. We now turn to the studies 
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themselves. 
In a study by Neuberg and Fiske (1987) the way in which 
interpersonal outcome dependence influenced the impression 
formation process was investigated. It was predicted that outcome-
dependence would facilitate "the use of relatively individuating 
processes and that the use of these individuating processes may be 
mediated by increased accuracy-driven attention to attribute 
information" (p. 434). In discussion of impression formation processes 
individuation and accurate impression formation are used 
interchangeably. 
Outcome dependence is argued to change the relationship 
between perceivers and the perceived. Perceivers who are outcome 
dependent may "attempt to form more accurate impressions in order to 
predict the other's behavior better and thus have greater control over 
their own outcomes" (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 433). Further, it is 
also stated that "under some circumstances, outcome dependency may 
motivate one to attempt greater accuracy, which may be reflected in 
more thought about the other on whom one depends" (p. 433). The 
authors do clarify that even if a motivation exists to be accurate, 
accurate impressions may not be formed; "perceivers could still form 
an inaccurate impression of the target, perhaps by allowing a target's 
category membership to bias either the search for information or the 
interpretation of that information" (p. 433). Unambiguously, 
individuated impressions are seen as accurate and category-based 
impressions biased and inaccurate. 
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Neuberg and Fiske (1987) conducted three studies to investigate 
the overall hypothesis that outcome dependence would lead to 
accuracy-driven attention to attribute information and, therefore, 
individuating impression formation processes. In the first study 
subjects were led to believe they would be designing creative games in 
interaction with a schizophrenic patient who had been hospitalised. 
Outcome dependence was manipulated by informing subjects that 
$20.00 would be given to each member of the subject-patient team who 
designed the most games. The subject and patient were cooperatively 
interdependent because the prize was to be awarded on the basis of 
their combined efforts. Subjects, in the not outcome dependent 
condition, were told that both a subject and patient could win a prize of 
$20.00 based on their own contributions rather than the overall 
performance of the team. Therefore, subject and patient would not be 
competing as a team, but subjects would compete with other subjects 
and patients with other patients. 
In order to (supposedly) make the interactions go more smoothly 
the subject and patient were given some information about one 
another. Subjects were asked to fill out an information sheet 
describing amongst other details their interests, hobbies and career 
goals. This information sheet was supposedly given to the patient 
situated in an adjacent room and the patient's information sheet to the 
subject. In fact subjects were given one of two bogus information 
sheets which contained either neutral or inconsistent information 
associated with the schizophrenic category label. 
In the neutral condition subjects were given a sheet containing 
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information that was affectively neutral, that is, it contained 
information neither consistent nor inconsistent with the schizophrenic 
label. In the inconsistent condition subjects received information that 
was affectively positive and "discrepant with respect to the 
schizophrenic label" (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 435). Mter reading 
the patient's profile subjects completed a questionnaire which included 
rating, on a 1 to 15 scale, how likeable they thought Frank (the 
patient) seemed to be. The other main dependent variable was a 
measure of attention to attribute information, operationalized as the 
amount of time each subject spent reading the patient profile. 
It was predicted that individuating processes would be used in 
the outcome dependent conditions because "subjects would be 
motivated to think about Frank's own particular characteristics in an 
attempt to better predict Frank's behavior and have greater control 
over the results of the interaction" (p. 435-6). Therefore, in outcome 
dependent conditions if subjects were using the information presented 
in the patient profile to form impressions, rather than the 
schizophrenic label, impressions should be neutral in the neutral 
conditions and positive in the inconsistent conditions. When the 
subject and target are not outcome dependent theoretically the 
category label should be the basis of the impressions. Given that the 
schizophrenic label was pre-tested as negative (the mean rating on a 1 
to 15 scale was 4.6) if the category label was being used then these 
impressions should be negative. 
Interestingly, despite the important theoretical role outcome 
dependence is argued to play in impression formation, Neuberg and 
110 
Fiske (1987) did not predict that outcome dependence would have any 
effect on when inconsistent information was used to describe Frank. 
They argued that inconsistent information "encourages relatively 
individuating processes anyway" (p. 437) so no differences between 
outcome dependent and independent conditions were expected. The 
view that inconsistent information automatically leads to 
individuation disregards the possibility that inconsistent information 
can be reinterpreted or ignored (a point discussed in Chapter 3). 
The mam analysis concerned ratings of likeability. Mean 
likeability ratings ranged from 10.08 in the neutral/not outcome 
dependent condition to 12.04 in the inconsistent/not outcome 
dependent condition. Clearly, even where Frank was seen as least 
likeable, the mean (10.08) was much higher than the pre-tested mean 
likeability of the schizophrenic category label ( 4.6) so it is difficult to 
argue that the category label is the basis of the impression in this 
condition. It is also difficult, given that Frank was generally liked in 
all conditions, to determine where impressions are neutral and where 
they are positive. In fact in later reference to a heart patient label a 
mean likeability score of 10.1 is argued to be judged affectively neutral. 
Neuberg and Fiske (1987) argued that the results "indicate that 
perceivers apparently used the neutral attribute information to a 
greater extent when outcome dependent than when not" (p. 436). 
Similar conclusions are drawn from findings on the attention 
measure. It was found that subjects spent more time reading the 
profile information about Frank in the two inconsistent conditions and 
the neutral/outcome dependent condition than in the neutral/not 
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outcome dependent condition. It was concluded that "subjects paid 
more attention to the attribute information in the three conditions that 
indicated individuating processing than in the one condition that did 
not. These results are consistent with the idea that attention to 
attribute information may play a role in eliciting individuating 
processes" (p. 437). 
Alternatively, one could interpret these results as indicating 
that it takes more time for subjects to form positive impressions. It is 
not clear that outcome dependence is necessarily affecting the actual 
process (i.e., categorization versus attribute-based) used to form 
impressions. For this reason in a second study the information used to 
describe Frank was controlled. In all conditions subjects were given 
information that was consistent with the schizophrenic label and 
outcome dependence was manipulated in the same way as in 
Experiment 1. In the label condition subjects were told that Frank 
was a schizophrenic patient but in the no label condition they were 
told he "entered St. Mary's around a year ago". There were also two 
additional conditions (outcome dependent and independent) in which 
subjects were told that Frank was a heart patient but the results on 
the main dependent measures were not compared directly. 
It was predicted that because the information provided about 
Frank was consistent with being a schizophrenic, negative impressions 
would be formed regardless of whether the schizophrenic label was 
provided or not. In place of time spent reading the profile information, 
the measure of attention in this study was the amount of time it took 
subjects to make an unexpected likeability judgement. It was 
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predicted that subjects would take longer to make their judgements 
where individuation was predicted; in the two no label conditions and 
in the schizophrenic label/outcome dependent condition. The mean 
judgement times were consistent with predictions. Mean judgement 
latencies (in seconds) in the no label conditions were 12.00 in the not 
outcome dependent and 12.05 in the outcome dependent conditions. In 
the schizophrenic label conditions the means were 7. 71 in the not 
outcome dependent and 13.55 in the outcome dependent conditions. So 
subjects were able to make the likeability judgments fastest when they 
were not outcome dependent with the target and were informed that 
the target was a schizophrenic patient. 
Based on the theoretical relationship between increased 
motivation, attention and individuation, subjects should invest more 
attention, and therefore make slower responses in the outcome 
dependent conditions. It was predicted that the "outcome-dependency 
manipulation would influence the amount of attention required to form 
the impression without influencing the content of the judgements 
made" (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 438). The fact that similar response 
latencies were observed in the no label/outcome dependent (12.05) and 
no label/not outcome dependent (12.00) conditions indicates that the 
amount of time taken to make a judgement is not straightforwardly 
affected by outcome dependency. It is also important to remember that 
attribute information consistent with being a schizophrenic was used 
in this second study, so the information would have been easily 
categorizable. Based on the assumption that attributes can be used to 
elicit a category label (see Fiske et al. 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) a 
case could be made that more stereotypic impressions and faster 
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likeability judgements should have been made m the no label/not 
outcome dependent condition. 
A third study was designed to investigate whether "increased 
accuracy-driven attention to attribute information may mediate the 
influence of outcome dependency on individuating impression 
formation processes" (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 440). The study was 
similar to Experiment 1, except that accuracy-driven attention rather 
than outcome dependence was manipulated. Subjects in the accuracy-
driven attention condition were told that "It is extremely important 
that you make every effort to form as accurate an impression as 
possible" (p. 441). This instruction was omitted in the no accuracy 
driven attention condition. 
The mean likeability ratings (on a 1 to 15 scale) for each 
condition can be ranked from lowest to highest as follows: neutral/no 
accuracy driven attention (10.13), neutral/accuracy driven attention 
(11.27), inconsistent/accuracy driven attention (11.64), and 
inconsistent/no accuracy driven attention (11.67). With the lowest 
mean being 10.13 the impression is more neutral than negative and 
given that all impressions, as in Experiment 1, are relatively positive 
it is not convincing that the impressions in the no accuracy driven 
attention conditions are more category-based (in the sense of being 
based on a pre-stored negative impression of schizophrenics). 
However, Neuberg and Fiske (1987) claimed the results of these 
studies as evidence that outcome dependence and accuracy driven 
attention instructions or goals motivate subjects to increase accuracy-
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driven attention and form more individuated impressions. It is 
concluded that "outcome dependency leads to relatively individuating 
impression formation processes and that this effect is mediated by 
increased accuracy-driven attention to the target's attribute 
information" (p. 441). Further, "it seems reasonable to posit that 
accuracy-driven attention to attribute information mediates outcome 
dependency's tendency to elicit relatively individuating impression 
formation processes" (p. 442). Again, and unambiguously, accurate 
impressions are equated with individuated impressions, and it is 
attention to attribute information which is argued to lead to these 
individuated impressions. Neuberg and Fiske (1987) directly argued 
that individuated impressions are more accurate: "our results suggest 
that outcome dependency leads perceivers to evaluate targets with 
respect to their actual characteristics" (p. 442, emphasis added). 
In these three studies by Neuberg and Fiske (1987) the focus is 
on interpersonal impression formation - subjects forming an 
impression of another individual. Typically, stereotyping and 
category-based processes have been operationalized through the 
provision of category labels (see also Fiske et al., 1987, outlined in 
Chapter 3). In a study by Ruscher et al. (1991) impression formation 
was investigated in interpersonal and intergroup situations. 
Ruscher et al. (1991; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990) argued that 
outcome dependence had been typically manipulated through 
cooperation (e.g., Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). The 
subject and target person (the person the subject had to form an 
impression of) were told that they would be awarded a prize based on 
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their combined efforts. Consequently, interdependence is confounded 
with the subject and target being members of the same team. Ruscher 
and Fiske (1990) were interested in unconfounding interdependence 
and group membership by focusing on competitive interdependence. 
They found evidence that when a subject and target were competitively 
interdependent more time was spent looking at inconsistent 
information about the target. The conclusion was that, as with 
cooperative interdependence, competitive interdependence led subjects 
to want to better predict their opponent's behaviour and form more 
individuated impressions. 
However, in a later article by Ruscher et al. (1991) another 
related issue was identified. Although individuated impressions are 
formed when subjects believe they will be competing with another 
individual person for a prize the same may not hold for intergroup 
competitors. They cited a number of instances, including research 
associated with the outgroup homogeneity effect (e.g., Linville & Jones, 
1980; Linville, Salovey & Fischer, 1986) which indicated that more 
stereotypic impressions are formed of opponent group members when 
groups are effectively competitively interdependent. They argued that 
although both interpersonal and intergroup competition "involve 
competitive interdependence, intergroup competitors are 
simultaneously co-operatively interdependent with their teammates" 
(p. 596). Ruscher et al. (1991, p. 596) offered a cognitive resources 
explanation for stereotyping in intergroup contexts: 
Intergroup competitors therefore have two possible foci of 
attention: members of their own team and members of the 
opposing team. We propose that, given limited attentional 
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resources, intergroup competitors' higher priority is forming 
impressions of their team mates. The lack of team mates in the 
interpersonal competition eliminates this drain on attentional 
resources and allows perceivers to allocate more individuating 
attention to opponents. 
Ruscher et al. (1991) conducted two experiments. The design of 
the first experiment involved an intergroup and interpersonal 
manipulation. In the interpersonal conditions subjects thought that 
they would be playing a game with one opponent and in the intergroup 
conditions they thought they would be playing the game with two 
ingroup members (team mates) and three outgroup members 
(opponents). In all conditions subjects read about five players. In the 
intergroup condition the team, either ingroup or outgroup, with the 
highest score would be entered into a draw with other winning teams 
for a $45 prize. Subjects were therefore cooperatively interdependent 
with team mates but competitively interdependent with opponents. In 
the interpersonal condition subjects were told that they would be 
randomly paired with another person and that if they were the winner 
they had a chance to win a $15 prize. In all conditions, then, the 
subject and targets were outcome dependent. 
Subjects were informed that they (and team mates in the 
intergroup condition) were likely to perform about average on the task. 
This made it possible to manipulate the anticipated performance of 
opponents as either competent or incompetent, which in turn enabled 
subsequent information provided to be expectancy-consistent or 
expectancy-inconsistent. Using a similar practice to Ruscher and 
Fiske (1990), subjects were given self-descriptive statements about five 
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other players, the first of which described anticipated (in)competence 
at the task. Eight additional statements either consistent, 
inconsistent or neutral regarding (in)competency followed. In the 
condition where competency was expected statements associated with 
incompetence were seen as inconsistent, and vice versa. 
It was found that in the interpersonal condition more time was 
spent looking at inconsistent than consistent information about the 
opponent. From the talk aloud data generated from each subject 
responding vocally to information provided about their opponent, it 
was also found that more dispositional inferences were made in the 
interpersonal condition. 
In this first study differential attention to inconsistent and 
consistent information about team mates and opponents in intergroup 
conditions could not be assessed because expectations of team mates 
were neutral. Ruscher et a!. (1991) concluded that their first study 
supported the view that an interpersonal competition would lead to 
more individuated impressions of opponents than intergroup 
competition because "individuation of opponents during intergroup 
encounters is hampered because perceivers use their attentional 
resources to individuate teammates" (p. 601). However, they 
acknowledged that they also needed to demonstrate the hypothesised 
basis for this finding in attentional resources. A second experiment 
was designed predicting that: "individuating processes (attention to 
and dispositional inferences about inconsistent information, as well as 
more heterogeneous impressions) would be used more in forming 
impressions of team mates than of opponents" (p. 60 1). 
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Again in this study an expectation for targets (1 team mate and 
2 opponents) to be competent (superior) or incompetent (inferior) in 
performance on the task was manipulated along with whether the 
target was a member of the subject's own or the competing group. 
Findings indicated that subjects used consistent information more 
when forming impressions of opponents and inconsistent information 
when forming impressions of team mates. More dispositional 
comments were also made about team members in terms of 
inconsistent information than consistent information and vice versa for 
opponents. Self-references were also more likely to be made when 
discussing team mates. 
This finding that in intergroup interdependent situations team 
mates are individuated (evidenced by the focus on inconsistent 
information) but that opponents are stereotyped (evidenced by the 
focus on consistent information) is of course at odds with the 
hypothesis that outcome dependence increases attention and leads to 
individuation. Yet it is consistent with Ruscher et al.'s (1991) analysis 
that in intergroup situations opponents are not individuated "because 
given limited resources intergroup competitors' higher priority is 
forming impressions of team mates" (p. 596; see Fiske 1993b; Fiske & 
Ruscher, 1993). 
However, the results ofRuscher et al.'s (1991) study reveals that 
although increased time was spent examining consistent information 
for opponents and inconsistent information for team mates, the total 
amount of time spent examining information associated with the 
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opposing team and the subject's own team does not differ (93.1 seconds 
for the opposing team and 93.3 seconds for own team; see also Spears 
& Haslam, 1997). It is not clear that the subjects were investing more 
attentional resources when forming impressions of ingroup members 
at the expense of opponents, or that more attention overall was 
required by subjects to form more individuated impression of team 
mates. Why did subjects, if they had limited resources, spend more 
time looking at consistent information about opponents? Ruscher et al. 
(1991, p. 603) argued that it was because: 
given a lack of major motivation to be accurate, a perceiver may 
simply focus on category-consistent attributes to reconfirm the 
category ... intergroup competitors were unwilling to expend the 
major resources to incorporate inconsistent information into 
their impressions of opponents. However, they complied with 
the experimenter's requirement to form impressions of their 
opponents by simply reconfirming their expectancies ... through 
increased attention to expectancy-consistent information. 
It is not clear why attention to consistent information is 
compliance with experimenter demands whereas, attention to 
inconsistent information represents effort towards accuracy (Oakes & 
Reynolds, 1995). The explanation that stereotypic impressions are 
formed of opponents in intergroup competition because of limited 
cognitive capacity is undermined by evidence that overall attention to 
information about team mates and opponents did not vary. 
More generally, the evidence that outcome dependence 
manipulations do in fact increase the attention invested in impression 
formation is, at the very least, equivocal. Erber and Fiske (1984, 
120 
Experiment 1) found that the time spent looking at information about 
a target was 54.76 seconds in a no outcome dependent condition, and 
56.26 seconds in an outcome dependent condition. Ruscher & Fiske 
(1990) reported no significant difference between attention to 
information in their no interdependence (86.27 seconds) and 
interdependence (100.67 seconds) conditions. In their second 
experiment the pattern reversed, with average time spent looking at 
information being 67.90 seconds and 66.82 seconds in the no 
interdependence and interdependence conditions respectively. In the 
studies reported by Neuberg and Fiske (1987; see Chapter 5) only the 
first study assessed attention as time spent looking at information, 
and no main effect for outcome dependence was found (note, however, 
that none was predicted because the provision of inconsistent 
information was argued to automatically lead to individuation). The 
results of these studies therefore reveal no systematic evidence that 
interdependence manipulations do in fact clearly result in an increase 
in the overall attention allocated to the impression formation task. 
The link between interdependence, a motivation to allocate more 
attention, and individuation is not as direct as the social cognitive 
theoretical analysis suggests. However, what is clear in Ruscher et 
al.'s (1991) study is that the type of information subjects attend to 
when forming impressions of ingroup compared to outgroup members 
varies regardless of interdependence. Alternative explanations for 
such findings are outlined in the context of the empirical work of the 
thesis in chapters 6 and 7. At this point it is important to note that 
there seems to be a relationship between forming impressions of 
ingroup members and gaze duration at inconsistent information. We 
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now move on to examine variables that are argued to directly affect 
cognitive capacity and their impact on the impressions that are 
formed. 
4.3.3 Cognitive load and the stereotyping process 
The theoretical position that stereotypes require less effort and 
use fewer resources has also been investigated by trying to 
demonstrate that stereotypes are used more when perceivers' cognitive 
load is increased (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 
1985; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; 
Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard & Birrell, 
1978; Stangor & Duan, 1991). Cognitive load has been mainly 
operationalized through task complexity or cognitive busyness (see 
Spears & Haslam, 1997, for a review). 
The use of stereotypes or heuristics has been shown to increase 
for more complex judgement tasks (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 
1987). However, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) found that cognitive 
busyness only increased stereotyping when the stereotype was 
activated. In the first study reported by Gilbert and Hixon (1991) 
subjects were presented with incomplete words presented on cards by 
either an Asian or Caucasian card-turning assistant. The five key 
word fragments were piloted to be stereotypic of Asians (e.g., POLI_E 
(polite), S_Y (shy), RI_E (rice)). Subjects had to complete the word 
fragments under conditions where they did (busy condition) or did not 
(not busy condition) have to rehearse an eight-digit number. Rather 
than cognitive busyness increasing the use of stereotypes it was 
anticipated that cognitive busyness would inhibit stereotype 
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activation. It was predicted and found that non-busy subjects 
generated more stereotypic completions of the word fragments. 
These findings were replicated in a second study which also 
included a distinct application stage. All subjects had to listen to the 
card-turning assistant describe their day, half of the subjects 
concurrently had to register recognition of letters presented on a 
screen. Results indicated that those subjects not busy in the first stage 
of the experiment and then busy during the activation stage made 
more stereotypic ratings of the Asian than Caucasian card-turning 
assistant. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) concluded that "people are more 
likely to rely on activated stereotypes when conscious deliberation 
becomes difficult, but the very conditions that interfere with conscious 
deliberations may also interfere with the activation of the stereotypes" 
(p. 515). It is important to note that there were few differences in 
performance for those in the overload, busy condition - "cognitive 
busyness did not prevent subjects from performing well on the 
completion task or from noticing the assistant's race" (p. 511). Such 
findings question whether cognitive resources are constrained by 
cognitive load manipulations and suggest perhaps that other factors 
could account for the results obtained. 
Macrae et al. (1993) also manipulated "cognitive busyness" by 
requiring subjects to rehearse an eight digit number while completing 
experimental tasks. The effects of cognitive load on the recall of 
inconsistent and consistent information was the research focus (see 
also Stangor & Duan, 1991). To create a more realistic stimulus 
subjects watched a video depicting a conversation between two women. 
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One of the women (the experimental target) was described to subjects 
as either a hairdresser or doctor and the statements made by her were 
stereotypic of hairdressers (e.g., a hairdresser in the United Kingdom 
"goes to Spain for holidays") and stereotypic of doctors (e.g., "interested 
in politics"). Statements stereotypic of doctors were stereotype-
disconfirming of hairdressers and vice versa. Results showed that 
subjects in the low-load condition recalled more inconsistent than 
consistent information about the target. The reverse was true for the 
high load condition. As in the motivational studies described in the 
last section, use of inconsistent information was argued to reflect a 
reduction in stereotyping. 
Spears and Haslam (1997, also see Haslam, Oakes, Rainbird & 
Spears, 1994) argued that where subjects have to rehearse an eight 
digit number or recognise letters presented on a screen and view 
information about a particular target, they could be confused as to the 
main task of the study. Haslam et a!. (1994) argued that the 
"researchers' manipulation of load is confounded with that of task 
orientation. In their high load condition it is not simply the case that 
subjects have :!l:lQlll information to deal with that might impact upon 
their attentional resources but also that they actually have a different 
task to perform" (p. 6). It is also worth noting that these researchers 
were unable to replicate the results obtained by Macrae et al. (1993). 
The cognitive resources allocated to a particular task have also 
been assessed through performance on a second task. Macrae et a!. 
(1994) had subjects perform two tasks concurrently and subjects were 
told they would be assessed on both tasks. Subjects had to form an 
124 
impression of a target when stereotypic information was absent or 
present. For example, subjects were presented with personality traits 
describing "John" (that he was rebellious, aggressive, dangerous, 
observant and modest) and were asked to form an impression of him. 
In one condition, the stereotype condition, subjects were also told that 
John was a skinhead as each of the five stereotypic and five neutral 
personality traits were presented. 
At the same time subjects had to monitor information presented 
via a tape-recorder. The prediction was that the impression formation 
task would be easier - use less resources - when a category label for the 
target was available. If this was the case then further resources could 
be applied to, and improve performance on, the monitoring task. The 
predictions of the first study were generally supported. Effects were 
also found on subsequent studies where supraliminal and subliminal 
priming techniques were used. 
However, better performance on the second task in Macrae et 
al.'s (1994) studies could be determined by whether an impression 
already existed or not. Subjects were relying on existing impressions 
in the stereotype condition and where no stereotype information was 
provided a new impression was being formed. It would be interesting 
to assess subjects' performance on the concurrent task under 
conditions where subjects in the no stereotype information condition 
had already formed an impression of what John was like as a person. 
There is a clear need to move away from first impressions when 
making predictions about when we individuate and stereotype others. 
It is also worthwhile examining the types of impressions formed under 
125 
conditions where less stereotypic information is provided. For 
example, Yzerbyt, Rocher and Coull (1996a, 1996b) found that 
stereotypes only enhanced information processing when there was a 
moderate degree of stereotypicality. Based on results like these, 
Yzerbyt, Rocher and Schadron (1997) challenged the view that 
stereotypes are energy-saving devices and argued that stereotypes 
have a major sense-making role and are themselves explanations (see 
also Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1992; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991). 
Nolan, Haslam, Spears & Oakes (1996) also offered an 
alternative explanation of stereotyping which moves away from 
cognitive resources based accounts. They endorsed a fit- or meaning-
based approach where an important function of stereotyping was seen 
"to increase access to information about the subjectively real 
similarities and differences between social groups in a given context" 
(p. 10, emphasis in the original). This approach is based on self-
categorization theory which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Subjects were presented with information about six targets (3 
hairdressers and 3 doctors) which was "highly fitting", that is, the 
targets generally behaved in a stereotype-consistent fashion. Load 
was manipulated in the first study as a concurrent task and in the 
second study as time pressure. The main dependent variable was the 
number of intracategory to intercategory confusions on a recognition 
task (after Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978). If stereotypic 
impressions are formed under high load conditions then stereotyping 
should increase with load. However, if the formation of stereotypic 
impressions is related to fit detection then in the high load conditions 
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less stereotyping would be possible. The results indicated that 
subjects made more intercategory compared to intracategory 
confusions (they stereotyped less) as cognitive load increased. The 
results challenge the view that stereotyping is always efficient and 
effortless and encourage further, more direct examinations of the fit-
based approach. 
In summary then, there are clearly issues with the way 
cognitive capacity has been manipulated in the cognitive load 
literature. It is not clear whether the results obtained are due to 
cognitive capacity or alternative explanations such as whether subjects 
have a different task to perform. An associated issue is whether these 
studies are actually manipulating cognitive load. Gilbert and Hixon 
(1991) argued that busy subjects are deprived of processing resources 
and should "perform more poorly than non-busy subjects on a variety 
of indices ... substantial error rates on an overload task are necessary 
if one is to claim unequivocally that capacity is exceeded" (p. 511). If 
limited cognitive resources are the basis for categorization then it 
needs to be clear that "capacity is exceeded" where stereotyping is 
predicted. 
As highlighted by Nolan et al. (1996, p. 7) in the cognitive load 
literature the perceiver is interpreted as a passive processor of 
information. Similarly, Neisser (1976) commented that "the very 
concept of 'capacity' seems better suited to a passive vessel into which 
things are put than to an active developing structure" (p. 80). The 
view that categorization is used to preserve cognitive resources has 
generally focused attention away from more fundamental questions 
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about the purpose of social perception and the perceiver's role in the 
process. Since the early person perception research the perceiver has 
been neglected in understandings of the impression formation process. 
4.4 Conclusions 
There is no doubt that in social cognition research categorization 
is understood as a process which conserves cognitive resources. The 
human perceiver is argued to have limited cognitive capacity and 
categorization is thought to conserve resources through information 
simplification and reduction. However, through simplification and use 
of overgeneralizations information is distorted. When we form 
impressions of others based on their group memberships these 
impressions are seen as inaccurate. It is the process at the heart of 
stereotyping - categorization - which is responsible for the distortion. 
Individuation, on the other hand, is interpreted as inherently 
more accurate, because impressions are based on "idiosyncratic 
attributes" and the person's "actual characteristics". The fact that 
stereotypic impressions are distorted and individuated impressions are 
accurate means these two types of impressions cannot be formed 
through the same process. How can the same process produce 
distorted and accurate social perception? As argued in contemporary 
impression formation models (outlined in Chapter 3) there must be two 
separate impressions formation processes. 
In this chapter, variables thought to mediate when one process 
or the other operates were also discussed. Motivational variables such 
as outcome dependence and accuracy goals should encourage the 
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percmver to allocate more attention and form more individuated 
impressions. Importantly, it has not been clearly shown that there are 
overall increases in attention in outcome dependent conditions or 
conditions where an accuracy goal is provided. In the cognitive load 
literature, where available resources are manipulated directly, it has 
also been difficult to show that cognitive capacity is impeded where 
stereotypic impressions are predicted. In fact there is evidence that 
use of stereotypes can decrease with increased cognitive load. 
Such mixed results would suggest a re-think of the theoretical 
argument that stereotyping occurs because perceivers have limited 
cognitive capacity. However, the theoretical argument that perceivers 
categorize and stereotype to preserve resources continues to direct 
research largely unscathed. In the next chapter, a completely different 
interpretation of the categorization process and social perception is 
outlined- a view presented by self-categorization theory. 
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Chapter 5 
SOCIAL IDENTITY, SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND THE 
ROLE OF THE GROUP IN IMPRESSION FORMATION 
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
5.1 Introduction 
The picture which develops from the last two chapters is that in 
current models of impression formation there are two processes 
through which we can form impressions of others: a categorization-
free process used when we form individuated impressions, and a 
categorization process used when we stereotype others. The way the 
categorization process is understood from the social cognition 
perspective further supports the argument that individuated and 
stereotypic impressions are based on distinct impression formation 
processes. Categorization is conceived as a process which: 1) is 
equated with the formation of stereotypic impressions; 2) distorts and 
biases perception; 3) involves the static application of category labels 
and associated attributes which are stored in memory; and 4) is 
undermined if more attention and cognitive resources are allocated to 
the target person and the impression formation process. 
In this chapter a different approach is explored - one which 
focuses on the role of the perceiver - the self- in impression formation 
and categorization. Research specific to self-categorization theory is 
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the focus. As will be seen, the categorization process is understood in 
a fundamentally different way from this perspective. Categorization is 
portrayed as a dynamic, meaningful, context-dependent assessment of 
relevant similarities and differences which gives stimuli meaning and 
therefore necessarily forms the basis of all social perception. The 
relationship between the perceiver and reality is addressed directly. 
Self-categorization theory forms the basic theoretical orientation for 
the thesis so it is important that the theory and the historical context 
in which it has developed are outlined. The overall message of this 
chapter is that it is the way the categorization process is understood 
that differentiates self-categorization theory from the models of 
impression formation discussed thus far. 
Self-categorization theory has been recently described as "a 
general analysis of the functioning of the categorization process in 
social perception and interaction which speaks to issues of individual 
identity as much as group phenomena" (Oakes eta!., 1994, p. 94). In 
this definition two main themes emerge. The first theme is the 
distinction between "individual identity" and "group phenomena". A 
pervasive assumption of the theory and research discussed in this 
thesis to date is that the individual is the primary psychological reality 
and that social processes can be reduced to, and best explained by, 
individual processes (the work of Asch and Sherif is a clear exception; 
see Asch, 1952; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989, Turner & Oakes, 1997; 
Vinacke, 1957). 
The emphasis on reducing psychological phenomenon to an 
individual explanation is reflected in the early person perception and 
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stereotyping research, and more recently, in the social cognitive 
analysis of stereotyping outlined in the last chapter. It is argued that 
to perceive others as individuals is accurate and valid, but to form 
impressions of others based on their group memberships reflects 
distortion and bias. The reality of the group and group differences are 
rejected without question. This chapter provides an overview of theory 
and research concerned with establishing the reality of the group, and 
reviews the debate surrounding whether group behaviour is distinct 
from individual behaviour. 
The second theme, of the quote above by Oakes et al. (1994) 
concerns how the categorization process operates in social perception. 
There have been a number of significant developments in social 
perception and social cognition which have impacted on the way 
categorization is understood in self-categorization theory. Two 
studies, those by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) and Tajfel, Flament, Billig 
and Bundy (1971) have had a far reaching impact. The former 
addressed issues of accentuation and categorization while the latter 
dealt with similar issues but in the context of the minimal group and 
intergroup behaviour. The work of Henri Tajfel was pivotal to both 
areas of research and the way in which the results from these studies 
were explained and elaborated led to social identity theory. An 
overview of social identity theory is provided. 
Important progress in understanding categorization and 
intergroup behaviour was made through social identity theory and 
related research. In self-categorization theory these developments 
were further integrated and expanded. In attempting to understand 
132 
the psychological relationship between the self and the group a 
completely different conceptualisation of categorization emerged. Two 
assertions about the categorization process that are central to this 
thesis are: 1) that categorization is the only mechanism through 
which stimuli are given meaning and as such, 2) that the formation of 
individuated and stereotypic impressions of others must be based on 
the same categorization process. Both these points affect the way self-
categorization theory is reviewed in this chapter. Other research, 
mainly from the cognition literature, which endorses the view that 
categorization is fundamentally a sense-making process is also 
reviewed. The first step though is to place these ideas in their 
historical, meta-theoretical context which begins with an examination 
of the reality of the group. 
5.2 The reality of the group 
Both social identity theory and self-categorization theory are 
described as non-reductionist theories of the social group. The group is 
seen to have a psychological reality which is distinct, valid and real 
and which cannot be reduced to, or explained by, individual processes. 
The primacy of the individual is rejected because, in many instances, 
"we do not act as isolated individuals but as social beings who derive 
an important part of our identity from the human groups and social 
categories we belong to" (Tajfel, Jaspars and Fraser, 1984, p. 5). 
Therefore, the formation of stereotypic impressions is not seen as 
necessarily distorted or biased. Group-based perceptions have the 
same capacity to reflect social reality as any other type of impression 
formation. 
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Debate over the social and psychological reality of the group has 
been referred to as the "essential problem" in social psychology (F. 
Allport, 1962; Asch, 1952; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1986). 
Throughout the history of social psychology there have been those who 
have accepted and others who have rejected the stance that groups are 
real entities which have a psychological reality. The way in which the 
reality of the group has been debated historically will be initially 
outlined (see Turner, 1987 for a more detailed discussion). 
The pre-experimentalists like LeBon, McDougall and Freud 
theorised about the distinctive features of groups and all, to some 
extent, argued that group behaviour was irrational, driven by 
primitive instincts and emotions. Crowds were argued by LeBon 
(1920) to be characterised by a loss of individual personality, where 
individuals were no longer distinctive and heterogenous: 
whoever be the individuals that compose [the group], however 
like or unlike their mode of life, their occupations, their 
character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been 
transformed into a group puts them in possession of a sort of 
collective mind which makes them feel, think and act in a 
manner quite different from that in which each individual of 
them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. 
(1920, p. 29) 
The transformation from the individual mind to the collective mind 
was characterised by the expression of more primitive unconscious 
instincts: 
a man descends several rungs m the ladder of civilization. 
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Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is 
barbarian - that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses 
the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the 
enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings. (1920, p. 36) 
LeBon's analysis of a collective mind was interwoven with the 
observed features of short-lived groups like crowds or revolutionary 
groups and largely viewed as negative and inferior to individual 
thought and action. 
McDougall (1921) made explicit an inherent contradiction in 
LeBon's work. That is, groups can be better or worse than their 
members, groups need not be inferior to individuals. In groups 
humans can act as barbarians but they can also achieve remarkable 
feats such as language, art, science, morality (Turner, 1987). 
McDougall stated that society "has ideals and aims and traditions 
loftier than any principles of conduct the individual can form for 
himself unaided" (McDougall, 1921, p. 20). Recognition of this paradox 
meant that a different picture of the group-mind developed, in which a 
distinction was drawn between organised groups and more 
spontaneous groups like crowds. The former are seen to lead to the 
realisation of human potentialities through society; "only by 
participation in group life does man become fully man, only so does he 
rise above the level of the savage" (p. 20). Behaviour in unorganised 
groups was characterised, in the same way as by LeBon, as 
"excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent ... 
behaviour ... like an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in 
a strange situation, rather than like that of its average member; and 
in worst cases it is like that of a wild beast, rather than like that of a 
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human being" (p. 45). Therefore, while McDougall recognised the 
positive nature of groups, notions of loss of individual identity or 
'deindividuation', irrationality and increased emotion were also 
evident in his analysis. 
The role of emotion and changes in identity are also central 
aspects of Freud's work. Consistent with Freud's theorising in other 
domains, group formation was seen as the product of sexual emotional 
ties and emotional bonds (Freud, 1959, first translated in 1922). 
Group members were seen as being infatuated with their leader who 
then became part of the member's ideal self. The shared relationship 
and emotional ties between the members and their leader was argued 
to generate mutual identification and suggestibility. Freud's work 
concentrated more on the specifics of group formation and the 
processes of emotional suggestion and identification. 
A common theme shared by each of these pre-experimental 
approaches was the role of emotion and loss of one's individual 
personality. Interestingly, individual identity was seen as more 
rational, intelligent and civilized. When people act as a group 
member, for example, as part of a crowd, they were generally 
characterised as more barbarian, primitive and driven by instincts. 
All the pre-experimentalists, however, clearly recognised the existence 
of groups and the psychological impact of groups on individuals. 
A different view emerged from behaviourists like Floyd Allport 
who rejected evidence of a group mind. In a behaviourist tradition, 
Allport argued that there is no distinct group psychology and that 
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evidence of group behaviour could be understood in terms of how 
people learn to act in different situations. He clearly stated that there 
is "no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a 
psychology of individuals ... There is likewise no consciousness except 
that belonging to individuals" (F. Allport, 1924, p. 4). For Allport, the 
individual is the only psychological reality, a group is no more than the 
sum of the individual members that comprise it (Turner, 1987; Oakes 
et al., 1994). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Sherif and Asch developed a very 
different and more interactionist analysis of the group which, like 
Allport's, was experimental in nature. They argued that there was a 
reality to the group, and that groups could be psychologically 
represented. These group-based representations were not seen as 
irrational or the product of a "faulty" process. Through interaction 
between the individual and society individuals were psychologically 
changed (Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989, 1997). It was argued that there 
were collective group products like norms, stereotypes and values 
created by groups rather than individuals. 
Sherif (1936) clearly rejected Allport's argument that the group 
was merely the sum of individual components. Applying principles of 
Gestalt psychology, which assumed that higher order properties were 
different from their constituent parts, Sherif argued that people in 
interaction generated whole, new, social products. Groups were seen 
to have emergent properties, the product of interaction between the 
individual and the group, which could not be understood through 
examination of the individual members alone. When these collective 
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products were internalised the individual became a psychological 
group member. Sherif (1961) argued that "at the psychological level, 
then, the individual becomes a group member to the extent that he 
internalizes the major norms of the group ... his very identity and self-
conception becomes closely tied to his status and role in the group" (p. 
8). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the area where Sherifs work has had 
the most impact is in the area of intergroup relations. He advocated 
that to change group attitudes like stereotypes the relationship 
between the groups needed to be altered; "it is exceedingly difficult to 
change attitudes when intergroup relations remain the same 
attitudes toward other groups and images of them are products of 
particular relationships between groups, not their original cause" 
(Sherif, 1967, p. 25). The point that stereotypes are the product and 
not the cause of intergroup relations is important. Often in the 
current stereotyping literature it seems that stereotypes are seen to be 
responsible for intergroup relations, rather than a representation of 
the relationships between groups in society. 
Asch (1952), like Sherif, argued that there were inherent group 
properties, that there was a "mutually shared psychological field" (p. 
142). He focused on how group action was possible, and its impact on 
individuals. The psychological process associated with group 
behaviour was described as arising: 
when each participant has a representation that includes the 
actions of others and their relations. The respective actions 
converge relevantly, assist and supplement each other only when 
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the joint situation is represented in each and when the 
representations are structurally similar. Only when these 
conditions are given can individuals subordinate themselves to 
the requirements of joint actions. These representations and the 
actions that they initiate bring group facts into existence and 
produce the phenomenal solidarity of group processes. (1952, p. 
251-252) 
He clearly argued that there was a "socially structured field within the 
individual" (p. 253) and that individuals could think and act in terms 
of this shared field. 
Asch also explicitly understood the implications of the 
alternative theoretical argument which endorsed individualism and 
the belief that groups are the "shorthand expressions for the 
innumerable specific activities of individuals" (Asch, 1952, p. 241). He 
stated that if there was no group reality then "the logical conclusion 
would be that group facts are subjective constructions and that the 
facts of social life are the result of psychological error" (1952, p. 246). 
The themes of distortion, bias, and misrepresentation evident m 
current stereotyping literature support aspects of Asch's prophecy. 
There are clearly those who argue that group behaviour can be 
reduced to individual behaviour and others like Asch and Sherif, who 
argue that group behaviour has distinct, emergent properties. 
However, debate surrounding the reality of the group and 
psychological group membership has declined since the 1950s and 
1960s. There is evidence that the study of group phenomena became 
more dispersed with increased interest in intragroup behaviour and 
characteristics like group cohesiveness and interdependence (Hogg, 
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1992). However, mainly through the work of Henri Tajfel and 
colleagues, questions regarding the reality of the group and related 
explanations of intergroup and group behaviour continued to develop. 
These developments are the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
Two areas of research - accentuation effects influenced by the 
"New Look" tradition in perception and the minimal group studies -
have impacted significantly on how group phenomena are understood 
and explained. Discussion of research relevant to each of these areas 
is followed by general overviews of both social identity theory and self-
categorization theory (detailed reviews can be found elsewhere e.g., 
Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987; 
Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989; Turner et al., 1994). 
5.3 Categorization and accentuation 
Tajfel was initially interested in the judgement process and was 
heavily influenced by the 'New Look' tradition in perception (Bruner, 
1958; Tajfel, 1980). A general principle of this approach was that 
"perception must be understood as an active interaction between the 
human organism and its environment" (Tajfel, 1980, p. 76). Up until 
this time, and in the spirit of much of the early person perception 
research (see Chapter 2), perception was defined in terms of the 
establishment of "close and invariant relationships between the 
sensory input and its perceptual outcome" (Tajfel, 1980, p. 76). As will 
be seen, Tajfel brought to the area of social psychology an 
understanding of the categorization process from perceptual and 
cognitive orientations. 
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Tajfel (1981) argued strongly against the v1ew that 
categorization and stereotyping were irrational. It did not make sense 
to him that the human mind was considered efficient and effective in 
the physical world but when applied to the social environment it was 
seen as primitive and deficient. Tajfel wrote, "it is as if we are 
suddenly dealing with a different and strange animal that uses some 
of his abilities to adapt to some aspects of his environment, and is 
quite incapable of using them to adapt to others" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 128). 
Three functional cognitive processes - categorization, assimilation and 
the search for coherence- emerged from Tajfel's analysis (Tajfel, 1969). 
Categorization and the associated issue of accentuation has received 
much research attention. 
5.3.1 Accentuation effects 
A classic study by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) provided evidence of 
the accentuation effects of categorization. The basic theoretical 
principle to emerge from this study was that "when a classification is 
correlated with a continuous dimension, there will be a tendency to 
exaggerate the differences on that dimension between items which fall 
into distinct classes, and to minimise these differences within each of 
the classes" (Tajfel, 1969, p. 83). Categorization was seen to 
accentuate or exaggerate the differences between groups so they are 
perceived "as if they are more similar and different than they could, in 
principle, be shown to be" (Oakes & Turner, 1990, p. 116, 
paraphrasing Tajfel 1972). 
In the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study, subjects were asked to 
judge in centimetres the length of eight lines which varied in length by 
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a constant ratio. In the classified and randomly classified conditions 
the lines were labelled with an 'A' or a 'B'. In the classified condition 
there was a predictable relationship between the line length and the 
way the lines were labelled, with the four smaller lines labelled with a 
capital letter 'A' and the larger lines labelled with a 'B'. The labels in 
this study can be interpreted as the peripheral dimension and the 
length of the lines as the focal dimension. In the randomly classified 
condition half the lines were randomly labelled A and half B. In this 
condition there was no stable or predictable relationship between the 
length of the lines and the labels. In the unclassified condition the 
lines were presented without labels. 
The results indicated that the difference in length between the 
lines labelled A and those labelled B was exaggerated in the classified 
condition. There was also some evidence that classification could lead 
to an accentuation of similarity in length among lines sharing the 
same label. The accentuation principle was supported by, and clearly 
articulated in, this study. There was evidence that the similarities 
within and differences between the two groups were accentuated when 
there was a "correlation" between the "classification" and the 
"continuous dimension" (Tajfel, 1969, p. 83). 
The Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study suggested that accentuation 
was an automatic, uncontrollable by-product of the categorization 
process. The accentuation effect has been shown to be robust and 
reliable not only with the categorization of physical stimuli but also 
with social stimuli (see also Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; McGarty & Penny, 
1988). In support of Tajfel's analysis of the categorization process and 
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its potential application to real groups Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner 
(1964) assessed Canadians' stereotypes of Indians. Canadian subjects 
listened to live interviews of two Indians and two Canadians and rated 
them on a number of scales. The two Indians were seen as more 
similar to each other on traits relevant to the Indian stereotype and 
the Canadians were seen as more similar on dimensions associated 
with the Canadian stereotype. 
A number of other studies have been conducted which support 
categorization and accentuation with social stimuli. These studies are 
important because they establish a central point in terms of the 
empirical work in this thesis, that a fundamental aspect of 
categorization is accentuation. Some relevant studies will be 
elaborated. Doise and colleagues conducted a number of studies of 
accentuation. In one study, 10 year old boys and girls were asked to 
describe a member of one gender group under conditions where they 
did or did not anticipate describing a member of the other group. 
Intracategory similarity and intercategory difference were accentuated 
where there was awareness that both groups would be assessed (Doise, 
1978). Additional evidence was found in a study by Doise, Deschamps 
and Meyer (1978, Experiment 2) where three ethnic groups in 
Switzerland (German, French and Italian) were described by Swiss 
school children on a set of 16 positive and negative traits. They found 
that in conditions where one of these groups was substituted with 
members from a different country (eg. Germans from Germany) the 
two Swiss groups were seen as more similar. In other words, the 
intragroup differences among Swiss linguistic groups was reduced 
when a non-Swiss outgroup was included in the frame of reference. A 
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series of studies by Wilder have also consistently found evidence of the 
accentuation effects associated with intragroup and intergroup 
categorizations (e.g., Wilder, 1981, 1986; see Oakes et al., 1994, 
Chapter 3 for a review). 
Evidence that categorization and therefore stereotyping were 
part of normal cognitive functioning and were not due to personality 
factors or cognitive deficits (cf. Sherif, 1967) led to an increase in 
stereotyping research, particularly in work examining a link between 
cognitive processes and stereotyping. A study conducted by Taylor et 
al. (1978) also built on Tajfel's work and adopted a methodology that 
has since been widely used to examine accentuation effects (e.g., 
Hewstone, Hantzi & Johnston, 1991; Miller, 1986; Stangor, Lynch, 
Duan & Glass, 1992). Subjects listened to a discussion between six 
people and as each person was speaking a picture (supposedly) of the 
speaker was presented. The main dependent variable was whether 
subjects could recall "who said what". Three studies were conducted, 
one where the race of the discussants was varied (3 white and 3 black 
targets), another where sex rather than race was the basis of 
categorization (3 male and 3 female targets) and another where the 
sex of the six people in the discussion was varied from all male to all 
female. 
In the first study where subjects listened to three white and 
three black men discuss a publicity campaign for a play, intraracial 
confusion was found to be higher than interracial confusion. In other 
words, subjects were able to more accurately indicate whether a black 
or white person made the statement than indicate which speaker 
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within a racial category had made a particular statement. The results 
were similar in a second experiment where the speakers were three 
females and three males. These two studies provide additional 
support for the accentuating effect of categorization. 
The third study in this series demonstrated that when there are 
fewer members of one group compared to another (e.g., 1 female and 5 
males), the member/s of the smaller group (e.g., the 1 female) are 
perceived as more assertive and influential and were rated in more 
stereotypical terms (e.g., more feminine). The findings are used to 
support the position that distinctive and infrequent information is 
attended to more by subjects (see Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991 for 
an alternative explanation based on the principles of fit; see also 
Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Oakes, 1994). 
These studies provide widespread evidence to support the 
hypothesis that similarities within and differences between groups are 
accentuated following categorization. However, as identified in a 
study by McGarty and Penny (1988; see also McGarty & Turner, 
1992), not all research has found inter-class and intra-class effects 
concurrently. They argued that the basis of categorization needs to be 
"perceptually meaningful or salient ... where the correlation between 
the peripheral and focal dimensions is high (high fit), and the 
categorization is readily available, accessible or otherwise useful for 
the categorization task" (p. 149). Importantly then, accentuation 
would seem to be sensitive to perceiver and contextual factors and may 
not be as automatic and uncontrollable as social cognitive theories of 
categorization would suggest. 
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The effect Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) identified with the 
judgement of lines has been broadly applied to perception of social 
groups and stereotyping. Tajfel himself clearly argued that 
stereotypes: 
arise from a process of categorization. They introduce simplicity 
and order where there is complexity and nearly random variation. 
They can help us to cope only if fuzzy differences between groups 
are transmuted into clear ones, or new differences created where 
none exist ... in each relevant situation we shall achieve as much 
stereotyped simplification as we can without doing unnecessary 
violence to the facts. (Tajfel, 1969, p. 82) 
The analysis that stereotyping was the product of a normal cognitive 
process that may introduce "simplicity and order" motivated a 
categorization approach to stereotyping which was outlined in detail in 
the previous chapter (e.g., Hamilton, 1979; Taylor 1981a, 1981b). The 
relationship between categorization and accentuation established by 
Tajfel also led to a reinterpretation of intergroup theory and research. 
5.3.2 The minimal group 
Tajfel was particularly interested in the conditions under which 
interindividual behaviour shifts to intergroup behaviour. He initially 
set out to determine the minimal conditions necessary for intergroup 
discrimination (cf. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). In a now famous article 
by Tajfel et al. (1971) an experiment was reported which had been 
designed to minimise variables typically associated with ingroup 
favouritism and discrimination, such as a history of hostility, personal 
interaction or conflicts of interest. Schoolboys were divided into two 
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groups supposedly on the basis of their preference for the abstract 
painters Klee and Kandinsky. The assignment to groups was in fact 
random. 
The groups were "minimal" in the sense that there was no social 
interaction between the groups or shared goals, and the boys did not 
know who was in their group. The main dependent measure was the 
allocation of rewards to other individuals defined only in terms of their 
code number and group membership (e.g., Klee or Kandinsky). Tajfel 
(1981) argued that the studies could also be seen as "maximal" in the 
sense that a situation was created where "members of one group act 
towards members of another in complete disregard of the individual 
differences between them. The (imposed) anonymity of the 'outsiders' 
insured in the experiments that no variations would occur in the way 
they were treated" (p. 241; see also Diehl, 1990). 
Tajfel et a!. (1971) found that subjects not only favoured their 
ingroup but used reward strategies which maximised ingroup gain 
relative to outgroup gain. The finding that with social categorization 
comes homogeneous group behaviour and ingroup bias has gained 
considerable support since this study was reported (e.g., Billig & 
Tajfel, 1973; Perdue, Dovido, Gurtman & Tyler, 1990; Spears & 
Manstead, 1989; see Tajfel, 1978b; Turner, 1978, 1980). The ongoing 
significance of this and related studies concerns the theoretical 
explanation which led to an alternative analysis of intergroup 
behaviour - social identity theory. 
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5.4 Social identity theory 
One of the most important points which Tajfel (1972) identified 
from minimal group studies like the one outlined above was that the 
minimal group created a "meaningless" situation for participants, and 
that meaning could be imbued by acting in terms of group 
memberships. That is, participants could make a distinction between 
"their own 'group' and the other, between the two social categories in a 
truly minimal 'social system'. Distinction from the 'other' category 
provided ipso facto an identity for their own group, and thus some kind 
of meaning to an otherwise empty situation" (1972, pp. 39-40). The 
selective and meaning-giving features of the categorization process 
were recognised by Tajfel, who argued that the main function of 
categorization was to give the environment meaning and to afford 
action (Tajfel, 1972; see also Bruner, 1957a, 1957b). Also for Tajfel, 
categorization and group memberships enabled one to create and 
define one's place in the social world (Tajfel, 1978a). 
Tajfel (1978c) recognised that there was a relationship between 
the individual and their group memberships. One aspect of this 
relationship is that individuals want to evaluate themselves positively, 
so ingroup and outgroup distinctions are made in such a way as to 
ensure positive distinctiveness between their own and other relevant 
outgroups. Tajfel (1978a) linked the individual self-concept and group 
behaviour further through the notion of social identity, described as 
"that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that group 
membership" (p. 63). 
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These ideas regarding the linkages between group behaviour 
and individual behaviour led to the development of the interpersonal-
intergroup continuum. Behaviour at the intergroup extreme was 
characterised by membership in social groups, and behaviour at the 
interpersonal extreme was characterised as being based on "personal 
relations" and "individual characteristics" (Tajfel, 1979, p. 401). As 
outlined in the previous chapter, a similar differentiation forms the 
basis of the continuum (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and dual-process 
models (Brewer, 1988) but without general recognition that there is a 
distinctively group-based social reality. Both intergroup and 
interpersonal social reality were given equal status on the continuum 
by Tajfel. Through placement at opposite ends of the continuum they 
were also recognised as distinct. 
Tajfel (1978a) developed a number of other continua in the 
theory of intergroup relations, such as social change and social 
mobility, and variability and social uniformity. All relate 
psychological processes to the reality of social conditions and their 
perceived social structure. But it was the explicit link made between 
the self and the group that provided fertile ground for further analysis 
of the essential problem in social psychology, the relationship between 
the individual and the group, between the psychology of the individual 
and the realities of group life (Tajfel, 1979; Turner et al., 1987; Turner 
& Oakes, 1986, 1989). 
Turner (1982, 1984) developed aspects of social identity theory 
by proposing "a tentative and provisional theory of group behaviour in 
149 
terms of an identity mechanism" (1984, p. 526). The identity 
mechanism provided an important link between the interpersonal and 
intergroup ends of the continuum and elaborated a psychological basis 
for understanding individual and group behaviour. The interpersonal-
intergroup continuum is transformed through the "identity 
mechanism" into a cognitive, social psychological theory of the group. 
Turner's (1982, 1984) "self-stereotyping hypothesis" placed self-
identification or self-categorization at the core of the theory. He 
argued that "it is the cognitive redefinition of the self- from unique 
attributes and individual differences to shared social category 
memberships and associated stereotypes - that mediates group 
behaviour" (1984, p. 528). The "cognitive redefinition" is the process 
which explains how individuals can psychologically be group members 
and "reinstates the group as a psychological reality and not merely a 
convenient label for describing the outcome of interpersonal processes" 
(Turner, 1984, p. 535). 
Two aspects of self-definition or self-categorization - personal 
identity and social identity- were seen as the causal underpinnings of 
the different forms of social behaviour represented at the interpersonal 
and intergroup ends of the continuum, respectively. Personal identity 
encompassed personal identifications where specific idiosyncratic 
attributes emerge from one's sense of self as unique and different from 
all other people (relevant to the particular comparison being made). 
Social identity contained social identifications which are self-
descriptions that emerged from social category memberships - the 
conception we have of ourselves which is attributable to our group 
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memberships (Tajfel, 1979; Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner et a!., 1987). 
Aspects of the "identity mechanism" and "self-identification 
hypothesis" have been developed and refined in self-categorization 
theory. 
5.5 Self-categorization theory 
Social identity theory has proved to be a fruitful theory of group 
and intergroup behaviour. While positive self-evaluations and 
motivational variables were central to social identity theory, social 
cognitive variables are essential aspects of self-categorization theory. 
Self-categorization theory has been described as explaining "variations 
in how people define and categorize themselves and the effects of such 
variations" (Turner, 1991, p. 155; Turner et a!., 1987). Through the 
identity mechanism and the self-identification hypothesis variations in 
self-identity became fundamental to the analysis of the reality of the 
group. It was necessary to explain and understand personal as well as 
social identity and the relationship between them. In light of Tajfel's 
"meaning" emphasis, and consistent with the meta-theoretical 
recognition of the reality of the group, a dynamic, context-dependent, 
categorization process was elaborated, to afford selective and relative 
but not oversimplified or impoverished perception (Turner & Oakes, 
1997). 
Rather than duplicating the number of rev1ews of self-
categorization theory that already exist (e.g., Hogg, 1992; Turner, 
1991; Turner eta!., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989; Turner eta!., 
1994) in this section the theory will be elaborated in terms of two 
related themes central to this thesis. First, the way in which 
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categorization gives stimuli meaning will be described, and secondly 
the role of categorization in the formation of individuated and 
stereotypic impressions will be explored. 
5.5.1 Categorization as a meaning-giving process 
In self-categorization theory it is argued that all perception 
involves categorization and that categorization itself is a process used 
to give stimuli context-dependent meaning. There is agreement with 
Bruner, who clearly stated that categorization is pivotal to all 
perception in his paper "On Perceptual Readiness" (1957a). He argued 
that "all perceptual experience is necessarily the end product of a 
categorization process" (p. 124) and based this conclusion on two main 
arguments. First, what is perceived is given meaning by the class of 
objects with which it is grouped. Therefore unless an object is 
categorized it is not possible for that object to have the "more 
elaborated, connotative meaning" (Bruner, 1957a, p. 148) which stems 
from giving stimulus information an identity based on previous 
knowledge. Second, information that is not categorized cannot be 
described or communicated; "if perceptual experience is ever had raw, 
ie., free of categorical identity, it is doomed to be a gem serene, locked 
in the silence of private experience" (Bruner, 1957a, p. 125). 
A third point highlighted by Oakes and Turner (1990) is that 
categorization does not involve merely placing structure on a formless, 
invariant environment but involves abstracting real constancies and 
variation in the stimulus environment in a way meaningful for the 
perceiver (see also Bruner, 1957a, b; Neisser, 1987a; Rosch, 1978). 
Reality is not seen as homogeneous or uniform. There are an infinite 
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number of ways in which information in the stimulus environment can 
be categorized. The question is, why do we perceive some similarities 
and differences and not others (this issue has also been addressed in 
the cognitive literature which is discussed in the next section)? 
The context-dependence of meaning is central to the way 
categorization is understood in self-categorization theory. Three 
interrelated factors - perceiver readiness, comparative fit and 
normative fit - define the selective, meaningful and relational 
properties of categorization. Perceiver readiness builds on Bruner's 
(1957) notion of accessibility and relates to "the tendency for certain 
ways of categorizing to be more accessible as a function of perceivers' 
expectations, motives, values and goals" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 199). 
Past experiences also constrain the perceiver's "readiness" to construct 
particular categories. Importantly, the concept of perceiver readiness 
highlights the point that perception is relative to the perceiver; "that 
we see the world veridically but in a way that is useful and relevant to 
our goals and needs and stamped by our values and theories" (Oakes 
et al., 1994, p. 201; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1997). 
Perceiver readiness and the observed features of the stimulus 
environment interact to produce context-specific categorization. The 
principles of comparative fit and normative fit are also used to explain 
category salience. The meta-contrast principle is the basis of 
comparative fit (Turner, 1985). This principle states that in a 
particular context, stimuli will be categorized as the same when the 
average differences perceived between them (intra-class differences) 
are less than the differences between them and other stimuli (inter-
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class differences) within the comparative context (Campbell, 1958; 
Codol, 1975; Rosch, 1978; Tajfel, 1969; Turner et al., 1987; Tversky, 
1977). Categories are formed through a context specific assessment of 
similarity and difference. For example, an individual would be 
perceived as Australian to the extent that the differences between the 
individual and other Australians was perceived as less than the 
differences between Australians and Americans in that particular 
comparative context. Based on the principles of comparative fit, in 
another situation Australians and Americans could also be seen as 
more similar if, for example, non-English speakers were included in 
the frame of reference (see Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1993; Haslam, 
Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992). 
However, to categorise people as Australians compared to 
Americans there must not only be similarities within and differences 
between the groups, but these must be in the right direction on the 
relevant dimensions of comparison. So there is a content as well as a 
structural dimension to categorization. Normative fit relates to the 
content dimension, the direction or meaning of the categorization in a 
particular social environment (see Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1991). It 
follows that people's normative beliefs play an important role in the 
perceptual selectivity of the categorization process; "similarities and 
differences must be consistent with our normative beliefs and theories 
about the substantive social meaning of the social category" (Turner et 
al., 1994, p. 455). 
Self-categorization theory argues, then, that categories are 
formed to reflect the interaction between context-specific, relative 
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judgements of similarity and difference (comparative and normative 
fit) and the perceiver's background theories, experiences, motives and 
goals (perceiver readiness). This interpretation of the categorization 
process is clearly distinct from the view that categorization distorts 
reality through the static application of stored category labels and 
associated attributes. Importantly, though, self-categorization theory 
can explain stability (as well as fluidity) in the generation of particular 
categorizations (Turner et al., 1994). If the perceiver's relationship to 
reality is defined in the same way over time then the same 
categorization will result not because the cognitive system is static, or 
categories and attributes are stored in a fixed way, but because the 
categorization process used to form these judgements is rational, 
context-dependent and selective. 
5.5.2 The formation of individuated and stereotypic impressions 
Given that all perception is relative to the perceiver the 
impressions we form of others must depend on self-categorization - the 
way we perceive ourselves in a given context. These self-
categorizations are defined by the principles of perceiver readiness and 
comparative and normative fit. But, as outlined earlier, self-
categorization theory endorses and reflects a meta-theoretical 
tradition where veridical social perception involves both individuated 
and group perception. Both groups and individuals are seen "to exist 
objectively". Therefore, both personal (individual) and social (group) 
categorizations are necessary to reflect and represent social life (Oakes 
et al., 1994, p. 189). 
Self-categorization theory recogmses that it IS valid and 
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accurate to perceive ourselves and others as individuals who are 
distinct and unique, and as group members, for example as 
Australians, who are similar and interchangeable with all other 
Australians. There are not only variations in the way we can 
categorise ourselves and others but also in the level of inclusiveness of 
categorization. 
The concepts of personal and social identity have been developed 
further within self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) to reflect 
"variations in how people define and categorize themselves" (Turner, 
1991, p. 155) and are conceptualised within a hierarchical model of 
categorization (cf. Rosch, 1978; Turner et al., 1987). For theoretical 
clarity, three levels of self-categorization are identified; the 
superordinate (self as a human being), intermediate (self as a group 
member) and subordinate (self as an individual person). The 
superordinate level, is more inclusive than the intermediate and so on. 
Social identity is represented at the intermediate level, where 
ingroup and outgroup categorizations are based on the similarities 
within and differences between social groups. Stereotyping and group-
based impressions occur when we perceive others as ingroup members 
(members of the same group as self) in relation to outgroup members 
(members of a different group from self). Personal identity operates at 
the subordinate level where differentiations are made between oneself 
and other ingroup members. Thus, personal identity is based on 
individual differentiation within an ingroup context, where we 
accentuate differences between ourselves and others on relevant 
dimensions. 
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Importantly, based on the principles of comparative and 
normative fit, it is possible to predict when we will form stereotypic 
and individuated impressions of ourselves and others. It is argued 
that a shared social identity and stereotypic impressions can only 
develop when another relevant group (outgroup) exists to provide a 
contrast. When no such outgroup exists similarities and differences 
will be found within the group, leading to person-based (individuated) 
rather than group-based (stereotypic) impressions. As stated in Oakes 
et al. (1994): 
meta-contrast can only find category identity for a group of 
stimuli by differentiating a contrasting category within the same 
context. A person cannot be defined as ingroup in contrast to 
outgroup where only ingroup members are available for 
comparison: a less inclusive level of (personal) self-categorization 
which contrasts the person with ingroup members must be found. 
(p. 190, see also Oakes, 1997) 
The key point is that the same categorization process, but operating at 
different levels of abstraction, is used to form stereotypic and 
individuated impressions of ourselves and others. At the ingroup-
outgroup level intra-group similarities and inter-group differences are 
accentuated, and if interpersonal comparisons are relevant this shifts 
to an accentuation of intra-individual similarities and inter-individual 
differences (Oakes et al., 1994; Simon, Pantaleo & Mummendey, 1995; 
Spears & Doosje, 1996). Stereotypic and individuated impressions are 
both products of categorization. 
In summary, then, the formation of both stereotypic and 
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individuated impressions is seen as psychologically valid; "it is no 
more wrong to categorize people as groups than it is to categorize them 
as individuals" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 189). The way in which we 
categorise ourselves and others is explained by the principles of 
perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit. As will be 
seen in the next section there is correspondence between the way 
categorization is understood in self-categorization and recent work in 
the cognitive literature. Issues of similarity and of the importance of 
background theories are particularly relevant. 
5.6 Understanding categorization from the cognitive 
perspective 
Recent developments in the cognitive literature, which are 
outlined in this section, support the view that categorization is a 
sense-making, meaning-giving process. From a cognitive perspective, 
there is clear recognition that the perceiver's knowledge and theories 
about the world interact with the information available in a particular 
situation to give that situation meaning. 
An approach to cognition has been developed which recognises 
"ecological" and "intellectual" factors in the perception process 
(Neisser, 1987b; see also Oakes et al., 1994, Chapter 5 for a review). 
Both of these concepts will be elaborated. The so called ecological 
factors refer to real similarities and differences in the stimulus 
environment on which basis categories are formed. Building on the 
work of Rosch and colleagues, reality is understood as heterogeneous; 
"combinations of attributes of real objects do not occur uniformly" 
(Rosch et al., 1976, p. 383). A good example of this point is the 
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category "bird", where it is a fact of the perceptual world that wings 
and feathers co-occur more frequently than wings and fur (Rosch, 
1978, p. 29). 
Categories are not seen to be arbitrary but formed through 
selective attention to real patterns of similarity and difference. The 
argument for real invariances relates directly to Bruner's (1957, p. 
127) notion of fit: 
Representation consists of knowing how to utilise cues with 
reference to a system of categories. It also depends upon the 
creation of a system of categories-in-relationship that fit the 
nature of the world in which the person must live. 
There is an infinite number of ways in which the in variances in the 
world can be perceived in terms of similarity and difference. The 
essential question is why, out of all the possibilities, do we select 
particular categories and not others. Both Bruner and Rosch argued 
that categorization works to maximise information so the categories 
selected are those which are meaningful for the perceiver in a 
particular context (also see Medin, 1988). 
Intellectual factors, such as "theories" about the way the world 
works, mediate the relationship between ecological factors and the 
categories which are used to represent reality. A model has been 
developed by Medin and colleagues where there is a progression away 
from the classical and probabilistic views of category formation 
towards a knowledge or theory-based approach (for summary see 
Medin, 1989; see also Nosofsky 1988, 1989). At the core of this shift is 
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a recognition of limitations with the notion of similarity. Problems 
with similarity are based on the traditional view, which drive 
prototype and exemplar models, that categories are fixed and defined 
by the similarity of component attributes (see Smith & Zarate, 1992 
for a different interpretation of the exemplar view). 
Murphy and Medin (1985) argued that the concept of similarity 
is generally under-defined. Is it not the case that all things could be 
seen as similar? They elaborated this point through the example that 
a plum and a lawn mower can be seen as similar because both are 
found on the same planet, weigh less than 1000 kg and can be 
dropped. In this example there is similarity but no meaningful 
categorization. Some similarities between objects give meaning while 
others are irrelevant. Meaning is argued to be dependent upon the 
situation and the perceiver's knowledge. People's theories about the 
stimulus environment direct the categorization process and define the 
basis on which objects will be compared; "concepts are coherent to the 
extent that they fit people's background knowledge or naive theories of 
the world" (Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987, p. 25; see also Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). 
Evidence for this theory-based approach comes from rule 
induction studies such as those by Nakamura, Wisniewski & Medin 
(cited in Medin, 1989; see also Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987) where 
subjects rated pictures of people drawn by children. The way the 
pictures were categorized was affected by the information given about 
the children who drew them. Subjects were informed that the pictures 
were drawn by children who were: 1) from the farm or city; 2) creative 
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or non-creative; or 3) mentally healthy or emotionally disturbed. It 
was clear that the interpretation of the stimulus itself was affected by 
the various category labels. For example, when given the farrnicity 
labels, farm children's drawings were each seen to reflect aspects of 
farm life. It was not that certain "given" features of the drawings 
increased or decreased in salience. Rather the stimulus information 
changed in meaning in order to support the categorization rules that 
were developed in each of the conditions. Based on evidence like this, 
the role of knowledge and theories in the categorization process is 
increasingly being recognised (e.g., Barsalou, 1987; Brown, P. & 
Turner, 1996; Klein & Kunda, 1992; Kunda, Miller & Claire, 1990; 
McCauley, 1987; McGarty & Grace, 1996; Medin & Wattenmaker, 
1987; Michalski, 1989; Rips, 1989; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). 
From a cognitive perspective, there is clear recognition that the 
perceiver's knowledge and theories about the world interact with the 
information available to give that information meaning. 
Categorization is seen as a selective process where theories are used 
and developed to explain relevant variations in the stimulus 
environment. The analysis of categorization in self-categorization 
theory, and the work of Bruner, Rosch, Neisser, Medin and colleagues, 
suggest that categorization is not a process which distorts information. 
Rather it identifies categorization as the route to meaningful 
perception. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Three important points emerge from this chapter which are 
central to the thesis. Firstly, in the section on the reality of the group 
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a fundamentally different role of the group in impression formation 
and social behaviour has been outlined. The argument was presented 
that reality is not just made up of individuals, but that groups exist 
and therefore need to be psychologically represented. As outlined by 
Asch and Sherif, the internalization of group norms can transform 
individual behaviour into group behaviour. This position challenges 
the classic individualism which has shaped past and present 
impression formation theory and research. Through the work of Henri 
Tajfel and colleagues questions regarding the reality of the group 
continued to develop and have led to social identity theory and self-
categorization theory. Both theories were outlined but with a focus on 
the way categorization is understood and how categorization relates to 
the formation of individuated and stereotypic impressions. 
Secondly, categorization is understood in self-categorization 
theory as a meaning-giving process used to make relative, context-
dependent judgements of similarity and difference from the perceiver's 
perspective. The view of categorization as a meaning-giving process 
stands in direct opposition to the position taken in the impression 
formation models, outlined previously, that to categorize and 
stereotype is distorted, biased and inaccurate. In self-categorization 
theory, and the cognitive literature reviewed, a complex analysis of the 
relationship between the perceiver and the stimulus environment has 
been developed. 
Thirdly, because of the preceding two points that 1) both 
individuals and groups are seen to exist objectively and 2) 
categorization is a meaning-giving process which underlies all social 
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perception, it follows that 3) both person and group perception must 
involve categorization. Importantly, the same categorization process 
but operating at different levels of abstraction is argued to be used 
when we form individuated and stereotypic impressions of others. 
Self-categorization theory makes some very specific predictions 
regarding when we will individuate and stereotype ourselves and 
others. 
There are clearly two conflicting accounts of the impression 
formation process, and of variations in impressions formation. On the 
one hand, it is argued in current impression formation models that 
there are two impression formation processes and that the allocation of 
attention and cognitive resources determines when individuated and 
stereotypic impressions of others are formed. On the other hand, it is 
argued in self-categorization theory that all impressions are formed 
through the same categorization process but that it is variation in the 
level of abstraction - interpersonal or intergroup - that determines 
whether individuated or stereotypic impressions are formed, 
respectively. The juxtaposition of these two perspectives defines the 
aims of the empirical work in this thesis. The aims are: 1) to 
determine whether attention or contextual variations can best account 
for variations in impression formation (chapters 6 and 7); and 2) to 
investigate whether both stereotypic and individuated impressions are 
formed through the same categorization process (chapters 8 and 9). 
Details of the empirical issues, methods of investigation and the 
findings are the focus of the next four chapters. 
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Chapter6 
INTERDEPENDENCE, COMPARATIVE CONTEXT AND 
VARIATIONS IN IMPRESSION FORMATION 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous theoretical chapters two main perspectives on 
impression formation have been detailed: the social cognition 
attention model and self-categorization theory. A number of issues 
emerge from the differences between these perspectives. A crucial 
question is under what conditions are individuated and stereotypic 
impressions formed? Are variations in impressions determined by the 
comparative context, either interpersonal or intergroup? Does 
stereotyping increase when perceivers are unmotivated to allocate 
attentional resources? These questions are directly investigated in the 
first experiment of the thesis reported in this chapter. 
Motivational factors (interdependence) and comparative context 
(interpersonal, intergroup) are included as variables in the 
experimental design. In the experiment subjects had to form an 
impression of a constant target - their opponent. Feedback about 
subject's own group membership was varied in order to manipulate 
comparative context in line with self-categorization theory. The 
subject and opponent were members of the same group in 
interpersonal conditions but members of opposite groups in intergroup 
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conditions. The salience of the intergroup context was also 
manipulated to be high or low. In the intergroup high salience 
condition comparisons between the subject and opponent were more 
explicitly defined in ingroup-outgroup terms than in the low salience 
condition. Therefore, it was predicted based on self-categorization 
theory that there would be increased stereotyping in the high salience 
condition. 
The other independent variable was interdependence. Based on 
Fiske and colleagues' predictions the aim was to motivate subjects, 
through a competitive interdependence manipulation, to pay more 
attention in interdependent compared to non-interdependent 
conditions. Competitive interdependence was manipulated in this 
experiment using the same method as Ruscher et al. (1991; see 
Chapter 4). Participants could win a prize of the same value either by 
competing directly with their opponent or by scoring above the 50th 
percentile. 
In the Ruscher et al. (1991) study subjects had to form 
impressions of team mates and opponents in the intergroup condition 
but only opponents in the interpersonal condition. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, Ruscher et al. argued that stereotypic impressions were 
formed in their intergroup conditions, even when the subject and 
target were interdependent, because subjects had two foci of attention. 
In the present study all subjects had to form an impression of one 
opponent. This means that there is only one focus for attention in both 
the interpersonal and intergroup conditions and any variations in 
attentional demand other than that associated with the manipulation 
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of interdependence are controlled. If interdependence is successfully 
manipulated then according to the attention model subjects should 
form individuated impressions in the interdependent condition and 
stereotypic impressions in the non-interdependent condition. 
In previous research where motivational factors have been 
manipulated, a main dependent variable has been the time subjects 
spend looking at information about the target - more specifically, gaze 
duration. A relationship has been assumed between longer gaze 
durations for the counter-stereotypic information provided to describe 
the target and the formation of more individuated impressions. In 
addition to the attention measure, comments made by subjects while 
forming impressions have been assessed (e.g., Fiske et a!., 1987; 
Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher eta!., 1991). However, there has been 
limited interest in the overall content of the impression itself and 
whether time spent looking at stereotype inconsistent and stereotype 
consistent information actually does lead to the formation of more 
individuated and stereotypic impressions, respectively. For this reason 
the focus in this study is on the actual content of the impression in 
order to assess directly the outcome of the impression formation 
process. 
In summary, two main predictions can be derived based on the 
different theoretical perspectives outlined. Self-categorization theory 
predicts that the content of impressions will be less stereotypic in 
interpersonal compared to intergroup contexts. Further, there should 
be more stereotyping in the intergroup high salience compared to the 
intergroup low salience condition because differentiation between the 
166 
ingroup and outgroup is enhanced. The attention model argues that 
interdependent subjects will be motivated to allocate more attention to 
the impression formation process and will therefore, form individuated 
impressions. On the basis of the attention model it would be predicted 
that more individuated impressions will be formed in the 
interdependent compared to the non-interdependent condition. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Subjects and design 
Thirty-four female and twenty-four male students from the 
Canberra Institute of Technology participated in the study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 
(attention: interdependent, non-interdependent) x 3 (comparative 
context: interpersonal, intergroup low salience, intergroup high 
salience) between subjects design. Participants completed both a pre-
test and the main study. 
6.2.2 Procedure 
The study was described as an investigation of problem solving 
and the effects of competition. It was explained that the study had two 
stages and that subjects would be required to complete a number of 
problem solving tasks. In stage one, subjects were told that they would 
complete four problem solving tasks and that their responses on these 
tasks would be used to develop individual profiles that would be used 
in the next phase of the study. On completion of these tasks, which 
included a description of the way they solved problems, it was 
explained that their responses would also be used to determine their 
own individual problem solving style. 
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Subjects were told that recent problem solving research had 
shown that there were a number of common strategies used to solve 
problems effectively. One strategy - lateral problem solving - was 
described as "making associations with other ideas not necessarily 
directly or obviously related to the problem at hand and could be 
characterised as innovative and adaptive". Alternatively, logical 
problem solving was described as "solving problems by having one 
integrated train of thought where ideas develop in a linear fashion, so 
solving problems in a reasoned, rational way". Subjects, therefore, 
expected at the next stage of the study to be given information about 
whether they had a logical or lateral problem solving style. 
In the second stage of the study (typically one week after the 
pre-test) subjects were told that their responses to the pre-test had 
been scored and their problem solving style assessed. Further, they 
were told that similar tasks to those in stage one of the study would be 
completed but this time in the presence of another person - their 
opponent. All participants were informed that they would be involved 
in a competition for a prize of $20.00. 
At this point the comparative context variable was manipulated. 
Following self-categorization theory, the aim in the interpersonal 
condition was to create a purely ingroup context within which 
interpersonal differentiation would be most salient. In this condition 
subjects were told that everyone in the session had a lateral problem 
solving style and no reference was made to logical problem solving. In 
contrast subjects in the intergroup conditions were led to believe that 
168 
some of those present were lateral and others logical problem solvers. 
Subjects were then handed a booklet. The front page explained 
how the subject's opponent had been selected. In the interpersonal and 
intergroup low salience conditions subjects were told that their 
opponent had been chosen randomly from those in the session. In the 
intergroup high salience condition, salience was increased by informing 
subjects that an aim of the study was to compare lateral and logical 
problem solving. Subjects were told they had been assigned to groups 
made up of others with the same problem solving style as themselves 
and that their opponent would be a member of the opposite group. 
Subjects were directed through the first pages of the booklet 
where they were given information about; a) their own problem solving 
style; b) how they could win the prize; and c) their opponent's problem 
solving style. As outlined above, in interpersonal conditions subjects 
were told that all those in the session, which included their opponent, 
had a lateral problem solving style. In order for all subjects to form an 
impression of a constant target, subjects in intergroup conditions were 
informed they had a logical problem solving style. 
Competitive interdependence was manipulated, usmg the 
technique adopted by Ruscher and Fiske (1990; Ruscher et al., 1991; 
also Erber & Fiske, 1984). It was outlined that there were two ways 
subjects could win the prize of $20.00. In the interdependent condition 
subjects were told that their score would be compared with their 
opponent's and that the person with the highest score would be entered 
into a draw for the prize. The other half of the subjects, those in the 
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non-interdependent condition, were informed that their score would be 
compared with all of the other scores and that those scoring above the 
50th percentile would be entered into the draw for the prize. In the 
intergroup high salience condition, where subjects had been explicitly 
informed they were assigned to groups, subjects were told that an 
average score for their group and their opponent's group would be 
calculated and the group with the highest score, or groups scoring 
above the 50th percentile, would be entered into the draw. 
Subjects were then asked to read through the information 
provided about their opponent. In all conditions the opponent was 
described as having a lateral problem solving style and six hand-
written statements, supposedly provided during the pre-test problem 
solving tasks, were provided. The statements were actually developed 
from piloting such that two were stereotypic of being a lateral problem 
solver ("brainstorm different ideas" and "be open to novel solutions") 
two were counter-stereotypic ("constrain options" and "use ordered 
thinking") and two were neutral statements ("try not to get uptight" 
and "be up front with yourself and others about the problem"). 
Importantly, all subjects were provided with exactly the same 
information about their opponent. 
A number of questions followed in which subjects were asked 
about their feelings towards the competition and about their 
impression of their opponent. Subjects were led to believe that once 
they had provided answers to these questions the competition would 
take place. In fact on completion of the questionnaire subjects were 
informed there would be no competition phase. Participants were 
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debriefed about the study's aims and objectives and all participants 
were entered into a draw for a prize of $20.00. 
6.2.3 1iaterials 
The materials consisted of two booklets. The first, used in the 
pre-test phase, incorporated four different problem solving tasks and 
was ostensibly used to determine subjects' problem solving style -
logical or lateral. The second booklet was used in the study proper and 
incorporated the main manipulations, the dependent measures and 
manipulation checks. After subjects had read the information provided 
about the main manipulations and their opponent (as outlined above) 
they were asked to answer a number of questions. 
Initially subjects were asked the following six questions and they 
had to mark a response on nine point scales with appropriately 
labelled ends. The first two questions - 1) How much are you looking 
forward to the competition with your opponent? 2) How well do you 
think you are going to perform on the problem solving tasks in 
comparison to your opponent? - were included to give an impression of 
genuine interest in the competition. The next four questions were 
designed to examine the perceived similarity between the subject and 
their opponent: 3) How similar do you think you and your opponent 
are to each other? 4) To what extent do you think you and your 
opponent would have things in common? 5) How far do you think you 
and your opponent would agree with each other on how to solve 
problems? 6) How far do you think you and your opponent would agree 
with each other in general? 
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In order to assess the actual content of impressions subjects 
were given a Katz-Braly type checklist task (Katz & Braly, 1933; see 
Haslam et al., 1992). A list of 15 words was presented and subjects 
had to underline those that they felt were typical of their impression of 
their opponent. The list consisted of five stereotypic (consistent), five 
counter-stereotypic (inconsistent) and five neutral words associated 
with lateral problem solving which had been previously piloted. 
Subjects then had to choose the five words out of those underlined that 
were most typical of their impression and estimate the percentage of 
lateral problem solvers who had each of the characteristics (confusion 
about whether these percentages needed to sum to 100 or not meant 
that the results could not be properly analysed so the measure will not 
be discussed further). A response scale measure was also included to 
try and assess whether impressions were more individuated or 
stereotypic: 7) Think about your general impression and feelings about 
your opponent. How far do you think your impression and feelings are 
related to your opponent's individual personality or characteristics that 
are shared by lateral problem solvers as a group? 
Subjects then moved on to complete a number of other questions 
assessing how they felt about others with the same problem solving 
style: 8) How similar do you think you are to other lateral problem 
solvers? 9) How much do you think you have in common with other 
lateral problem solvers? 10) How representative do you think you are 
of other lateral problem solvers? and 11) How much do you like being 
a member of the lateral style group? In the intergroup conditions 
'lateral problem solver' was replaced with 'logical problem solver' 
where applicable. 
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In order to assess the impact of some subjects being told they 
had a lateral and others a logical problem solving style subjects were 
asked "To what extent do you agree that you are a lateral (logical) 
problem solver?" Two questions were also designed to assess the 
perceived interdependence between the subject and target: 13) How 
concerned are you about how your opponent is going to perform? 14) 
To what extent do you think your opponent's score will determine your 
chances of going into the draw to win the prize? Finally, as a measure 
of the type of information remembered in the impression formation 
process subjects were asked to recall as much information as they 
could about their opponent. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Manipulation checks 
The mean responses on the item which assessed the extent to 
which subjects agreed they had the problem solving style assigned to 
them (either logical or lateral) was analysed in a 2 (interdependence) x 
3 (comparative context) between subjects analysis of variance 
CANOVA) which revealed no significant effects. Overall, subjects 
agreed with the feedback regarding their problem solving style (M = 
7.14; see Table 6.1). 
The items assessing the interdependence manipulation - 1) how 
concerned subjects were about their opponents performance, and 2) the 
perceived influence the opponent would have on subjects' chances of 
entering the draw for the prize - were analysed in a 2 
(interdependence) x 3 (comparative context) between subjects 
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multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Unless otherwise stated 
in this and subsequent cases the univariate effects were identical to 
the multivariate results. Using the Wilks criterion the only significant 
multivariate effect was the main effect for interdependence (F(2, 51)= 
8.80, ll < .001). 
Table 6.1 
Means for mani!lulation check measures 
Interdependent Non· interdependent 
p GL GH p GL GH 
(N=13) CN=6) (N=8) (N=ll) (N=8) (N=12) 
Measure 
Agree problem-solving style 7.69 6.17 7.25 6.82 6.75 7.50 
Concerned opponent's performance 5.31 4.00 5.12 3.36 4.50 3.58 
Opponent influence draw for prize 7.92 6.67 5.38 4.45 4.88 4.33 
Note: P = interpersonal, GL = intergroup low salience, GH = intergroup high 
salience. 
Examination of the univariate F-tests revealed no significant 
effects on the first item (F(1, 52)= 2.34, ll > .10). However, the pattern 
of the means suggests that subjects were more concerned about their 
opponent's performance in the interdependent compared to the non-
interdependent condition (Ms = 4.96 and 3.74, respectively). On the 
second item, the main effect for interdependence was significant (F(l, 
52) = 17. 73, ll <.001). As predicted, it was found that subjects felt their 
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opponent would affect their chances more in the interdependent than 
non·interdependent condition (Ms = 6.89 and 4.52, respectively). These 
results indicate that the study produced conditions under which those 
who endorse the attention model (e.g., Ruscher et al., 1991) would 
expect subjects to be motivated to pay more attention and form more 
individuated impressions. 
6.3.2 Tvve of impression 
The aim of the checklist measure was to assess the content of 
impressions by examining the frequency with which different types of 
words were selected to describe the opponent. The number of 
stereotypic, counter-stereotypic and neutral words subjects selected as 
most typical of their impression of their opponent were summed in 
each condition. These frequencies were adjusted for variation in cell 
sizes (by dividing the total number by n for that cell and then 
multiplying by the average cell size). A measure of the relative use of 
stereotypic compared to counter-stereotypic information was developed 
by subtracting the frequency for counter-stereotypic words from that 
for stereotypic words. 
The relative measure of stereotypicality as well as the 
frequencies for stereotypic, counter-stereotypic and neutral word 
selection were each analysed using the log-linear technique. For 
comparative context and interaction effects, the analysis was based on 
an initial contrast between the responses of subjects in the 
interpersonal condition and those in the combined intergroup (group) 
conditions followed by a comparison between scores in the intergroup 
low and intergroup high salience conditions (see Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2 
Frequencies and z scores for the relative stereotypicality measure and 
selection of stereotypic. counter-stereotypic and neutral information. 
Z-scores 
Interdependent Non-interdependent Interaction Main effects 
effects 
p GL GH p GL GH A B c D E 
Relative 13.39 24.17 30.20 9.66 18.12 24.16 .14 .15 1.40 3.10* 1.22 
measure 
Stereo typic 22.31 27.39 33.83 20.21 26.58 29.80 .06 .26 .52 1.77 .87 
Counter- 8.92 3.22 3.63 10.55 8.46 5.64 .76 .54 1.45 2.04+ .31 
stereo typic 
Neutral 17.10 17.72 10.80 17.45 13.20 12.80 .20 .82 .14 1.13 .94 
Note: + p < .05 (z-crit = 1.96); * p < .01 (z-crit = 2.36); underlined p < .10 (z-crit = 1.64); P = 
interpersonal; GL = intergroup low salience; GH =intergroup high salience; A= PvGUGH; 
B = GLvGH; C = interdependent v non-interdependent; D = PvGUGH; E = GLvGH. 
For the relative stereotypicality measure there was a significant 
mam effect for comparative context on the contrast between the 
interpersonal and combined group condition (z. = 3.10, .ll. < .01). As 
predicted, more stereotypic relative to counter-stereotypic information 
was selected in the group condition than the interpersonal condition 
(Frequencies (fs): 24.16 and 11.53, respectively; see Figure 6.1). The 
pattern of results on the relative measure also suggest that there is 
more relative stereotyping in the intergroup high salience than the 
intergroup low salience condition. However, the main effect for the 
contrast comparing these two conditions was not significant (z = 1.22, .ll. 
> .10). 
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Figure 6.1. Relative frequency of stereotypic versus counter-stereotypic 
word selection in interpersonal (Personal), intergroup low salience 
(GroupL) and intergroup high salience (GroupH) conditions 
There was also a marginally significant mam effect for 
comparative context in the analysis involving the selection of 
stereotypic words (& = 1.77, ll < .10). More stereotypic words were 
selected in the combined group condition compared to the interpersonal 
condition (fs: 29.40 and 21.26, respectively; see Figure 6.2). There were 
no significant differences between the intergroup low and intergroup 
high salience conditions for the selection of stereotypic words. 
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Figure 6.2. Frequency of stereotypic word selection 
For counter-stereotypic words there was a significant main effect 
for comparative context between the interpersonal and combined group 
condition (z; = 2.04, .Q<.05; see Figure 6.3). More counter-stereotypic 
words were selected to describe impressions in the interpersonal (f = 
9. 7 4) than in the group condition (f = 5.24; see Figure 6.3). For the 
selection of counter-stereotypic words there were no significant 
differences found between the intergroup low salience and intergroup 
high salience conditions. 
The interdependence variable produced no significant effects. In 
fact the highest z-score comparing interdependent and non-
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interdependent conditions was 1.45 for counter-stereotypic words. In 
the interdependent condition counter-stereotypic words were selected 
at a frequency of 5.26 compared to 8.23 in the non-interdependent 
condition. This pattern of results is in fact in the opposite direction to 
that predicted by Ruscher and colleagues (see Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3. Frequency of counter-stereotypic word selection 
A parametric measure was also developed to assess the content 
of impressions. A stereotyping score for each subject was generated by 
giving subjects a score of +1 for selecting each stereotypic word as most 
typical of their impression of their opponent, a score of -1 for each 
counter-stereotypic word and a score of 0 for each neutral word (a 
technique commonly used in the analysis of Katz-Braly content e.g., 
Haslam et al., 1992). Scores for the five traits were summed, therefore 
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each subject could have a score between +5 and -5, a higher score 
reflecting more stereotyping. The stereotyping score was analysed by 
means of a 2 (interdependence) x 3 (comparative context) ANOV A. The 
only significant result was a main effect for comparative context (F(2, 
52)= 4.75, ll < .05). Two t-test contrasts for comparative context were 
conducted in the same way as specified in the log-linear analysis (using 
protected t-tests alpha= .01). There was increased stereotyping in the 
combined group condition compared to the interpersonal condition (Ms 
= 2.50 and 1.17, respectively, .t(56) = -2.86, ll < .01) but the means in 
the intergroup low salience and intergroup high salience conditions did 
not differ significantly (Ms = 2.14 and 2.75, respectively, .t(32) = -.98, ll 
> .10). 
6.3.3 Recall of information 
Subjects were also asked to recall as much information as they 
could about their opponent. The statements recalled were coded as 
being stereotypic, counter-stereotypic or neutral by an independent 
coder and the experimenter with an agreement rate of above 85 
percent. The independent coder's frequencies were used in the 
analysis. 
The number of statements recalled were adjusted for unequal 
cell sizes and analysed in the same way as the checklist frequencies. A 
measure of the relative recall of stereotypic compared to counter-
stereotypic statements was calculated for each condition. This relative 
measure was analysed using the log-linear technique, as were the 
frequencies with which stereotypic, counter-stereotypic and neutral 
statements were recalled across conditions (see Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3 
Frequencies and z-scores for the relative recall measure and recall of 
stereotypic. counter-stereotypic and neutral information. 
Interdependent Non~ interdependent 
p GL GH p GL GH 
Interaction 
effects 
A B 
Z-scores 
Main effects 
c D E 
Relative 
measure 
10.00 16.41 15.79 5.48 10.93 20.92 .89 1.32 .95 2.49* 1.17 
Stereotypic 16.67 21.10 19.43 13.16 17.00 22.66 .47 .81 .50 1.36 .45 
Counter- 6.67 4.69 3.64 7.68 6.07 1.74 .45 .84 .22 1.66+ 1.28 
stereotypic 
Neutral 10.67 8.21 10.93 13.16 10.93 9.59 .25 .64 .47 .69 .24 
Note: * p < .01 (z-crit = 2.36) + p < .10 (z-crit = 1.64); P =interpersonal; GL = intergroup 
low salience; GH = intergroup high salience; A = PvGL/GH; B = GLvGH; C = 
interdependent v non-interdependent; D = PvGLIGH; E = GLvGH. 
The only significant effects to emerge from these analyses 
concerned the comparative context manipulation. Analysis of the 
relative recall measure revealed that significantly more stereotypic 
relative to counter-stereotypic information was recalled in the 
combined group condition (f = 16.01) than in the interpersonal 
condition (f = 7.74; z. = 2.49, Q < .01; see Figure 6.4). There was also a 
tendency for counter-stereotypic statements to be better recalled in the 
interpersonal condition (f = 7.18) compared to the combined group 
condition (f = 4.03; z. = 1.66, p <.10). No significant differences were 
evident between the intergroup low salience and intergroup high 
181 
salience conditions . 
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Figure 6.4. Relative recall of stereotypic versus counter-stereotypic 
information 
For parametric analysis of the information recalled, a recall 
score was developed. As with the stereotyping score, subjects were 
given a score of +1 if they recalled a stereotypic statement, a score of -1 
if they recalled a counter-stereotypic statement and a score of 0 if they 
recalled a neutral statement. These scores were summed for each 
subject and analysed in a 2 (interdependence) x 3 (comparative 
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context) ANOVA. A main effect for comparative context was the only 
significant finding (F(2,52) = 4.31, ll. < .05). Two contrasts for 
comparative context were conducted. Subjects recalled more 
stereotypic statements in the combined group condition (M = 1.53) 
than the interpersonal condition (M = .58, i(56) = -3.00, ll. < .01). There 
was also a non-significant tendency for more stereotypic information to 
be recalled in the intergroup high salience (M = 1.65) than intergroup 
low salience condition (M = 1.36; (t(32) = -.65, ll. > .10). 
6.3.4 Analysis of other measures 
(i) Influence on impressions 
Subjects were asked directly whether they thought their 
impression of their opponent was based on the opponent's individual 
personality or characteristics associated with their problem solving 
style (where 1 = individual personality, 5 = both and 9 = group 
characteristics). A 2 (interdependence) x 3 (comparative context) 
AN OVA revealed no significant effects on this item (see Table 6.4). 
(ii) Attitude to competition 
Subjects were asked about their attitudes to the competition -
how much they looked forward to the competition (general attitude) 
and how well they thought they would perform (anticipated 
performance). Each measure was analysed in a 2 (interdependence) x 
3 (comparative context) between subjects ANOVA. A significant main 
effect for comparative context emerged on the general attitude to 
competition measure (F(2, 52) = 9.53, ll. < .001) and anticipated 
performance measure (F(2, 52)= 4.65, ll. < .05). Unless otherwise 
specified in this and subsequent cases Newman-Keuls analysis is used 
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to assess differences between means. Subjects looked forward to the 
competition least and thought they would perform less well in the 
intergroup low salience condition compared to the other two conditions. 
(iii) Evaluations of ingroup members 
Four items were designed to assess how subjects perceived 
others who had the same problem solving style as their own. These 
measures were analysed in a 2 (interdependence) x 3 (comparative 
context) between-subjects MANOVA (see Table 6.3). No significant 
multivariate effects were found. Only one of the univariate F-tests was 
significant at the .05 level. There was a significant main effect for 
comparative context on the "like" measure (F(2, 52) = 3.73, P. < .05). 
Subjects liked being a member of their own problem solving group 
more in the interpersonal and intergroup high salience conditions than 
in the intergroup low salience condition (Ms interpersonal = 6.96; 
intergroup high salience= 6.50; intergroup low salience = 5.43). 
(iv) Similarity to opponents 
Four items were also designed to assess subjects' perceived 
similarity to their opponent. These measures were analysed in a 2 
(interdependence) x 3 (comparative context) between subjects 
MANOVA. The multivariate main effect for comparative context was 
the only statistically significant result to emerge from this analysis 
(F(8, 98) = 2.80, P. < .01). On all four univariate tests subjects in 
interpersonal conditions (who had the same problem solving style as 
their opponents) saw themselves as generally more similar to their 
opponent than did those in the intergroup conditions (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4 
Means for other response scale measures. 
Interdependent Non-interdependent 
p GL GH p GL GH 
Influence on impression 
Personality or Group factors 5.85 6.00 5.50 5.70 4.38 5.33 
Attitude to competition 
General attitude 6.62 5.17 6.88 6.73 3.13 6.58 
Anticipated performance 6.31 5.67 6.75 6.46 5.00 7.08 
Evaluation ofingroup members 
Similar 7.31 6.00 6.75 5.91 6.50 6.08 
Common 7.08 5.33 6.75 6.20 5.75 5.17 
Represent. 6.15 5.00 6.25 5.64 5.38 5.75 
Like 7.46 4.83 7.13 6.36 5.88 6.08 
Similarity to opponents 
Similar 6.62 3.33 4.00 6.00 4.88 4.42 
Common 6.62 4.67 5.38 5.36 5.25 4.92 
Agree problem-solv. 6.31 4.83 3.38 5.73 4.62 4.42 
Agree in general 6.54 5.83 4.88 5.73 5.50 5.83 
6.4 Discussion 
The results in this study suggest that as predicted from self-
categorization theory, the tendency to individuate or stereotype varied 
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with the salient level of abstraction - interpersonal versus intergroup. 
Subjects were found to use more counter-stereotypic information to 
describe their opponent when the subject and opponent shared the 
same problem solving style and where within-group comparisons were 
contextually relevant. On the other hand, more stereotypic 
information was incorporated into the impressions when opponents 
had the opposite problem solving style as subjects and intergroup 
comparisons were salient. The recall measures also revealed that 
subjects recalled more counter-stereotypic information about their 
opponent in interpersonal conditions and more stereotypic information 
in intergroup conditions. 
In addition, the trends in the data suggest that subjects formed 
more stereotypic impressions in the intergroup high salience than the 
intergroup low salience condition. However, the results found in these 
two intergroup conditions did not generally differ significantly. It 
seems, contrary to predictions, that defining the competition between 
the subject and target explicitly in ingroup-outgroup terms did not 
impact on the salience of the intergroup context. Describing the 
targets as having the opposite problem solving style to subjects was 
sufficient to invoke intergroup comparisons and increase the formation 
of stereotypic impressions in the group conditions. 
Unlike in previous studies where motivational factors have been 
manipulated, differential use of stereotype consistent and stereotype 
inconsistent information did not depend on whether the perceiver and 
the perceived were outcome dependent or not. Checks to assess the 
interdependence manipulation were explicitly included in this study 
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and the results indicated that subjects were more concerned about 
their opponent, and believed that their opponent could influence their 
prize winning chances more in the interdependent than non-
interdependent condition. Subjects did perceive that their outcomes 
depended more on their opponents in interdependent conditions, but 
there was no evidence of more counter-stereotypic information being 
used, or more individuated impressions being formed, in 
interdependent conditions. 
Theoretically, from a cognitive resources perspective on the 
formation of stereotypic and individuated impressions, subjects who 
were outcome dependent should have been motivated to pay more 
attention in order to form more "accurate" individuated impressions. 
Outcome dependency should have promoted "individuation via an 
increase in perceivers' accuracy-driven attention" (Pendry & Macrae, 
1994, p. 306; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). The fact that interdependence 
was successfully manipulated but had no impact on the types of 
impressions formed across conditions therefore raises questions about: 
1) the interpretation of Ruscher et al.'s (1991) findings and more 
generally, 2) the different dependent variables used to assess 
impression formation. Both of these issues will be discussed. 
Ruscher et al. (1991) found in their study, which involved only 
interdependent conditions, that stereotypic rather than individuated 
impressions were formed of opponents in the intergroup condition (see 
Chapter 4). Ruscher et al.'s analysis was that stereotyping occurred in 
intergroup contexts because of cognitive capacity limitations. Subjects 
had two foci of attention in the intergroup condition which strained 
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available cognitive resources 
As noted in the introduction, the variables identified by Ruscher 
et al. (1991) to account for their findings were controlled in this study. 
Subjects formed impressions of one constant opponent in interpersonal 
and intergroup conditions. Yet stereotypic impressions were formed of 
opponents in interdependent and non-interdependent intergroup 
conditions. The cognitive resources explanation cannot account for 
these results. However, self-categorization theory would argue that 
more stereotypic impressions are formed in intergroup contexts 
because stereotyping functions to represent the relationship between 
ingroup and outgroup members. 
The finding that interdependence was successfully manipulated 
in our study but had limited impact on the content of impressions 
raises some important questions about the dependent variables used to 
assess impression formation. Attention to stereotype consistent and 
stereotype inconsistent information has typically been used to assess 
the type of impressions formed of others. In this study, the actual 
content of the impression and not gaze duration has been measured 
and no effects associated with the interdependence manipulation have 
been found. The link between interdependence, a motivation to 
allocate more attention to counter-stereotypic information, and 
individuation may not be as straightforward as the social cognitive 
theoretical analysis suggests. 
It would be useful to further investigate the relationship 
between attention to information and the actual impression formed. 
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This is particularly important when attention to inconsistent and 
consistent information tends to be viewed, in the literature, as 
synonymous with the formation of individuated and stereotypic 
impressions, respectively. In effect, the process underlying impression 
formation and the assumed content of impressions are conflated in this 
methodology. The amount of time subjects gaze at information does 
not necessarily tell us much about what subjects are actually doing 
with the information. 
It is clear that inconsistent information can be reinterpreted, 
ignored or integrated into the impression (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Yzerbyt et a!., 
1997). If gaze duration is the dependent measure researchers are not 
privy to why the information is a focus for attention. Measures 
regarding impression content are needed in addition to attention 
measures to reveal the outcome of the impression formation process. 
There are also some clear limitations in this study which need to 
be discussed in the context of future directions for research. The first 
issue is that there is a potential alternative interpretation for the 
results obtained across the comparative context conditions of this 
study. It could be argued that, because outgroup members (opponents 
who had the opposite problem solving style) were stereotyped and 
ingroup members (opponents who had the same problem solving style) 
were individuated, this study has replicated the classic outgroup 
homogeneity effect. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the outgroup homogeneity effect refers 
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to more differentiated and heterogeneous impressions being formed of 
ingroup compared to outgroup members. Typical explanations for the 
effect are concerned with; a) the level of familiarity with ingroup 
members or b) how information specific to ingroup members is encoded 
and retrieved (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988; Linville & Jones, 1980; Park, 
Judd & Ryan, 1991). Therefore, it is not clear in this study whether 
variations in the impressions formed across comparative context 
conditions are due to; a) asymmetry in judgements of ingroup or 
outgroup members or b) the salient level of abstraction, interpersonal 
or intergroup. 
Haslam et al. (1995a, 1995b), as outlined in Chapter 3, offered 
an alternative explanation of the outgroup homogeneity effect based on 
self-categorization theory. They argued that the effect is a product of 
the fact that the outgroup, but not the ingroup, are typically evaluated 
in an intergroup context. Haslam et al. (1995b) have shown in a 
number of studies that when impressions are formed of ingroup and 
outgroup members in an intergroup context impressions of both are 
stereotypical and homogeneous. In addition, more heterogeneous 
impressions of ingroup members have been found, in their studies, 
under the typical judgement conditions. 
Therefore, one way to dissociate the results found in this study 
from the outgroup homogeneity interpretation would be for an 
impression of an ingroup member to be formed in both interpersonal 
and intergroup contexts. It would then be possible to further clarify 
self-categorization theory predictions regarding variations in the 
formation of individuated and stereotypic impressions. 
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Another point to note about the current study is that 
interdependence has been successfully manipulated but there were no 
separate indications that attention increased in the interdependent 
compared to the non-interdependent conditions. For example, subjects 
did not recall more information overall in the former condition. It 
needs to be recognised that Fiske and colleagues themselves also had 
difficulty showing evidence of overall increases in attention using more 
direct reading time measures (e.g., Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher et 
al., 1991). However, Neuberg and Fiske (1987) presented a detailed 
mediational analysis in which they argued that it is via a motivation to 
be accurate that interdependence increases individuation. Therefore, a 
more direct test of the position that attention impacts on whether 
individuated or stereotypic impressions are formed of others may be to 
manipulate accuracy goals directly in the same way as Fiske and 
Neuberg (1987). 
In the next chapter, a second experiment is reported where 
accuracy goals rather than interdependence are manipulated. In 
addition, a similar comparative context manipulation is incorporated 
but impressions of ingroup members are formed in interpersonal and 
intergroup contexts. The results found in this first experiment also 
need to be replicated with more subjects in order to confirm their 
reliability. Overall, though it is possible to conclude that the findings 
of this first study offer support for self-categorization theory's, rather 
than the attention model's, predictions regarding variations in 
impression formation. 
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Chapter 7 -
ACCURACY GOALS, COMPARATIVE CONTEXT AND 
VARIATIONS IN IMPRESSION FORMATION 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a study is reported which was designed to build 
on Experiment 1 where competitive interdependence and comparative 
context were manipulated. In Experiment 1 the level of abstraction, 
interpersonal or intergroup, was confounded with whether the target 
was an ingroup or outgroup member. Subjects were told that their 
opponent had the same problem solving style as themselves in the 
interpersonal condition and the opposite problem solving style in 
intergroup conditions. To fully explore the predictions made by self-
categorization theory regarding impression formation it is necessary to 
design a study where subjects form impressions of an ingroup member 
in an interpersonal and an intergroup context. It will then be possible 
to demonstrate whether the content of impressions varies with the 
level of abstraction rather than simply with in- or outgroup 
membership. 
The experiment reported in this chapter is very similar to 
Experiment 1 except that the intergroup low salience condition is 
replaced by an intragroup condition. In this new condition subjects 
form an impression of a target person who is an ingroup member in an 
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intergroup context. Importantly, then, in this experiment subjects 
form an impression of an ingroup member in an interpersonal 
(interpersonal condition) and intergroup context (intragroup 
condition), and also form an impression of an outgroup member in an 
intergroup context (intergroup condition). Based on self-categorization 
theory it is predicted that because impressions are being formed in 
group contexts in the intragroup and intergroup conditions stereotypic 
impressions should be formed of the target person. More individuated 
impressions should be evident in the interpersonal context, where 
there is no meaningful contrasting outgroup and within-group 
comparisons are relevant. 
An additional aim of this study is to investigate further the role 
of motivational factors in impression formation. The relationship 
between interdependence, an increase in the allocation of cognitive 
resources and individuation was questioned in Experiment 1. It was 
noted in the last chapter and in Chapter 4 that Neuberg and Fiske 
(1987) specifically argued that interdependence impacts on impression 
formation via increases in accuracy-driven attention. Therefore, it is 
accuracy-driven attention which is the core feature of the attention 
model analysis. In the current study accuracy goal instructions were 
manipulated, using a similar technique as that adopted by Neuberg 
and Fiske (1987), as a more direct test of the prediction that increases 
in attention will result in more individuated impressions. 
There are also difficulties with using a competitive or 
cooperative interdependence manipulation in this particular study 
given the function of the comparative context manipulation. For 
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example, if competitive interdependence was manipulated it may be 
difficult for the subject to perceive the target person as an 
interchangeable ingroup member in the intragroup condition if they 
are competing with one another for a prize. It is possible that such a 
manipulation would encourage more interpersonal differentiations and 
the formation of more individuated rather than stereotypic 
. . 1mpresswns. Likewise, if cooperative interdependence was 
manipulated it could be difficult for subjects in the intergroup 
condition to perceive the target as a member of a different group when 
they would be required to work together and compete for a team prize. 
It is likely that subjects would see the target as an ingroup rather than 
an outgroup member under these conditions. These problems 
highlight the fact that interdependence affects far more than attention, 
and that the salience of particular self-other comparisons can be 
shaped by such manipulations. 
Therefore, in order to manipulate interdependence and 
comparative context successfully in this experiment the type of 
interdependence would have to vary throughout the design. In the 
intergroup condition (where subjects would form an impression of an 
outgroup member) the subject and target would be competitively 
interdependent. In the intragroup condition (where subjects form an 
impression of an ingroup member) the subject and target would have 
to be cooperatively interdependent. Fiske and colleagues make similar 
predictions regarding interdependence in both cooperative (Erber & 
Fiske, 1984) and competitive situations (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990), but if 
the type of interdependence was varied throughout the design other 
alternative explanations may be difficult to control. It should also be 
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noted that competitive interdependence has already been manipulated 
in the previous study. 
Given difficulties with the interdependence manipulation and 
the fact that the interdependence effect is thought to be mediated by 
accuracy goals, the latter were manipulated in the present study. 
Neuberg and Fiske (1987) argued that it is "the goal of forming an 
accurate impression, in conjunction with sufficient attentional 
resources, that encourages individuating processes" (p. 441; see also 
Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Just as was the case with interdependence, 
on the basis of the attentional model it would be predicted that more 
individuated impressions should be formed in this experiment in the 
accuracy goal compared to the no accuracy goal condition. 
On the basis of self-categorization theory, subjects were expected 
to form individuated impressions of the target person in the 
interpersonal conditions and stereotypic impressions in the intragroup 
and intergroup conditions. Based on the results of Experiment 1 a 
simple relationship between the accuracy goal and increased 
individuation was not expected. 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Subjects and design 
Subjects were 19 male and 82 female first year psychology 
students who participated for course credit. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of six conditions in the 2 (attention: accuracy goaVno 
accuracy goal) x 3 (comparative context: interpersonal, intragroup, 
intergroup) between-subjects design. Subjects completed the pre-test 
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and then the main study. Two subjects in the intragroup/no accuracy 
goal condition were inadvertently given the wrong questionnaire and 
three subjects did not fully complete the main impression content 
dependent measure, so their responses were not included in the 
analysis. 
7 .2.2 Procedure 
The first stage of the study was the same as in Experiment 1, 
and in the second stage of the study (typically one week after the pre-
test) subjects were also given feedback about their problem solving 
style. In the interpersonal condition it was explained that everyone in 
the session had the same problem solving style. In the intragroup and 
intergroup conditions subjects were told that some people in the 
session had a lateral and others a logical style and that the 
experimenter was particularly interested in how lateral problem 
solvers perform in comparison to logical problem solvers. At this point 
those students with particular code numbers were asked to accompany 
a second researcher to complete aspects of the study in a separate 
room. This division into two groups was random but was designed to 
reinforce the perception that there were logical and lateral problem 
solvers in the intergroup and intragroup conditions. 
Participants were handed a booklet with instructions on the 
front. Subjects were told that they would be completing similar 
problem solving tasks to those in part one of the study but this time in 
the presence of another person described as a team mate in the 
intragroup condition and opponent in the interpersonal and intergroup 
conditions. 
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As in Experiment 1, subjects were also told how their opponent 
or team mate had been chosen. In the intragroup conditions subjects 
were told that their team mate would be a member of the same 
problem solving group to which they belonged. In the intergroup 
condition the opponent was described as a member of the opposite 
problem solving group to the one that subjects belonged. In the 
interpersonal condition, where no contrasting outgroup was made 
explicit, subjects were informed that their opponent had been chosen 
randomly from others in the session. 
Subjects were directed through the first pages of the booklet 
where they were given information about their own problem solving 
style. In contrast to Experiment 1 in this study the target person was 
described as having a logical problem solving style. Therefore, in order 
to have subjects in all conditions form an impression of a team 
mate/opponent with a logical problem solving style, subjects in the 
interpersonal and intragroup conditions were told they had a logical 
style. In the intergroup condition the subjects were told they had a 
lateral problem solving style. 
Following Neuberg and Fiske (1987), subjects' impression 
formation goals were then manipulated. Before reading information 
about their opponent/team mate, subjects in the no accuracy condition 
were told: 
We would like you to form an impression of your opponent (team 
mate) 
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In addition subjects in the accuracy condition read: 
It is extremely important that you make every effort to form as 
accurate an impression as possible. There will be a prize (which 
will be described later) for those who form the most accurate 
impression. 
Subjects were then asked to read through the information 
provided about their opponent/team mate. In all conditions the target 
was described as having a logical problem solving style, and six hand-
written statements (the same as used in Experiment 1) were provided. 
The statements inconsistent with being a logical problem solver were 
consistent with being a lateral problem solver and vice versa. 
In terms of problem solving style the subject and target had the 
same style in interpersonal and intragroup conditions (both logical) 
and different problem solving styles in the intergroup condition 
(subject lateral and opponent logical). As in Experiment 1, all subjects 
were provided with exactly the same information about the target. 
Subjects were then asked to work through a series of questions. On 
completion of these questions subjects were debriefed and all subjects 
in the accuracy goal condition were given a small prize. 
7.2.3 11aterials 
As in Experiment 1 the materials consisted of two booklets. The 
first booklet was the same as that used in the previous study and 
comprised four problem solving tasks. The second booklet 
incorporated the main manipulations as outlined above and the 
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dependent measures. After subjects had been given information about 
their own and their opponent's or team mate's problem solving style 
they were asked to answer a number of questions. 
Initially subjects were asked to complete a Katz-Braly type 
checklist similar to Experiment 1 but comprising five stereotypic 
(consistent), five counter-stereotypic (inconsistent) and five neutral 
words associated with logical problem solving which were derived from 
earlier piloting. Following the checklist subjects were asked to mark 
where they would place themselves and their opponentJteam mate on 
two dimensions consistent with lateral problem solving (imaginative 
and spontaneous) and two consistent with being a logical problem 
solver (methodical and reasoned). For example, the word "reasoned" 
was presented next to a line 8.6 centimetres long labelled at one end by 
"less reasoned" and the other "more reasoned". Subjects had to mark 
two vertical lines, one which reflected their own position on the 
dimension (labelled with a S), and another marking the perceived 
position of their opponent (labelled with an 0) or team mate (labelled 
with aT). 
Subjects moved on to complete the following questions where 
they had to mark a response on a 9-point scale with appropriately 
labelled ends: 1) How similar do you think you and your opponent 
(team mate) are to each other? 2) To what extent do you think you and 
your opponent (team mate) would agree on how to solve problems? 3) 
How confident are you in the assessment of your problem solving style? 
4) How much effort did you put into forming an impression of your 
opponent (team mate)? 5) How much attention did you pay to the 
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hand-written descriptive information about your opponent (team 
mate)? 6) How accurate do you think your impression of your 
opponent (team mate) is? 7) How difficult do you think it was to form 
an impression of your opponent (team mate)? 8) How confident are you 
that you will score higher than your opponent (team mate) on the 
problem solving tasks? 
Subjects were asked to recall as much of the information 
provided about the target as they could and also to rank the 
information provided from 1 "most informative" to 6 "least informative" 
in terms of forming their impression. Two further open-ended 
questions were included where subjects were asked to describe how 
they formed their impression of their opponent (team mate) and what 
they thought was the aim of the study. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Manipulation check 
Subjects were asked how confident they were in the assessment 
of their problem solving style in order to determine the effect of some 
subjects being told they had a logical style and others that they had a 
lateral style. A 2 (accuracy) x 3 (comparative context) between-subjects 
ANOVA revealed no significant effects. The overall mean confidence 
was 4.97. 
Subjects' self-ratings on the two logical dimensions - reasoned 
and methodical - and the two lateral dimensions - imaginative and 
spontaneous - were used to assess identification as logical and lateral 
problem solvers in the relevant conditions. Self-ratings on each of the 
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four dimensions were analysed in separate 2 (designated problem 
solving style) x 2 (accuracy) between subjects ANOVA's. There were 
significant main effects for designated problem solving style on the 
dimensions methodical (F(1, 91) = 19.66,!! < .001) and reasoned (F(1, 
91) = 11.03, !! = .001). Subjects rated themselves higher on these 
dimensions when they were told they had a logical rather than a 
lateral problem solving style (Ms: methodical = 4.90 and 3.46, 
respectively; reasoned = 5.89 and 4.83, respectively). On the 
dimensions imaginative and spontaneous no significant effects were 
found. Subjects did however, tend to rate themselves higher on these 
dimensions when they were told they had a lateral rather than a 
logical problem solving style (Ms: spontaneous = 5.27 and 5.01 
respectively; imaginative = 5.27 and 5.16, respectively). Subjects 
allocated a logical problem solving style seem disinclined to 
characterise themselves as unimaginative and lacking in spontaneity. 
7.3.2 Type of impression 
The checklist measure was analysed in the same way as in 
Experiment 1. The relative stereotypicality measure as well as the 
frequencies for stereotypic, counter-stereotypic and neutral word 
selection were each analysed using 2 (accuracy) x 3 (comparative 
context) log-linear analysis. The contrasts were also specified in the 
same way as in Experiment 1. Frequencies and z-scores are 
summarised in Table 7 .1. 
On the relative stereotypicality measure there were significant 
main effects for the contrast comparing interpersonal and the 
combined intragroup/intergroup (group) condition (z; = 1.95, !! = .05) 
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and the contrast comparing intragroup and intergroup conditions (z; = 
3.62, n< .001). Consistent with the findings in Experiment 1 subjects 
stereotyped more in the group condition than interpersonal condition 
(fs: 36.39 and 21.62, respectively). It was also found that subjects 
stereotyped more in the intergroup (f = 44. 71) compared to intragroup 
condition (f = 28.07). Analysis of the relative measure also revealed a 
significant main effect for accuracy (z; = 2.04, ll. < .05), with 
stereotyping less evident in the accuracy goal compared to the no 
accuracy goal condition (fs: 27.72 and 35.31, respectively). 
Table 7.1 
Frequencies and z-scores for the relative stereotypicality measure and 
selection of stereotypic. counter-stereotypic and neutral information. 
Z-scores 
Accuracy goal No Accuracy goal Interaction Main effects 
effects 
p I 0 p I 0 A B c D E 
Relative 25.94 9.19 48.04 17.29 46.96 41.38 3.03* -4.22* ·2.04+ -1.95 -3.62* 
measure 
Stereotypic 45.16 30.63 54.77 39.39 54.11 51.18 1.46 -2.48* -.98 -.73 -1.10 
Counter- 19.22 21.44 6.78 22.10 7.15 9.80 -1.09 2.55* .79 3.10* -.16 
stereo typic 
Neutral 17.30 29.61 20.18 20.18 21.44 20.69 -.77 1.12 .27 -.98 1.39 
Note: underlined p < .10 (z-crit = 1.64); + p < .05 (z-crit = 1.96); * p < .01 (z-crit = 2.36); P = 
interpersonal; I = intragroup; 0 =intergroup; A= Pvl/0; B = IvO; C = accuracy goal v no 
accuracy goal; D = Pvi/0; E = 1 vO. 
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Importantly, these main effects on the relative measure were 
qualified by significant interactions on the contrast between 
interpersonal and the combined group condition (z;_ = 3.03, n < .01) and 
between the intragroup and intergroup conditions (z;_ = 4.22, n < .01). 
Both interactions are due to findings in the intragroup/accuracy goal 
condition where subjects selected more non-stereotypic and less 
stereotypic information to describe impressions (see Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7 .1. Relative frequency of stereotypic versus counter-stereotypic 
word selection in interpersonal (Personal), intragroup (Intra) and 
intergroup (Inter) conditions. 
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Examination of the interaction on the relative stereotypicality 
measure between the attention conditions and the interpersonal and 
combined group conditions, revealed that subjects used relatively more 
stereotypic information when describing impressions in the combined 
group/no accuracy goal condition (f = 44.17) compared to the other 
three conditions (fs: group/accuracy goal = 28.62, interpersonal/ 
accuracy goal= 25.94, interpersonal/no accuracy goal= 17.29). 
The second interaction between attention conditions and the 
intragroup and intergroup conditions indicated that in the 
intragroup/accuracy goal condition (f = 9.69) there was far less use of 
stereotypic relative to counter-stereotypic traits than in the other three 
conditions (fs: intragroup/no accuracy goal = 46.96, intergroup/ 
accuracy goal = 48.04, intergroup/no accuracy goal = 41.38). Subjects 
clearly stereotyped less in the intragroup/accuracy goal than in the 
intragroup/no accuracy goal condition and the two intergroup 
conditions. 
The pattern of results for the stereotypic, counter-stereotypic 
and neutral information reflects a similar pattern. For the selection of 
counter-stereotypic words there was a significant interaction on the 
intragroup versus intergroup contrast (z.. = 2.55, p_ < .01) and a 
significant main effect for comparative context on the contrast between 
the interpersonal and combined group condition (z = 3.10, p_ < .01; see 
Figure 7.2). Subjects are clearly using more counter-stereotypic 
information when describing impressions in both the interpersonal 
conditions (fs: accuracy goal= 19.22 and no accuracy goal= 22.10) and 
the intragroup condition where an accuracy goal was provided (f = 
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21.44) compared to the other three conditions (fs: intragroup/no 
accuracy goal = 7.15; intergroup/ accuracy goal = 6.73; intergroup/ no 
accuracy goal = 9.80). 
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Figure 7.2. Frequency of counter-stereotypic word selection 
For the selection of stereotypic words there was also a 
significant interaction on the contrast between intragroup and 
intergroup conditions (&. = -2.48, 1!. < .01; see Figure 7.3). More 
stereotypic information was selected when forming impressions in the 
intragroup/ no accuracy goal condition (f = 54.11) and the two 
intergroup conditions (fs: accuracy goal = 54.77 and no accuracy goal = 
51.18) than in the intragroup/accuracy goal condition (f = 30.63). 
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Figure 7.3. Frequency of stereotypic word selection 
As in Experiment 1 a parametric measure was developed to 
further assess the content of impressions. A stereotyping score for 
each subject was generated by giving subjects a +1 for each stereotypic 
word selected as most typical of their impression, a -1 for each non-
stereotypic word and a 0 for each neutral word. Scores for the five 
traits were summed. Each subject could have a score between +5 and 
-5 with a higher score reflecting more stereotyping. 
As in Experiment 1, there was a significant main effect for 
comparative context (F(2, 90) = 3.41, n < .05). Subjects stereotyped 
more in the intergroup condition (M = 2. 7 4) than the intragroup (M = 
1.68) and interpersonal conditions (M = 1.30). This main effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction (F(2, 90) = 3.59, n <.05). For 
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reasons of interpretability the Newman-Keuls technique was used, 
unless otherwise stated in this and subsequent cases, to examine 
differences between means across conditions. Subjects stereotyped less 
in the two interpersonal conditions (Ms: interpersonal/accuracy goal 
condition = 1.58, interpersonal/no accuracy goal condition = 1.00) and 
the intragroup/accuracy goal condition (M =.56). Subjects stereotyped 
more in the intragroup/no accuracy goal condition (M = 2. 79) and the 
two intergroup conditions (Ms: intergroup/accuracy goal condition = 
2.94, intergroup/ no accuracy goal condition = 2.53). The mean in the 
intragroup/accuracy goal condition was found to be significantly 
different from all other means. The means in the both interpersonal 
conditions differed significantly from those in the intragroup/no 
accuracy goal condition and the two intergroup conditions. 
7.3.3 Recall of information 
Two measures of recall were developed. Subjects were asked to 
recall as many of the statements used to describe their team 
mate/opponent as possible. The total number of statements subjects 
recalled was analysed. These statements were also coded using a gist 
criterion and the number which "fitted" the actual information 
provided were also analysed. These two measures were each analysed 
using 2 (accuracy) x 3 (comparative context) ANOVAs (see Table 7.2). 
There were no differences in recall of the actual statements 
provided. On the total number of statements recalled there was a 
significant main effect for comparative context (F(2, 90) = 4.32, 12 < 
.05). Subjects recalled more information in the interpersonal condition 
(M = 4.03) than in the group conditions (Ms: 3.16 in the intragroup and 
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3.17 in the intergroup conditions). 
Table 7.2 
Means for recall measures 
Total number 
Number correct 
Most informative 
Accuracy goal 
Pers Intra Inter 
(N=17) (N=16) (N=17) 
4.00 3.44 
2.00 1.63 
.29 -.13 
3.00 
1.59 
.47 
No accuracy goal 
Pers Intra Inter 
(N=17) (N=14) (N=l5) 
4.06 2.56 3.33 
2.00 1.57 1.80 
.18 -.07 .67 
Note: Pers =interpersonal, intra= intergroup, inter= intergroup 
Subjects were also asked to rank the six statements used to 
describe the target person from most to least informative. The 
statement ranked first by each subject was coded in the same way as 
the checklist and type of recall measure. If a stereotypic statement 
was ranked as most informative subjects were given a score of +1, a 
score of -1 was allocated if a non-stereotypic statement was listed and 
a score of 0 if a neutral statement was ranked first (see Table 7.2). 
The only significant result was a main effect for comparative context 
(F(2, 90) = 5.71, n < .05). Subjects ranked non-stereotypic statements 
as more informative in the intragroup (M = -.10) and interpersonal (M 
= .24) conditions compared to the intergroup condition (M = .56). 
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7.3.4 Analysis of other measures 
(i) Effort in impression formation 
Variables designed to assess subjects' effort in impression 
formation were analysed in a 2 (accuracy) x 3 (comparative context) 
between-subjects MANOVA (see Table 7.3). Included were the items 
concerned with the difficulty of impression formation, the level of effort 
and attention allocated to the process. Unless otherwise stated, the 
univariate effects were identical to the multivariate effects. No 
significant multivariate effects were found. 
(ii) Similarity to opponent/team mate 
Measures of how similar subjects felt they were to their 
opponent/team mate and the extent to which they felt they would 
agree with them were also analysed in a 2 (accuracy) x 3 (comparative 
context) between subjects MANOVA (see Table 7.3). Using Wilks 
criterion there was a significant multivariate effect for comparative 
context (F(4, 178) = 4.05, n < .01) which was qualified by a significant 
multivariate interaction (E( 4, 178) = 2.50, n < .05). Investigation of the 
univariate tests revealed a main effect for comparative context on both 
the similarity (F(2, 90) = 5.67, n < .01) and agreement (F(2, 90) = 7.58, 
n <.05) measures. Consistent with a shared group membership being 
more salient in the intragroup condition subjects thought they were 
most similar to the target in the intragroup (M = 6.48) compared to the 
interpersonal (M = 5.82) and intergroup condition (M = 5.21). Subjects 
also thought they would agree with the target more in the intragroup 
(M = 6.4 7) and interpersonal (M = 6.00) conditions than in the 
intergroup (M = 5.03) condition. 
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There was also a significant univariate interaction (F(2, 90) = 
4.22, Il. < .05) on the agreement measure. Examination of the means 
reveals that the interaction is associated with the interpersonal and 
intragroup conditions. In order to decompose the interaction protected 
t-test comparisons were conducted (alpha level set at .01). In the 
intragroup/accuracy condition the mean on the agreement item does 
not differ from the interpersonal/accuracy condition (Ms: 6.06 and 6.65, 
respectively; .t(31) = 1.11, Il. > .10). In the no accuracy goal condition 
the difference between means in the intragroup condition and 
interpersonal conditions approaches significance (Ms: = 6.93 and 5.35, 
respectively; .t(29) = -2. 72, Il. < .02). In the intragroup conditions the 
pattern of the means suggests that subjects felt they would agree with 
their team mate more about how to solve problems in the no accuracy 
(M = 6.93) compared to the accuracy condition (M = 6.06), but the 
difference between these means was not significant (.t(28) = -1.71, Il. < 
.10). Subjects also tended to report higher anticipated agreement with 
their opponent in the interpersonal/ accuracy goal condition (M = 6.65) 
compared to the interpersonal/no accuracy goal condition (M = 5.35; 
.t(32) = 2.23, Il. < .05). There was also a consistent pattern of less 
agreement in the intergroup conditions. 
(iii) Confidence in performance 
Subjects were asked how confident they were that they would 
score higher than their opponent/ team mate on the problem solving 
tasks. Responses were analysed in a 2(accuracy) x 3(comparative 
context between subjects ANOVA (see Table 7.3). No significant 
effects were found. 
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Table 7.3 
Means for other response scale measures. 
Accuracy goal No accuracy goal 
p I 0 p I 0 
Similarity to opponent /team mate 
Similarity 6.29 6.31 4.94 5.35 6.64 5.47 
Agreement 6.65 6.06 5.00 5.35 6.93 5.07 
Effort in immession formation 
Effort in impression 5.88 6.44 5.94 6.29 5.86 6.80 
Attention to info. opp./team mate 6.47 6.94 6.47 6.71 6.36 6.73 
Difficulty in impression formation 5.94 5.63 6.77 5.88 5.79 4.80 
Confidence in performance 4.77 4.38 5.24 5.59 4.86 4.40 
P§:rGeived accurac~ 5.35 6.00 4.29 5.88 5.14 5.93 
(iv) Accuracy of impressions 
Responses to the item measuring the perceived accuracy of the 
impressions formed was also analysed in a 2 (accuracy) x 3 
(comparative context) ANOVA (see Table 7.3). A significant 
interaction was found (F(2, 90) = 4.37, p < .02). Subjects thought their 
impression was least accurate in the intergroup/accuracy condition and 
most accurate in the intragroup/accuracy condition. 
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7.4 Discussion 
The results found in the interpersonal and the intergroup 
conditions of this study clearly replicate those found in Experiment 1. 
Subjects used more counter-stereotypic information when forming 
impressions in the interpersonal condition and more stereotype 
consistent information in the intergroup condition. Also, stereotype 
consistent information was ranked as more informative in the 
intergroup condition, whereas, counter-stereotypic information was 
considered more important in the interpersonal condition. 
Importantly, in this study there was no evidence that the type of 
impressions formed in these two conditions was influenced by the 
accuracy goal manipulation. 
In this study there was no systematic increase in individuation 
where an accuracy goal was provided. However, the accuracy goal in 
interaction with the comparative context manipulation, did increase 
individuation (relative to the no accuracy condition) in the intragroup 
condition. It was found that in the intragroup/no accuracy condition 
the ingroup target was stereotyped. However, in the intragroup/ 
accuracy goal condition more individuated impressions were formed of 
the target person. This finding cannot be straightforwardly explained 
by the attention model. If the accuracy instruction does increase 
attention to attribute information, in particular inconsistent 
information, then this instruction should have had an impact in the 
interpersonal and intergroup conditions as well. In these conditions 
there should have been more individuation in the accuracy goal versus 
no accuracy goal conditions. In fact, in the interpersonal and 
intergroup conditions the results tend to suggest, if anything, that 
212 
relatively more stereotypic impressions were formed under accuracy 
goal conditions. 
Evidence of individuation in the intragroup/accuracy goal 
condition was also counter to predictions based on self-categorization 
theory. However, it is possible to explain the findings as a product of 
variations in the salient comparative context. To the extent that the 
comparative context was interpreted by subjects in intergroup terms it 
was predicted that they would form more stereotypic impressions in 
the group conditions. Stereotypic impressions were formed in the 
intragroup condition where no accuracy instruction was provided, and 
in the two intergroup conditions. It is possible that the contrasting 
outgroup and associated intergroup comparisons were not salient when 
subjects formed impressions of their team mate in the 
intragroup/accuracy goal condition. 
The fact that subjects in intragroup conditions were in a room 
with only other ingroup members, and the accuracy goal emphasised 
forming an impression of one of these members, could have made 
interpersonal rather than intergroup comparisons more relevant for 
subjects. Thus, the accuracy instruction in interaction, with a weakly 
manipulated intergroup context could have shifted the salient 
comparative context such that interpersonal, within-group 
comparisons were more relevant (see also Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 
1997). 
In fact results on the agreement measure offer some support for 
the argument that intergroup comparisons were not salient in the 
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intragroup/accuracy goal condition. It would be predicted, from self-
categorization theory, that the salience of intergroup comparisons 
would be indicated by higher perceived agreement with an ingroup 
member about problem solving. It was found that subjects tended to 
think they would agree with their team mate more about problem-
solving in the intragroup/ no accuracy goal compared to the intragroup/ 
accuracy goal condition which suggests that interpersonal comparisons 
may have been salient in the latter condition. 
Shifts in the salient comparative context can also explain why, 
on some measures, there was more individuation in the 
intragroup/accuracy goal condition. Subjects were told that they had 
the same problem solving style as the target in the interpersonal and 
intragroup conditions. However, in the intragroup conditions the 
target was described as a team mate and in the interpersonal 
conditions the target was described as an opponent. Therefore, in the 
intragroup conditions the subject and target are explicitly described as 
members of the same group. If the accuracy goal in interaction with a 
weak intergroup manipulation contributed to a shift in the 
comparative context from intergroup to interpersonal levels, then the 
fact that a higher order ingroup was more explicitly defined may have 
led to further interpersonal differentiation. 
In self-categorization theory it is argued that the basis of 
individuation is formation of a "(personal) self-categorization which 
contrasts the person with ingroup members" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 
190). Given that an ingroup was more defined in the intragroup 
compared to the interpersonal conditions subjects could have 
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contrasted themselves from the target more if interpersonal 
comparisons were contextually relevant. Stereotype inconsistent 
information may enable subjects to differentiate themselves from the 
target. Therefore the use of more counter-stereotypic information in 
the intragroup/accuracy goal condition could be explained in terms of 
this differentiation process. In summary then, a possible explanation 
for individuation in the intragroup/accuracy goal condition is that the 
accuracy goal instruction in interaction with a weak manipulation of 
the intergroup context, may have influenced subjects to accentuate the 
differences rather than the similarities between themselves and the 
target. 
There are also some additional results which need to be 
considered. It is important to emphasise that the results regarding 
comparative context in this second experiment cannot be explained 
through the potential outgroup homogeneity explanation which 
clouded the interpretation of the results in Experiment 1. The results 
of this second experiment indicate that ingroup members can be 
individuated or stereotyped depending on salient features of the 
comparative context (see Haslam et al., 1995a, 1995b). 
It is also interesting to note that in the intragroup conditions 
subjects ranked inconsistent information as more informative in 
impression formation in both the intragroup/accuracy goal condition 
and intragroup/no accuracy goal condition. However, in the former 
condition the target was individuated and in the latter more 
stereo typic impression were formed of the same target. These results 
further support the conclusions drawn in Experiment 1 that there are 
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problems with using typical attention measures to assess what the 
perceiver is actually doing with the information in order to form an 
integrated impression. It is possible that subjects reconciled the 
counter-stereotypic information to form more stereotypic impressions 
in the intragroup/no accuracy goal condition (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 1997). 
As outlined in the previous chapter the relationship between time 
spent looking at information, the recall of information, the importance 
of particular types of information in impression formation and the 
actual content of the impression needs to be explored in more detail. 
Direct manipulations of cognitive capacity, as used in the 
cognitive load literature summarised in Chapter 4, and comparative 
context variables may provide another direction for future research. 
However, as outlined in Chapter 4 some preliminary studies by Nolan 
et al. (1996) have investigated the impact of such variables on the level 
of stereotyping. Their results clearly supported the predictions, based 
on self-categorization theory, that stereotyping decreased when 
cognitive load increased because subjects could not meaningfully 
interpret the information in group-based terms. 
In summary then, predictions based on self-categorization 
theory are generally supported by the findings in this study. The main 
results of Experiment 1 have been replicated. There is no evidence 
that the accuracy goal systematically increased individuation relative 
to the no accuracy goal condition. There is also evidence that ingroup 
members can be individuated or stereotyped depending on whether 
interpersonal or intergroup comparisons are contextually relevant. 
These results offer support for the position that variations in 
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impression formation are mediated by the comparative context and the 
salient level of abstraction at which the impression formation process 
operates. 
7.5 General discussion of experiments 1 and 2. 
In the last two experiments there has been no systematic 
indication that motivational factors, such as interdependence and 
accuracy goals, influence the impressions formed of a specific target. 
The results generally supported self-categorization theory predictions 
where variations in impression formation corresponded with whether 
an interpersonal or intergroup context was salient. The most pressing 
question is why were the effects found in previous research regarding 
interdependence and accuracy goals not replicated in these two 
experiments. Although speculative there are two potential 
explanations which may be worth considering. 
First, it is possible that, as found in previous studies by Fiske 
and colleagues, subjects in experiments 1 and 2 did look at 
inconsistent information longer in the accuracy goal and 
interdependence conditions (e.g., Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher et 
al., 1991). However, if this is the case then gaze duration is not at all 
correlated with the content of impressions because there was no 
evidence of generally increased individuation in the interdependent 
and accuracy goal conditions in our studies. 
Secondly, it is possible that in previous experiments the effects 
obtained in the interdependence and accuracy goal conditions (e.g., 
looking at inconsistent information longer, making more dispositional 
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comments) have been due to implicit variations in the comparative 
context. That is, interdependence manipulations and accuracy goal 
manipulations may shape the comparative context in specific ways so 
that intergroup or interpersonal comparisons become more relevant to 
subjects. 
In fact, the results of studies such as those by Neuberg and 
Fiske (1987) and Ruscher et al. (1991) described in Chapter 4, can be 
interpreted in terms of possible variations in the salient comparative 
context. In Neuberg and Fiske's (1987) study the results suggested 
that subjects formed a stereotypic impression of Frank (a schizophrenic 
patient) when the subject and patient were not outcome dependent and 
the information provided was neutral with respect to the schizophrenic 
category. In this non-interdependent condition, subjects were told that 
their performance would be compared with that of other subjects and 
that Frank's performance would be compared with that of other 
schizophrenic patients. This instruction itself could reinforce the 
stereotype that schizophrenic patients are different and that their 
performance on the task needs to be assessed in terms of a special 
standard - that of other schizophrenic patients. It is possible that 
subjects formed relatively stereotypic impression of Frank in this 
condition because the manipulation of low interdependence actually 
defined the self-target relationship in more intergroup terms. 
The instructions in the outcome dependent condition in Neuberg 
and Fiske's (1987; see also Erber & Fiske, 1984) study could also affect 
the salience of interpersonal or intergroup comparisons. Generally, in 
outcome dependent conditions the subject and patient are 
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cooperatively interdependent and have to work together. A prize is 
awarded based on their combined efforts. The instructions could 
encourage subjects to see themselves and the person they are forming 
an impression of as sharing the same ingroup membership and 
therefore more within-group, interpersonal comparisons would be 
predicted from the self-categorization theory perspective. The level of 
abstraction at which impressions of others are formed could be affected 
by cooperative outcome dependent manipulations. 
In the Ruscher et al. (1991) study the confound between 
cooperative interdependence and forming an impression of an ingroup 
member was overcome through use of competitive interdependence. In 
competitive interdependent conditions it was found that stereotype-
inconsistent information was looked at for longer than stereotype-
consistent information when forming an impression of a team mate 
and the reverse was found when impressions of opponents were 
formed. It is possible that judgements of team mates may represent 
interpersonal differentiations within an ingroup and therefore the 
focus is on characteristics which differentiate group members -
inconsistent information. On the other hand, judgements of opponents 
could have been made on an ingroup-outgroup basis, and subjects 
focused on characteristics which differentiated between the ingroup 
and the outgroup - consistent information. This interpretation 
assumes that judgements of team mates, as found in Experiment 2, 
were made in a relatively interpersonal rather than intergroup context. 
The manipulation of interdependence in both Neuberg and 
Fiske's (1987) and Ruscher et al.'s (1991) studies may have changed 
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the basis of comparison between the perceiver and the perceived and 
actually framed the comparative context at particular levels of 
abstraction. As the comparative context has been explicitly 
manipulated in the two experiments reported in this thesis any such 
implicit effects may have been subsumed. The outcome is clear effects 
in both studies for comparative context and no systematic evidence 
that motivation factors lead to the formation of more individuated 
impressions. 
In summary then, the following conclusions can be drawn from 
the results of experiments 1 and 2: 1) using the content of impressions 
as the main dependent measure, interpersonal contexts produce more 
individuation and intergroup contexts produce more stereotyping; 2) 
there is no evidence that motivation and attention, as manipulated by 
Fiske and colleagues, is systematically influencing the resultant 
impression. 
These findings have implications for our understanding of the 
impression formation process. The results further reinforce the view 
that individuated impressions may not be formed through a distinct 
resource consuming categorization-free process and warrant a more 
detailed examination of the relationship between categorization and 
individuation. It is this issue which is addressed in the remaining two 
experiments reported in this thesis. 
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ChapterS 
ACCENTUATION AND IMPRESSION FORMATION 
8.1 Introduction 
Experiments 1 and 2 have focused on the first empirical aim of 
this thesis - specification of the conditions under which more 
stereotypic or individuated impressions are formed. It has been shown 
that variations in the salient comparative context affect the content of 
impressions. Impressions did not vary systematically with the 
attention-related manipulations of interdependence and accuracy 
goals. The second empirical aim of the thesis, outlined in chapters 1 
and 5, is to investigate the actual process underlying impression 
formation. The emphasis in the next two experiments therefore shifts 
from direct interest in factors which influence the type of impressions 
formed of others to a related but perhaps more fundamental issue, an 
examination of process. 
Although in the previous two studies targets have been 
individuated and stereotyped broadly in line with self-categorization 
theory predictions, the impression formation process responsible for 
these different kinds of impressions has not been transparent. It has 
not been demonstrated that the formation of individuated and 
stereotypic impressions is based on the same categorization process, 
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but operating at different levels of abstraction. 
If categorization is the basis of individuated impression 
formation then this has significant and fundamental consequences for 
the social cognitive perspective on stereotyping. The whole argument 
that stereotyping is a distorted form of perception because it is an 
outcome of categorization would be challenged by evidence that 
individuated impressions are also based on categorization and 
accentuation. 
As became clear in chapters 4 and 5, social cognition and self-
categorization theory offer fundamentally different interpretations of 
the categorization process. A core issue which differentiates between 
these two approaches to social perception is the role of accentuation. 
As detailed in Chapter 4, and throughout experiments 1 and 2, 
variables such as outcome dependence and accuracy goals are 
interpreted as affecting whether subjects increase their "accuracy-
driven attention to attribute information" and evaluate targets "with 
respect to their actual characteristics" (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 442, 
emphasis added, see also Judd & Park, 1993). Attribute information 
and idiosyncratic characteristics are seen to represent a particular 
person in an absolute, stimulus-based way. Categorization and 
accentuation distort perception away from these more accurate 
representations of others. 
Alternatively, as outlined in Chapter 5, in self-categorization 
theory it is argued that categorization and accentuation reflect "real 
variations in the relational properties of people" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 
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196) and are the basis of meaningful inference. Shifts in the level of 
perception and associated accentuation of similarities and differences, 
from interpersonal-to-intergroup and from intergroup-to-interpersonal, 
are not seen to reflect distortion of any kind. Rather such shifts are 
argued to meaningfully reflect the "rational selectivity of perceptions 
in which it is more appropriate to categorize at one level in some 
contexts and at a different level in others" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 196). 
Changes in the level of categorization should, therefore, be evidenced 
by variations in the patterns of accentuation. Accentuation of 
intragroup similarities and intergroup differences in intergroup 
contexts should be replaced by accentuation of intrapersonal 
similarities and interpersonal differences where interpersonal 
comparisons are relevant (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1994; 
Turner & Oakes, 1997). 
Similarity measures, homogeneity in responses, and "who said 
what" measures, as detailed in Chapter 5, have been used extensively 
to show that categorization of stimuli leads to the accentuation of 
within category similarities and between category differences (see 
Wilder, 1986, for a review). Accentuation has been characterised 
throughout this research as mainly an intergroup phenomenon (see 
also Brewer & Weber, 1994; Simon et al., 1995). There has been 
limited investigation of patterns of accentuation where the formation 
of individuated impressions are concerned (cf. Sedikides & Skowronski, 
1993). Typically, interpersonal conditions are included in experiments 
as "base-line" conditions, in contrast to which the accentuation of 
similarities and differences at the group-level is defined. 
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A typical example of research on accentuation effects is 
represented in a study by Wilder (1984). Subjects were allocated to 
groups supposedly on the basis of their preferences for a particular 
artist (see Tajfel et al., 1971). Subjects had to estimate a range of 
opinions held by other ingroup or outgroup members. These 
estimations were either made under conditions where all subjects in a 
session were described as members of the same group (intragroup) or 
where ingroup and outgroup members were explicitly defined in the 
experimental session (intergroup). In intergroup conditions subjects 
had to either estimate the opinions of ingroup or outgroup members. 
Comparisons between the intragroup and intergroup-ingroup condition 
were used to assess the accentuation of similarity to self and perceived 
homogeneity. 
Wilder (1984) found that on the similarity measure, where 
subjects had to rate how similar they were to an ingroup or outgroup 
member on a 1 to 9 scale, the mean in the intragroup condition fell in 
between the means in the two intergroup conditions. Subjects rated 
themselves as being most different from outgroup members and more 
similar to ingroup members in the intergroup-ingroup than intragroup 
condition. It was argued that the presence of the outgroup enhanced 
perceived similarity. Responses were also found to be more 
homogeneous in the intergroup conditions. 
Wilder (1984), based on the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979), 
suggested that in the intragroup conditions attention would be focused 
"on the differences between individuals" (1984, p. 323). The 
accentuation of these differences was not specifically examined. In 
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fact, interpersonal differentiation has generally not been a main focus 
for research. It is not clear whether differences are accentuated 
indiscriminately or in a dimension specific way. In order to explain the 
impression formation process it is necessary not to take the "base-line" 
analysis for granted and to look at self-other accentuation m 
interpersonal contexts as a subject of interest in its own right. 
For this reason a study was designed to assess the specific 
pattern of accentuation between the same constant targets at both 
intergroup and interpersonal levels. If the pattern of accentuation is 
consistent with self-categorization theory predictions this may provide 
some preliminary evidence that categorization underlies impression 
formation in both intergroup and interpersonal contexts. 
In this study, three groups of subjects viewed the same video of a 
discussion between six people about their attitudes to success. The 
only information which varied across the three conditions was 
background information about who developed the video. Subjects were 
informed that participants in the discussion were arts and engineering 
students and that the video was made by (a) the Engineering students' 
association to examine the effect of faculty of enrolment on success; (b) 
a women's group on campus to examine the effect of gender on success 
or (c) the Centre for Educational Development and Management 
(CEDAM), which was described as an organisation interested in 
tailoring education more on an individual basis, to examine the effect 
of individuals' views on success. After watching the video subjects 
were asked to form an impression of two participants - target 1 and 
target 2. Both targets were female and each target made two 
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statements. One statement was stereotypic of being female and the 
other statement was stereotypic of being an arts student for target 1 
and an engineering student for target 2. 
The background information provided about who developed the 
video was predicted to subtly influence how the targets would be 
categorized. It has been shown by Medin and colleagues in their rule 
induction studies (see Chapter 5) that the same stimulus (e.g., 
pictures) can be interpreted in divergent ways depending on the 
background information available (e.g., information about who drew a 
series of pictures). Their results indicated that the meaning of the 
stimulus information changed in order to support the categorization 
rules that developed. In relation to self-categorization theory, Medin 
and colleagues' results could be explained in terms of the fact that 
changes in background theories actually change the comparative and 
normative features of the stimuli - the meaning of the stimuli and 
which similarities and differences are accentuated (see Brown & 
Turner, 1996; Oakes, 1983, 1987). 
In the current study the pattern of accentuation between the 
same two constant targets was, therefore, predicted to vary depending 
on the background information provided and how the targets were 
categorized. When the background information was ostensibly that 
the video was developed by a women's group on campus it was 
predicted that the targets would be seen as members of the same group 
"women" and perceived as similar to one another (intragroup condition; 
note that in this study intragroup refers to judgement of an ingroup 
member in an intergroup context). It was predicted that the same two 
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targets would be seen as different from one another, as members of 
distinct groups, "arts students" and "engineering students", where the 
video was supposedly produced by the Engineering students' 
association (intergroup condition). In the condition where CEDAM 
supposedly produced the video it was anticipated that the 
interpersonal differences between the targets would be accentuated 
(interpersonal condition). 
In the intergroup and interpersonal conditions the same 
prediction is made that the differences between the targets should be 
accentuated. However, because the level of abstraction at which 
impression formation occurs is anticipated to vary in these two 
conditions (intergroup and interpersonal), the dimensions on which 
similarities and differences are accentuated should be different in the 
two conditions. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Subiects and design 
Subjects were 26 female and 16 male first year psychology 
students who participated in the study for course credit. Subjects 
watched a video depicting a discussion between students about their 
attitudes to success. Background information about who developed the 
video were varied so that the anticipated categorization of the targets 
would be as; (a) members of the same group; (b) members of different 
groups; or (c) differentiated individuals. Therefore, the design of the 
study had one factor (anticipated categorization of targets) with three 
levels: intragroup, intergroup and interpersonal. Three subjects (two 
females and one male) stated on a manipulation check that they knew 
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students on the video so their responses were not included in analyses. 
Assignment to conditions was random. 
8.2.2 Procedure 
Sessions were run with between 1 to 11 subjects by a female 
researcher. Subjects were asked not to communicate with one another 
throughout the study, informed that the study concerned attitudes to 
success, and told that they would be viewing a video and then marking 
responses on a questionnaire. Subjects were informed they could 
withdraw from the study at any time and that their responses were 
entirely private and confidential. The researcher distributed the 
questionnaires and read through the front of the booklet. 
The front of the booklet contained a brief passage explaining 
that University administration was concerned about uneven 
perceptions of success across students in different areas of the 
university. This was followed by information about the purpose of the 
video. For example in the intergroup condition the subjects were 
informed that: 
The Engineering Students' Association explored the issue of 
attitudes to success. 
They brought students together from different areas of the 
university, in this case Arts and Engineering students, to discuss 
and examine the influence of faculty of enrolment on success. 
You are going to watch a segment of this discussion which was 
videoed by the Engineering Students' Association and then 
answer some questions about your impressions of those depicted 
and their attitudes to success. 
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The underlined aspects of the above passage varied across conditions 
(they were not underlined on the booklet). In the intragroup condition 
the words "Women's group on campus" replaced "Engineering 
Students' Association" and instead of "faculty of enrolment on success" 
the words "gender on success" were substituted. Likewise in the 
interpersonal condition the words "CEDAM" and "individuals' views on 
success" were inserted, respectively. In the interpersonal condition an 
explanation of CEDAM was also provided which stressed that CEDAM 
was interested in tailoring education more on an individual to 
individual basis. Note that all subjects were told that the students 
were from Arts and Engineering, so in all conditions the information 
about applicable category memberships was constant. Subjects then 
watched a video where six students, 3 males and 3 females, discussed 
their attitudes to success. After viewing the video subjects were asked 
to answer a series of questions and were then debriefed. 
8.2.3 11aterials 
The materials consisted of the video and the dependent 
measures questionnaire. For the video three female and three males 
discussed attitudes to success by following a carefully constructed 
script. The script was organised around statements which were pre-
tested as being either stereotypical of arts and engineering students or 
males and females. For the video the participants in the discussion 
were positioned so that sex of the discussants alternated from female 
to male around a semi-circle. Each of the six discussants made two 
comments on the video in what was designed to be an interconnected 
conversation. Table 8.1 describes the type of statement made by each 
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of the participants in the discussion. 
Table 8.1 
The type of statement made by each participant and the order of the 
contribution 
Sex of participant 
Contribution 1 
Contribution 2 
Participant 
A c 
Tl 
F M F 
B 
AS AS AS 
FS MS FS 
D E 
T2 
M F 
ES ES 
MS FS 
F 
M 
ES 
MS 
Note: Tl = Target 1; T2 = Target 2; F = Female; M = Male; FS = female 
stereotypical, MS = male stereotypical; AS = arts stereotypical, ES = Engineering 
stereotypical. 
Mter watching the video subjects were asked to mainly answer 
questions about two of the female discussants described as target 1 
and target 2. Target 1 and two other discussants (one male and one 
female) each made one statement stereotypic of an arts student's 
attitude to success (e.g., "I find that I understand things best when 
using my imagination and this is important because it leads to new 
and innovative ideas"). Target 2 and the two remaining male 
discussants each made a statement stereotypic of an engineering 
student's attitude to success (e.g., "I think it is your attitude to work 
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and being methodical and structured in the way you approach it. The 
amount of effort you put into something will determine your success 
more than any other factor"). 
The second statement made by each participant was stereotypic 
of their sex. Both target 1, target 2 and the other female discussant 
each made one statement stereotypic of a woman's attitude to success 
(e.g., "Your ability to communicate your ideas is essential. You always 
need to listen to what others have to say and have an open-mind and 
this allows you to form your own opinions"), while the three male 
discussants made statements stereotypic of a male's attitude to success 
(e.g., "to succeed you have to be able to be assertive and not worry too 
much about what others think"). 
After watching the video subjects were asked to work through 
questions in the booklet. On the first page of the booklet, a photograph 
taken from the video was presented with two of the female discussants 
marked as target 1 and target 2. Subjects were asked to form an 
impression of these targets. On the following page nine questions 
which concerned target 1 and target 2 were asked. The questions 
focused on how similar target 1 and target 2 were to each other, to 
what extent they agreed in the video and in general, and how similar 
they were in terms of their attitude to success. Also, how successful 
each would be, the extent to which they would have things in common, 
would like each other and get along. Subjects had to respond to each 
question by circling a number from 1 to 9 on scales with appropriately 
labelled ends. 
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On the next page subjects assessed the extent to which a 
number of traits (e.g., practical, communicative) characterised both 
target 1 and target 2. Nine traits were presented, each accompanied 
by a line 8.6 centimetres long labelled at one end "not at all" and at the 
other "very much". Two of the traits were pre-tested as being 
stereotypic of engineering students (practical and methodical), two 
were stereotypic of being an arts student (imaginative, creative), two 
were stereotypic of women (communicative and sensitive) and two 
were considered to be more individual characteristics (warm and 
friendly). Subjects also rated the targets on the dimension successful 
so the aim of looking at attitudes to success would seem legitimate. 
Subjects were asked to judge the extent to which the particular 
dimension characterised target 1 and target 2 by marking a vertical 
line to represent each of their positions on that dimension. 
The final page of the booklet provided space for subjects to write 
a brief description of their impression of target 1 and target 2. On this 
page there were also a number of additional questions, where subjects 
had to mark a response on a 9-point scale with appropriately labelled 
end points. Items assessed; 1) how confident subjects were in their 
responses; 2) how difficult they found the tasks; and 3) how interested 
they were in the experiment. In addition subjects had to indicate who 
they thought developed the video and whether anyone on the video 
was familiar to them. 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Judgements of targets based on response scale measures 
The first question (the main dependent measure) assessed the 
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perceived similarity between target 1 and target 2. Results were 
analysed using a oneway ANOVA (see Table 8.2). In line with 
predictions, the extent to which the targets were seen to be similar to 
one another varied across conditions (F(2,36) = 4.57, p < .05). 
Table 8.2 
Means on measures to assess the relationship between target 1 and 
target 2 
Categorization of targets 
Inter Intra Pers 
Measure 
Similar to each other 4.31a 6.23b 5.08c 
Agreed on video 5.38b 6.77a 5.15b 
Agree in general 5.00 5.62 5.23 
Similar attitudes to success 5.46b 6.62a 5.23b 
Like one another 4.54b 5.69a 4.69b 
Have things in common 4.69 5.69 5.08 
Would get along 4.92 5.69 5.08 
Note: Inter = intergroup, Intra = intragroup, Pers = interpersonal; means with 
different subscripts differ at p < or = .05. 
As can be seen from Table 8.2, the targets were judged to be 
most similar in the intragroup condition (M = 6.23) and least similar in 
the intergroup condition (M = 4.31). The targets were also rated as 
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relatively different from one another in the interpersonal condition (M 
= 5.08). The pattern of these differences was assessed using Newman-
Keuls and all three means were found to differ significantly from each 
other at the .05 level. 
Other variables reported in Table 8.2 were included to assess 
more generally the relationship between target 1 and target 2. These 
variables were analysed in a oneway MANOVA. No significant 
multivariate effects were found. On three items univariate effects 
were significant. They were: agreement on the video (F(2, 36) = 6.26, 
P. < .01), similar attitudes to success (F(2, 36) = 3.45, P. < .05) and the 
extent to which the targets would like one another (F(2, 36) = 4.10, P. < 
.03). In all cases the targets were seen as more similar in the 
intragroup condition than the other two conditions. The means in the 
intergroup and interpersonal conditions did not differ from each other. 
Subjects were also asked how successful they thought target 1 and 
target 2 would be respectively. Each item was analysed in a oneway 
ANOVA. No significant differences were found across conditions. 
Generally, perceived similarity and difference between the 
targets is varying in relation to contextual factors. Exactly the same 
targets are seen as different when faculty of enrolment or individual 
interest is the basis of comparison, and similar when being female 
becomes the salient feature for comparison. However, it is important 
to show that comparing across the intergroup and interpersonal 
conditions the way in which the targets are differentiated from each 
other varies depending on the level of abstraction of the impression 
formation process. 
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8.3.2 Target ratings on specific trait dimensions 
It was predicted that the targets would be judged differently on 
trait dimensions across conditions. The ratings of target 1 and target 2 
on each of the nine trait dimensions (e.g., warm, friendly, 
communicative, methodical) were each analysed using a 2 (target 
rated) x 3 (anticipated categorization of targets) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor. The means are reported in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 
Mean scores for target 1 and target 2 on trait measures 
Target 1 Target 2 
Inter Intra Pers Inter Intra Pers 
Trait dimensions 
Warm 4.72 4.09 5.21 4.35 4.47 5.14 
Communicative 5.49 6.34 5.99 5.55 6.23 6.04 
Friendly 5.14 4.67 5.09 4.76 5.58 5.49 
Sensitive 4.73 4.12 5.29 4.90 4.86 5.45 
Creative 6.29 6.04 5.99 4.80 5.60 5.49 
Methodical 4.46 5.13 5.06 6.22 5.40 5.89 
Successful 5.27 6.28 5.79 6.12 5.77 6.09 
Imaginative 6.19 5.54 5.87 4.63 5.59 4.77 
Practical 3.77 4.44 4.22 5.91 5.14 5.10 
Note: Inter= intergroup, Intra= intragroup, Pers =interpersonal 
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There were significant mam effects for target rated on the 
dimensions creative, imaginative, practical and methodical. Target 1 
was seen as more creative (Ms: target 1 (T1) = 6.11, target 2 (T2) = 
5.30; F(1, 38) = 7.43, ,12 < .01) and imaginative (Ms: T1 = 5.87, T2 = 
5.00; F(1, 38) = 7.90, ,12 < .01). Target 2 was seen as more practical (Ms: 
T1 = 4.14, T2 = 5.38; F(1,38) = 11.67, ,12 < .01) and methodical (Ms: T1 = 
4.88, T2 = 5.84; F(1, 38) = 6.73, ,12 < .02). Generally, target 1 is being 
rated higher on arts dimensions and target 2 on engineering 
dimensions. 
In order to further investigate relative judgements of 
similarities and differences on the various dimensions, the absolute 
difference between the rating of target 1 and the rating of target 2 was 
calculated. These scores were then averaged across dimensions pre-
tested as being consistent with studying engineering (practical, 
methodical) and arts subjects (imaginative and creative), being female 
(communicative and sensitive) or more individual characteristics 
(warm, friendly and successful). These three measures were analysed 
using a 3 (anticipated categorization of targets) x 3 (dimension) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The interaction 
approached significance (F(4, 72) = 2.23, ,12 = .07). The means are 
reported in Table 8.4 (see also Figure 8.1), where a higher score 
reflects greater perceived differences between target 1 and target 2. 
As can be seen from the table, the pattern of accentuation of 
similarities and differences between the targets on the various 
dimensions differs depending on background theories and the way the 
targets were categorized. 
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Table 8.4 
Mean differences scores between target 1 and target 2 on combined 
dimensions. 
Dimension 
Female Eng/Arts Individual 
Anticipated categorization 
Intragroup 1.52 1.50 1.89 
Intergroup 2.37a 2.15a 1.67b 
Interpersonal 1.72c 2.15d 1.45c 
Note: Means with different subscripts differ at the .05level based on Newman-Keuls 
analysis. 
The differences between the means were assessed using 
Newman-Keuls analysis. The comparisons of particular interest are 
between the intergroup and interpersonal conditions, in both, as seen 
on the main similarity measure, target 1 and target 2 are 
differentiated from each other. In the intergroup condition the targets 
are seen as more different on the engineer/arts dimensions and the 
female dimensions (Ms: = 2.15 and 2.37, respectively) than on the 
individual dimensions (M = 1.67). In comparison, in interpersonal 
conditions the targets are again seen as different on the engineer/arts 
dimensions (M = 2.15) but as more similar to one another on the 
female (M = 1.72) and individual dimensions (M= 1.45). There were no 
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differences between the means on the individual dimensions across 
conditions. The key point is that as predicted, the results suggest that 
the pattern of perceived similarity and difference between the targets 
is not the same in the intergroup and interpersonal conditions. 
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Figure 8.1. Mean difference scores between target 1 and target 2 on 
combined dimensions 
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8.3.3 Analysis of other measures 
The responses to the items assessing confidence in responses, 
interest in the study and perceived difficulty, were each analysed using 
between-subjects oneway ANOVA's. There were no significant 
differences found across the categorization of targets conditions (F(2, 
36) = 1.19, p > .10; F(2, 36) = 1.60, p > .10; and F(2, 36) = .09, p > .10, 
for each question respectively). 
8.4 Discussion 
The main aim of the study was to investigate the pattern of 
accentuation between the same two targets in interpersonal, 
intragroup and intergroup conditions. It was predicted that depending 
on the background information provided, targets would be categorized 
as members of either the same or different groups and that the 
similarities or differences between them would be accentuated, 
respectively. However, because specific patterns of differentiation 
have not typically been investigated when individuated impressions 
are formed, results in the interpersonal condition were of particular 
interest. In conditions where the targets were perceived as members 
of distinct groups or as unique individuals it was predicted that the 
differences between targets would be accentuated. Importantly, 
though, it was anticipated that the dimensions on which similarities 
and differences would be accentuated would differ given variations in 
the inclusiveness of categorization. 
One of the main dependent measures was the initial question 
regarding similarity, where subjects had to indicate on a 1 to 9 scale 
how similar target 1 and target 2 were to each other. Subjects 
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perceived the targets to be most similar in the intragroup condition 
and least similar in the intergroup condition. The mean in the 
interpersonal condition fell in between the means in the other two 
conditions. The results on the similarity measure indicate that the 
pattern of accentuation was unique in each condition. In particular, it 
was found that the means in the intergroup and interpersonal 
conditions differed significantly from one another suggesting a 
different basis of differentiation in these two conditions. 
These results are similar to those obtained by Wilder (1984) and 
suggest that intergroup, intragroup and interpersonal conditions were 
successfully manipulated in the current study using more subtle 
comparative context manipulations (see also Simon & Brown, 1987; 
Simon & Pettigrew, 1990) . Consistent with self-categorization theory 
predictions, categorization of the targets seems to be a product of the 
interaction between background information and the stimulus 
information provided. The results indicate that information about who 
produced the video influenced the meaning of the available 
information and how relevant similarities and differences were 
accentuated. 
The results on the similarity measure are, however, amenable to 
an alternative interpretation. Consistent with the view that group-
based perceptions are distorted relative to individuated impressions, 
the results in the interpersonal condition could be seen as a reflection 
of some true, accurate base-line relative to which accentuation in the 
other two conditions can be defined. The other findings could then be 
taken as evidence of accentuated similarity between the targets in the 
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intragroup condition, and accentuated difference between the targets 
in the intergroup condition. 
Importantly, the way in which the targets were represented 
relative to one another on the combined trait dimensions cannot be 
explained by this base-line accuracy analysis. On female dimensions, 
the targets were perceived as similar to one another in intragroup and 
interpersonal conditions but as more different to one another in the 
intergroup condition. On arts/engineer dimensions the targets were 
seen as different in the intergroup and interpersonal condition but 
more similar in the intragroup condition. The pattern of results in the 
interpersonal condition does not provide a base-line from which the 
similarities or differences between the two targets could be 
accentuated in the intergroup conditions. Is it the perceived difference 
on arts/engineer dimensions or similarity on female dimensions in the 
interpersonal condition, that provides the accurate basis for 
accentuation in the intergroup conditions? 
In many respects, though, it appears that the results on the 
dimension measures are not what would be predicted based on self-
categorization theory. The targets are not seen as more similar in the 
intergroup conditions on dimensions related to the categorization of 
the targets. For example, targets in the intragroup condition were not 
seen as more similar on the female than the arts/engineer dimensions 
even though it appears they were categorized as women in this 
condition. In the intergroup condition targets were not seen as more 
different on arts/engineer dimensions than other dimensions. There 
were also no differences found on the individual dimensions across 
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conditions. 
The results on the dimension measures were not consistent with 
predictions. Most importantly, it is not obvious how the ratings on the 
dimensions relate to the categorization of the targets. This is 
particularly true in the interpersonal condition where because a 
shared intragroup context was not specified there was no benchmark 
from which to assess the pattern of accentuation. Clearly, the specific 
nature of the dimensions needs to be further developed and piloted in 
future work. Other content measures could also be incorporated to 
further examine in what way the targets are being stereotyped or 
individuated and therefore, aid the interpretation of results. 
While recognising the problems and limitations associated with 
the dimension measures there are some particular results which are 
worthy of comment. First, the pattern of accentuation is different in 
all three conditions which reflects the impact of the background 
information provided and associated categorization of the targets. 
Second, the results suggest that the way similarities and differences 
are accentuated in the interpersonal condition are not indiscriminate. 
On some dimensions in the interpersonal condition the targets are 
seen as similar (female and individual dimensions), and on others they 
are seen as different (arts/engineer dimensions). The findings do 
suggest that differentiation only occurs on specific dimensions but it is 
not clear how these dimensions relate to the categorization of the 
targets. 
Clearly a superordinate category needs to be defined explicitly in 
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the interpersonal condition so that the specific pattern of within-group 
differentiation can be evaluated. It would then be possible to assess 
the type of dimensions, for example those consistent or inconsistent 
with the defining ingroup, on which differentiation occurs. However, 
the possible alternative "base-line" interpretation for the pattern of 
results found in this study suggests that even if the measures were 
refined, evidence of specific differentiation between people on 
particular dimensions may not be very persuasive. Such interpersonal 
differentiation, although consistent with self-categorization theory 
predictions, could be interpreted, by those who argue for the primacy of 
individuated perception, as reflecting the supposed accuracy inherent 
in individuation. 
The results of this study have reinforced the idea that in order to 
show that individuated impression formation is also based on a 
context-dependent categorization process, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the same constant target can be individuated in 
different ways depending on contextual factors. Evidence is needed 
that individuated impressions are as much based on relative self-other 
interpersonal judgements as stereotypic impressions are based on 
relative intergroup comparisons. It is therefore, necessary to 
investigate relative changes in interpersonal differentiation under 
conditions where the defining ingroup is manipulated. These are the 
challenges for the fourth and final study reported in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 -
CATEGORIZATION, ACCENTUATION AND 
INDIVIDUATION 
9.1 Introduction 
Are individuated and stereotypic impressions formed through 
the same categorization process? The answer to this question, based 
on the empirical evidence presented so far, is inconclusive. There are 
two main issues which need clarification before it is possible to provide 
a clear explanation of the impression formation process. The first 
concerns whether the different types of impressions formed of others 
are due to the salience of in- or outgroup membership. In experiments 
2 and 3 there was some indication that the same ingroup member 
could be individuated or stereotyped depending on contextual factors. 
It needs to be clear that it is the level of abstraction at which 
impressions are formed and not whether the perceived is an ingroup or 
outgroup member which drives the formation of individuated and 
stereotypic impressions. The second issue is that we are yet to 
demonstrate clearly that interpersonal comparisons, and associated 
accentuation of self-other similarities and differences, are also 
dependent on contextual factors. 
It is argued in self-categorization theory (see Chapter 5) that at 
the social level objects in the stimulus environment are perceived in 
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terms of their intragroup similarities and intergroup differences. 
When personal identity is salient this shifts to intra-individual 
similarities and inter-individual differences (Haslam et al. 1995a; 
Hogg & Turner, 1987; Oakes et al., 1994; Simon et al., 1995; for a 
different interpretation see Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Simon, 1993). 
An important aspect of self-categorization theory is the idea that 
interpersonal differentiation between ourselves and others occurs 
relative to those that define us as an ingroup member in the context of 
interest (e.g., Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). In other words, we 
define ourselves and others as unique individuals in relation to higher 
order shared superordinate categories, and the salience of these 
categories varies. Individuated impressions are, therefore, as much 
based on relative interpersonal judgements as stereotypic impressions 
are based on relative intergroup judgements. Individuation is not 
characterised as being stable and absolute but relative and variable. 
It is necessary to demonstrate empirically that individuated 
impressions are not more heterogeneous and variable in the abstract 
and have no special status as "accurate" stable representations 
relative to stereotypic impressions (e.g., Diab, 1963; Haslam et al., 
1992). Our impressions of others change because they are comparative 
and relative to self-perception in a given context. We can form 
different impressions of the same person depending on our goals and 
motives as a perceiver. The way we define and think about ourselves 
and interpret inherent features of the situation also affects the way we 
perceive others (Lambert & Wedell, 1991; Park, DeKay & Kraus, 1994; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1993). 
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The main aim of the current study is to investigate relative self-
other accentuation and to demonstrate that individuated impressions 
are not more heterogeneous and variable in the abstract, but that 
interpersonal differentiation, perceiving ourselves and others as 
unique and different, is comparative and relative to self-perception in 
a given context. It has been argued in the preceding chapters that in 
intergroup contexts the similarities within and differences between 
groups are accentuated when stereotypic impressions are formed. 
However, where there is no relevant outgroup, interpersonal 
comparisons become salient and the differences between ingroup 
members are accentuated. 
In the present study comparative context - interpersonal and 
intragroup - was manipulated. As found in experiments 1 and 2 
stereotype inconsistent information can be used to differentiate 
between ingroup members and stereotype consistent information best 
differentiates the ingroup from the outgroup. Therefore, if 
impressions of the same constant target are formed in interpersonal 
and intergroup contexts the content of impressions should be 
consistent with the defining ingroup in intergroup contexts but 
inconsistent with the defining ingroup in interpersonal contexts. 
The salient identity of subjects was also manipulated. In one 
condition subjects' identity as females, and in the other, their identity 
as science students, was made salient. Subjects were asked to form an 
impression of a constant target simultaneously defined in terms of two 
ingroups - as a female science student. The salience manipulation 
should define the basis of comparison between the subject and target. 
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In the female identity condition they should compare as women and in 
the science identity condition as science students. 
Importantly, though, the comparative context and salient 
identity manipulations should interact with one another, such that the 
content of impressions and pattern of self-other accentuation is 
divergent across conditions. In intragroup conditions the similarities 
between the targets should be accentuated, on female stereotypic 
dimensions in the female identity condition, and on science stereotypic 
dimensions in the science identity condition. In the interpersonal 
condition the accentuation of interpersonal differences between the 
subject and target should be on dimensions inconsistent with the 
stereotype of women in the female identity condition, and inconsistent 
with the stereotype of science students in the science identity 
condition. 
It is, therefore, predicted that in intragroup conditions; (a) 
stereotypic impressions consistent with the defining ingroup should be 
formed (women or science students); and (b) the similarities between 
the subject and target should be accentuated on dimensions consistent 
with the defining ingroup. In interpersonal conditions it is predicted 
that; (a) individuated impressions should be formed of the target 
evidenced by descriptions of the target inconsistent with the defining 
ingroup; and (b) the differences between the subject and target should 
be accentuated on dimensions inconsistent with defining ingroup. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Subjects and design 
This study was conducted in first year laboratory classes using 
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female science students. Fifty-six participants were assigned to one of 
four conditions in a 2 (salient identity female, science) x 2 
(comparative context: interpersonal, intragroup) between-subjects 
design. During debriefing six subjects revealed that they were 
suspicious about aspects of the study, so their data was not included in 
analyses. 
9.2.2 Procedure 
The study was conducted as part of a first year research 
participation tutorial. Initially, all subjects were allocated a code 
number and were asked to complete a supposedly unrelated task 
where they wrote down their sex, age, major of study and faculty. 
Information about subjects' sex and faculty of enrolment was required 
to select only female science students for the current study. Students 
were told that given the size of the class they would be divided up to 
complete a series of tasks. The code numbers of students who were 
female and enrolled in the science faculty were read out and these 
students were asked to accompany one of the researchers to an 
adjacent room. Subjects were not made aware of the basis of 
separation into two groups and given the small number of males in 
each tutorial class selection of all female students was not seen as 
problematic. 
Once in the other room it was announced that they would be 
involved in a study of attitudes to success. Subjects in the female 
identity condition were asked to think about how being female related 
to their attitude to success and to write down six statements or 
attributes which described their attitude to success. The same process 
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was used for those in the science identity condition except that they 
completed the task in relation to being science students. Subjects were 
made aware that this information could be read by others. 
The information was collected and a code letter was written in 
the top right hand corner. The experimenter also wrote the student's 
faculty and sex in an "office use only" section at the top of the page, 
while supposedly referring to enrolment details provided earlier. The 
aim of subjects describing their attitudes to success was to make their 
science identity and female identity salient, in the science and female 
identity conditions, respectively. 
Those subjects in the interpersonal condition were then 
informed that the study was concerned with variations in attitudes to 
success. As part of investigating this issue subjects were told that the 
experimenter wanted to get volunteers in the session together in pairs 
to discuss success and look at variations in attitudes to success in more 
detail. Thus, subjects thought they would be discussing with one 
person in the room. 
In the intragroup condition subjects were informed that we were 
interested in variations in attitudes to success between females and 
males in the female identity condition, and between science and arts 
students in the science identity condition. Subjects were led to believe 
that they could be involved in a discussion about attitudes to success 
in which they would be paired with a person in the room. This pair 
would then discuss with (depending on the salience condition) either a 
pair of males or a pair of arts students in the adjacent room. 
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In all conditions subjects were told that discussions were often 
found to be more productive if, prior to the discussion, participants had 
some information about who they would be discussing with. For this 
reason subjects were told that they would be given some information 
about their discussion partner. Subjects were handed a sheet of paper 
which (supposedly) contained the information just provided by another 
person about their attitudes to success. 
In fact all subjects were handed the same information. They 
were asked to read the information provided by this other person (the 
target), to try and form an impression of this person, and then to turn 
the page face down on the front of the desk. Subjects were also told 
that they would be asked to answer a series of questions before the 
discussion phase of the study. Subjects read the information provided 
about the target and where then shown the various questions they 
would be asked to answer before the discussion. When subjects had 
completed these questions they were thoroughly debriefed. 
9.2.3 Ddaterials 
The materials consisted of the information about the target 
person (who subjects thought they would be discussing with) and the 
questionnaire. All subjects were given the same target information. 
The six pieces of hand-written information were in fact bogus and 
developed so that two statements were consistent with being female 
(e.g., "be tolerant of others" and "be as creative as possible"), two 
statements were consistent with being a science student (eg., "do 
things in a systematic and methodical way" and "think logically about 
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things") and two statements were neutral (eg., "don't let things get you 
down" and "you have to enjoy what you do"). The statements 
consistent with being female were inconsistent with being a science 
student and vice versa. The "office use only" section at the top of the 
page also had the words "science" and "female" written by hand. 
Therefore, in all conditions subjects were given the information that 
the target was a female science student. 
Subjects were also given a booklet containing the dependent 
measures. The booklet reiterated the instructions on the front and it 
was emphasised verbally that we would be getting volunteers together 
to discuss attitudes to success. In the intragroup condition, it was also 
emphasised that there would be discussions (depending on the salience 
condition) between males and females or arts and science students. 
In much the same way as in experiments 1 and 2 the first 
question was a checklist where subjects were asked to read through 
fifteen words and underline those words typical of their impression of 
the target person. Of those words underlined they were then asked to 
select the five most typical of their impression and write them in the 
spaces provided. The fifteen words were pre-tested such that one third 
were stereotype consistent in terms of the salient categorization, one 
third were stereotype inconsistent (counter-stereotypic) and one third 
were neutral with respect to both female and science students' 
attitudes to success. Again those words consistent with female 
attitudes were those inconsistent with science students' attitudes to 
success and vice versa. 
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Following the checklist, subjects were asked to mark where they 
would place themselves and the person they would be discussing with 
on two dimensions consistent with being a science student (systematic 
and logical) and two consistent with being female (creative and 
tolerant). For example, the word "creative" was presented in front of a 
line 8.6 centimetres long labelled at one end as "less creative" and at 
the other as "more creative". Subjects had to mark two vertical lines 
reflecting the relative position of themselves (labelled with an S ) and 
the person they would be discussing with (labelled with a P). 
Subjects were then asked eight questions where they had to 
mark a response on a 9-point scale with appropriately labelled end-
points. The questions were: 1) How similar do you think you and the 
person you will be discussing with are to each other in general? 2) To 
what extent do you think you and the person you will be discussing 
with would agree with each other on attitudes to success? 3) To what 
extent do you think you and the person you will be discussing with 
would agree with each other in general? 4) How different do you think 
you and the person you will be discussing with are from each other in 
general? 5) How typical do you think the person you will be discussing 
with is of other science students? 6) How typical do you think the 
person you will be discussing with is of other females? 7) How difficult 
was it for you to form an impression of the person you will be 
discussing with? 8) How confident are you in your impression of the 
person you will be discussing with? 
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9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Manipulation checks 
Subjects were expected to identify as females in the female 
identity condition and as science students in the science identity 
condition. Subjects' self-ratings on the female dimensions (creative, 
tolerant) and science dimensions (systematic, logical) were used to 
check the salience manipulation. Self-ratings on the two female and 
two science dimensions were averaged and analysed using a 2 
(identity) x 2 (comparative context) x 2 (dimension) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor. The interaction between identity 
and dimension was significant ([(1, 46) = 4.26, ll < .05). Subjects rated 
themselves higher on female (M = 5.33) than science dimensions (M = 
4.85) when their female identity was salient. As predicted, the 
opposite pattern was found when science identity was salient; subjects 
rated themselves higher on the science (M = 5.13) than the female 
dimensions (M = 4.67). 
9.3.2 Tvpe of impressions 
The checklist results were analysed in the same way as in 
experiments 1 and 2 by looking at the frequency (adjusted) with which 
different types of words were used to describe the target. It was 
predicted that more inconsistent information would be used in 
interpersonal conditions and more consistent information would be 
used in intragroup conditions. 
The frequency with which traits were selected was analysed in a 
2 (comparative context) x 2 (identity) x 2 (type of trait information: 
consistent! inconsistent) log-linear analysis. A significant interaction 
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was found between comparative context and type of trait information 
(z = 2.23, n < .05) with subjects using more consistent traits in 
intragroup contexts (fs: IG (intragroup) = 29.81 , IP (interpersonal) = 
22.69) and more inconsistent traits in interpersonal contexts (fs: IG = 
20.19; IP = 28.37; see Figure 9.1). There was also a significant 
interaction between identity and type of trait information (z = 2.38, n < 
.01). In general, more consistent traits were used in the female 
identity condition and more inconsistent traits in the science identity 
condition. 
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A stereotyping score amenable to parametric analysis, similar to 
that used in experiments 1 and 2, was also developed. Of the five 
words subjects selected as typical of their impression, consistent words 
were given a score of +1, inconsistent words a score of -1 and neutral 
words a score of 0. Scores were summed for each subject and could 
range between +5 and -5. A 2 (comparative context) x 2 (identity) 
ANOVA was used to assess the stereotyping measure. A main effect 
for comparative context was found (F(1,46) = 5.89, 12 < .05). Subjects 
used more stereotypic or consistent information in the intragroup 
condition than the interpersonal condition (Ms: IG = .74, IP = -.50, 
respectively). Subjects also used significantly more consistent 
information in the female identity compared to the science identity 
condition. This finding may reflect broader consensus about the 
female stereotype. 
9.3.3 Impression content and accentuation measures 
Analysis of the type of impression formed across comparative 
context conditions indicated that more inconsistent information was 
used in interpersonal contexts and more consistent information in 
intragroup contexts. However, the specific content of the impressions 
across identity salience conditions also needs to be assessed. In 
intragroup contexts, where there was a relevant and meaningful 
contrasting outgroup, subjects were expected to use information 
consistent with the defining ingroup category (i.e., information 
stereotypic of women in the female identity condition and information 
stereotypic of science students in the science identity condition). On 
the other hand, in the interpersonal context where there was no 
explicit contrasting outgroup and interpersonal comparisons were 
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relevant subjects were expected to use information less consistent with 
the defining ingroup category (i.e., information inconsistent with being 
a woman in the female identity condition, more male/science student 
information, and information inconsistent with being a science 
student, more arts/female information, in the science identity 
condition). 
To assess the content of the impression in each of the four 
conditions the words selected as being most typical of impressions 
were examined. Although the measure is qualitative, more frequent 
use of particular words in describing impressions does provide some 
indication about the actual content of these impressions across 
conditions. For this purpose, the three words selected most often in 
the two intragroup and two interpersonal conditions will be considered 
(see Table 9.1). 
In the female/interpersonal condition the words ordered, 
rational and accepting were selected most frequently, while in the 
science/interpersonal condition the most frequently selected words 
were imaginative, rational and tolerant. Two of the three words 
selected in each of these conditions are inconsistent with the 
respective salient identity. Ordered and rational are inconsistent with 
the female stereotype and imaginative and tolerant are inconsistent 
with the science student stereotype. 
As can be seen from Table 9.1, in the intragroup conditions the 
most frequently selected words were generally consistent with the 
salient identity. In the female identity condition the three most 
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selected words were tolerant, flexible and sincere and in the science 
condition they were ordered, rational and tolerant. In both cases two 
of the three words are stereotypic of the ingroup category. Therefore, 
in all four conditions different words are being used to describe 
impressions and importantly in the two interpersonal conditions 
impressions are based on information inconsistent with the defining 
ingroup category. 
Table 9.1 
The selection of particular traits as most typical of impressions 
represented as a percentage 
Comparative context 
Personal Group 
Female Science Female Science 
Attribute 
Accepting 63.64 46.15 46.15 46.15 
Active 15.38 7.69 15.38 
Competitive 9.10 7.69 
Critical 9.10 7.69 7.69 
Eager 9.10 15.38 15.38 15.38 
Flexible 36.36 15.38 53.85 38.46 
Honest 27.27 30.77 41.15 30.77 
Imaginative 1.82 92.31 38.46 53.84 
Ordered 63.64 30.77 23.08 76.92 
Tolerant 54.55 69.23 76.92 61.54 
Rational 63.64 76.92 46.15 69.23 
Sincere 54.55 30.77 53.85 15.38 
Sociable 36.36 30.77 38.46 7.69 
Structured 54.55 38.46 46.15 53.86 
Witty 2.69 
Note: Scores reflect the percentage of subjects who selected each trait as 
typical of their impression of the target. Those in bold are the three most 
selected traits. 
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The accentuation measures also enable a more quantitative 
assessment of content of impressions. It was predicted that subjects 
would see themselves as relatively more similar to the target m 
intragroup conditions and relatively different from the target m 
interpersonal conditions. It was further predicted, based on the 
principles of categorization, that the subject and target would be 
judged as similar on dimensions consistent with the defining ingroup 
in intragroup contexts, and that the differences between the subject 
and target would be accentuated on dimensions inconsistent with the 
defining ingroup in interpersonal conditions. 
Subjects were asked to mark where they would rate themselves 
and the target on four different dimensions, two consistent with being 
a science student (systematic and logical) and two consistent with 
being female (creative and tolerant). The difference between the 
subject's own position and that of the target was averaged for the 
science dimensions and female dimensions. Five outlying scores were 
adjusted to the next most extreme score. All difference scores were 
then analysed in a 2 (identity) x 2 (comparative context) x 2 
(dimension) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor (see 
Table 9.2). 
Typically subjects did perceive themselves as more similar 
across dimensions in the intragroup compared to interpersonal 
condition although this trend was not significant (Ms: IG = -.57, IP = 
-.96; F(1,46) = 2.73, ll = .11). The pattern of the means also suggests 
that in the intragroup condition subjects see themselves as more 
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similar to the target on female dimensions in the female identity than 
the science identity condition (Ms: FI (female identity) = -.58, SI 
(science identity) = -.82) and more similar on science dimensions in the 
science identity compared to the female identity condition (Ms: SI = 
-.17, FI = -.72). However, none of these comparisons were statistically 
significant. There is clearly a high degree of variability associated 
with some of the results. For example on science dimensions the 
standard deviation in the intragroup/female identity condition 
indicates that some subjects thought they were quite different from 
the target. 
Table 9.2 
Mean difference scores and standard deviations on female and science 
dimensions. 
Personal Group 
FI SI FI SI 
(n=ll) (n=13) (n=13) (n=13) 
Dimension 
Female -.49 (.71) -1.26 (1.20) -.58 (.87) -.82 (.80) 
Science -1.48 (1.46) -.63 (1.13) -.72 (2.44) -.17 (.69) 
Note: FI = female identity, SI = science identity; all scores are negative which 
reflects that the subjects rated themselves higher on dimensions. 
As predicted, there was also a significant interaction between 
identity and dimension (F(1,46) = 4.66, n <.05). Subjects rated 
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themselves as most different from the target on female dimensions in 
the science identity condition (Ms: FD (female dimension) = -1.04, SD 
(science dimension) = -.40) and the difference was greatest on science 
dimensions when their female identity was salient (Ms: SD = -1.07, FD 
= -.54; see Figure 9.2 where the scores are represented without the 
sign). 
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Figure 9.2. Difference scores on female and science dimensions in the 
science identity and female identity conditions. 
As can be seen from Table 9.2 the pattern of differentiation in 
interpersonal conditions is consistent with predictions. Subjects tend 
to be accentuating self-target differences on dimensions inconsistent 
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with the defining ingroup. In order to assess this pattern of results 
further a separate 2 (identity) x 2 (dimension) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor was conducted for interpersonal conditions. 
There was, as predicted, a significant identity by dimension 
interaction (F(1,22) = 4.42, .12 < .05; see Figure 9.3). As predicted, 
subjects accentuated the difference between themselves and the target 
on science dimensions when female identity was salient (Ms: FD = 
-.49, SD = -1.48) and female dimensions when science identity was 
salient (Ms: FD = -1.26, SD = -.63). 
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Figure 9.3. Difference scores on dimensions in the interpersonal/ 
science identity and interpersonal/ female identity conditions. 
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9.3.4 Analysis of other measures 
The response scale measures were each analysed usmg 2 
(identity) x 2 (comparative context) between subjects ANOVAs (see 
Table 9.3). There were significant main effects for comparative 
context on the items concerned with how difficult subjects found it to 
form an impression (F(1,46) = 7.41, ll. < .01) and their confidence in 
their responses (F(1,46) = 6.10, ll. <.01). Subjects found it more 
difficult to form impressions in the intragroup condition, where 
stereotypic impressions were formed (Ms: IG = 5.58, IP = 3.89, 
respectively) and also had most confidence in their impression in the 
interpersonal, female identity condition. 
Table 9.3 
Means for other response scale measures 
Identity salience 
Female Science 
IP IG IP IG 
Measure 
Similar to target 5.92 5.46 5.27 4.92 
Agree with target 6.07 5.54 5.56 5.54 
Agree target in general 6.23 5.54 5.46 5.69 
Differ from target 4.46 4.77 4.73 5.23 
Target typical science 5.77 5.54 6.36 5.31 
Target typical females 6.54 6.54 6.64 6.30 
Difficulty impression 4.46 5.39 3.40 5.77 
Confident impression 4.69 4.08 6.18 4.39 
Note: IP =interpersonal, IG =intragroup. 
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9.4 Discussion 
The results of this study clearly show not only that the same 
target can be individuated or stereotyped depending on the 
comparative context but that the process used to form both types of 
impressions appears to be categorization. First, it has been shown 
that it is not whether the target is an ingroup or outgroup member 
which dictates whether individuated or stereotypic impressions will be 
formed but, as self-categorization theory would predict, the level of 
abstraction at which impression formation occurs. The fact that more 
stereotype inconsistent information was used to describe impressions 
in the interpersonal conditions and more stereotype consistent 
information was used in intragroup conditions indicates that 
individuated and stereotypic impressions were formed depending on 
the comparative context manipulation. The use of more stereotype 
consistent information in the female identity condition may also reflect 
greater consensus regarding the female compared to science student 
stereotype. 
Second, predictions regarding accentuation in interpersonal 
conditions were also supported. The way in which similarities and 
differences between self and other were accentuated across conditions 
was consistent with self-categorization theory's predictions. There was 
differential accentuation of self-other distinctiveness depending on the 
salient superordinate categorization. In interpersonal conditions 
differences between self and other were accentuated most on the 
dimensions inconsistent with the defining ingroup. When the context 
was defined in terms of being female, so that subject and target 
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compared as women, most differentiation occurred on male/science 
dimensions. That is, subjects emphasised their relative 
distinctiveness on systematic and logical, but not on creative and 
tolerant. 
On the other hand, where the sc1ence category provided the 
frame of reference, so the subject and target compared as fellow 
science students, most interpersonal differentiation occurred on 
arts/female dimensions. That is, subjects defined the distinctiveness 
between their personal self and that of the target in terms of their 
relative creativity and tolerance, rather than in terms of how 
relatively systematic or logical they were. These results show that 
there is accentuation of self-other difference in interpersonal 
conditions on dimensions which differentiate ingroup members most -
that is, those inconsistent with the ingroup category. 
The pattern of accentuation in the intragroup condition also 
suggests that the subject and target were seen to be relatively more 
similar to one another. Further, it appears that subjects perceived 
that they were most similar to the target on female dimensions when 
their female identity was salient and science dimensions when their 
science identity was salient. Yet, the variability in the intragroup 
condition on the accentuation measures, and the associated weak 
effects, suggests that while completing these measures there could 
have been a tendency for some subjects to make interpersonal 
comparisons between themselves and the target. The assessment of 
accentuation involved subjects marking their own individual position 
and that of an individual target on four dimensions, and possibly this 
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task itself could engender interpersonal rather than intergroup 
compansons. 
The manipulation of intragroup conditions is clearly difficult 
because the intergroup context has to be sufficiently powerful such 
that intergroup rather than interpersonal comparisons are 
contextually relevant (clearly, this was also an issue in the intragroup 
condition in Experiment 2, see Chapter 7). As stated by Oakes et al. 
(1994, p. 190) "a person cannot easily be defined as an individual in 
contrast to ingroup members where the context provides a stronger 
contrast with outgroup members". In future work it will be important 
to increase the salience of intergroup manipulations in intragroup 
conditions. This could be done, for example, by having subjects rate 
two targets - an ingroup and outgroup member and through outgroup 
members being present in the same room throughout the study. 
The findings of this study indicate that stereotypic impressions 
are formed in intergroup contexts and individuated impressions in 
interpersonal contexts. Further it appears that based on the 
principles of categorization the way in which oneself and others are 
defined can vary within a particular level of abstraction. In this study, 
two different stereotypic and two different individuated impressions 
were formed of the same target depending on contextual factors. 
Individuated impressions were not just characterised by the abstract, 
context-independent use of inconsistent information but impressions 
were formed based on the information which would differentiate 
individuals within the salient superordinate category most 
successfully. Differentiation occurred relative to the shared 
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superordinate ingroup membership which varied depending on 
contextual factors. 
The fact that individuated impressions have also been shown to 
be accentuated depending on self-categorization and the defining 
ingroup category indicates that individuated impressions are not a 
base-line from which to assess distortion at the group level. If, as the 
results of this study suggest, others are individuated relative to self-
perception in a particular context then there is no inherent accuracy or 
stability associated with perceiving others as individuals. 
Individuated impressions are no more context-independent than 
stereotypic impressions. Consistent with self-categorization theory, 
the results suggest that both individuation and stereotyping are 
manifestations of the categorization process. 
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Chapter 10 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the social psychological processes of 
impression formation, the manner in which judgements of others are 
made. In particular, the focus has been on explaining variation in 
impression formation and the process responsible for such variation. 
Our strategy has involved an assessment of whether individuated 
impressions are formed in a categorization-free manner and whether 
categorization is a process reserved only for the formation of 
stereotypic impressions. It has been argued that the way 
categorization is understood has fundamental implications for how the 
impression formation process is conceptualised and explained. 
In this final chapter the key aspects of the analysis are retraced. 
The theoretical and empirical implications of the thesis are discussed. 
In effect the following question is addressed: What contribution has 
been made in this thesis? Based on the approach advanced throughout 
the last nine chapters a number of areas for future research emerge, 
and two of the most relevant are outlined. Finally, we return to, and 
reflect on, the social psychological validity of the comments made by 
Mr. Jim Bolger reported in the opening chapter. 
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10.2 Recapitulation 
Chapters 1 to 5 of the thesis focused on different historical and 
contemporary understandings of how we come to understand others. 
Up until the 1960s impression formation research focused on the 
recognition of emotion and the ability to judge others. A number of 
different measures were developed to assess the individual target (the 
criterion) and also the judge's responses (the judgement). The overall 
discrepancy between the criterion and judgement was used to 
determine the accuracy of impressions. Personality and intelligence 
tests, expert judgments and ratings by those familiar with the target 
were used to define what the target was like. In Chapter 2, it was 
noted that these techniques are testimony to the assumption that 
accuracy was defined in terms of "the character of the beheld". 
Some researchers recognised that cultural stereotypes (Taft, 
1955) and accurate stereotypes (Cline & Richards, 1960) may increase 
judges' ability overall, but the idea that the target of judgement was 
anything other than a stable, constant, unique individual was not 
considered. In this early person perception research broader 
fundamental questions about the nature and role of person perception 
were neglected. It was simply assumed that the perceiver was a 
passive filter for information in the stimulus environment and that 
inputs (information about the individual target) should equate with 
outputs (the impression formed). 
Belief in the inherent accuracy of individuated impressions, was 
also reflected in early stereotyping research. Lippmann, who 
originally defined stereotypes, wrote in his book Public Opinion in 
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1922 that "there is no shortcut through, and no substitute for, an 
individualized understanding" (p. 59). Asch, who is responsible for one 
of the most influential papers on impression formation, "Forming 
impressions of personality", summarised the research climate as 
follows: "the canons of objectivity require of us to understand persons 
first and foremost as individuals" (Asch, 1952, p. 238). 
The assumed association between the perception of an 
individual person and accuracy permeated and moulded early 
stereotyping research. As a result, group-based perception and 
stereotypes were largely interpreted as being fictitious 
representations, abstracted from the target of judgement and in the 
"eye of the beholder". Stereotypes were considered "a very partial and 
inadequate way of representing the world" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 72) 
and were seen to exaggerate reality by marking out "certain objects as 
familiar or strange, emphasising the difference, so that the slightly 
familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat strange as sharply 
alien" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 59). 
The assumption that stereotypes were inherently distorted 
challenged researchers to determine the actual extent of their 
(in)accuracy. The goal from the outset was to explain the potentially 
erroneous nature of stereotypes, and the role of the perceiver attracted 
attention in the theories that developed. A popular view to emerge 
from the early stereotyping research was that stereotypes were 
described as "pictures in our heads that are essentially incorrect, 
inaccurate, contrary to fact, and, therefore, undesirable" (Fishman, 
1956, p. 28). 
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A different interpretation of stereotypes, offered by a minority of 
researchers which included Asch and Sherif, was also outlined in 
Chapter 2. The view that perceivers were deceived by observing others 
in terms of their group memberships was challenged and the reality-
based nature of perception was emphasised. The following quote from 
Asch (1952) was used to reflect the novelty of this alternative view: 
Observing the distortion that follows from merging individuals with 
their groups, some have counseled that it is misleading to judge 
persons in terms of group relations ... it is wrong to assume that we 
can best achieve a correct view of a person by ignoring his group 
relations. (p. 238) 
Likewise, Sherif believed that stereotypes reflected the perceived 
relationships between groups and were not the cause of intergroup 
relations; "attitudes toward other groups and images of them are 
products of particular relationships between groups, not their original 
cause" (Sherif, 1967, p. 25). 
Three clear messages from this early social perception research 
can be summarised as follows: 1) individuated person perception is 
accurate; 2) stereotypes and group-based perception are distorted and 
inaccurate; and 3) stereotypes are valid and reflect the real perceived 
relationships between groups. All three of these messages, as seen in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5, are integrated in different ways in more recent 
accounts of impression formation. The way in which these messages 
have been combined in contemporary models has had profound 
implications for how social perception and the role of the perceiver is 
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understood. 
In Chapter 3, two current impression formation models were 
described. Brewer (1988) in her dual process model and Fiske and 
Neuberg (1990) in their continuum model, brought together person 
perception and stereotyping work, and offered a more integrated 
understanding of how we form individuated and stereotypic 
impressions of others. Debates about the configura! and elemental 
nature of impression formation, which had consumed researchers 
throughout the 1970s, were largely integrated into these models 
unresolved. In fact extensions of the basic elemental model, such as 
the role of the general impression in shaping the meaning of 
component information, were not incorporated. The notion that 
information given about a particular person could be processed in an 
attribute-by-attribute, elemental way was endorsed and contrasted 
with category-based perception. 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that the distinction between an 
attribute or category label was not clearly defined in either model. It 
seems that an attribute is information abstracted from the perceiver 
(out there) and a category label is information inherent in the 
perceiver (stored in memory) which is disassociated from the perceived 
in any real sense. There is limited discussion about how knowledge 
regarding attributes and categories is developed, leading Zebrowitz-
McArthur (1988) to refer to categories in the context of Brewer's (1988) 
model as "immaculate conceptions" (p. 107). Both Fiske and Neuberg 
(1990) and Brewer (1988) neglect the fact that regardless of whether 
you define a piece of information as an attribute or category label, use 
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of both "types of information" involves comparison and comparison 
fundamentally depends on the perceiver, their prior knowledge, 
experiences and goals (Tajfel, 1968, 1972; Turner, 1987). 
It was also concluded in Chapter 3 that there was no strong 
evidence that impressions could be formed in an elemental way. At 
this point, then, adherence to two impression formation processes 
seemed more of a theoretical issue than a distinction based on clear 
empirical evidence. Therefore, Chapter 4 focused on the broader 
theoretical assumptions of recent impression formation models. In 
these models, and the social cognition literature which they mirror, 
stereotyping and categorization are used interchangeably. The human 
perceiver is understood to have limited cognitive capacity so 
categorization and stereotypes are used to limit the amount of 
information processed. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argued that we 
"have neither the cognitive capacity or time to deal with all the 
interpersonal information ... For reasons of cognitive economy, we 
categorise others as members of particular groups" (p. 14). 
Variables considered to undermine the use of category 
information in impression formation were also outlined in Chapter 4. 
Much of the research has focused on identifying factors which 
encourage the perceiver to allocate the additional resources required 
for the formation of more accurate individuated impressions. Of 
particular importance to the thesis, were motivational factors such as 
accuracy goals and outcome dependence. There has also been a recent 
emphasis on how perceiver goals and motivations impact on the way 
resources are allocated in impression formation (e.g., Fiske, 1993a: 
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Stangor & McMillan, 1992). 
These recent impression formation models integrated and built 
on research which has been shaped by the first and second messages of 
the early social perception work (outlined in Chapter 2 and above). 
Stereotypes are fundamentally interpreted as more distorted, 
inaccurate representations of others than individuated impressions. 
The same impression formation process cannot be used when distorted, 
stereotypic and accurate, individuated impressions are formed, and 
this has led to the proposition that different impression formation 
processes must be responsible for the two types of impressions. How 
can the same process lead to both accuracy and distortion? For 
theoretical reasons two distinct processes are required to explain 
impression formation, and variations in impressions, in these recent 
models (see also Hilton & von Rippel, 1996). 
A pervasive assumption of the early social perception, and more 
recent stereotyping research, is that the individual is the only 
psychological reality and that social processes can be reduced to, and 
best explained by, individual processes. The emphasis on the 
individual and associated reductionism is reflected in the social 
cognitive analysis of impression formation, where it is argued that to 
perceive others as individuals is most accurate and valid. 
An alternative approach was outlined in Chapter 5. Building on 
the work of Sherif and Asch, which shaped the third message of the 
early social perception work (outlined in Chapter 2 and above), a 
distinct social identity theory and self-categorisation theory approach 
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to social perception has developed. The fundamental distinction is 
that the reality of the group and group differences are recognised. The 
work of Henri Tajfel and colleagues formed the basis of social identity 
theory. Tajfel's research showed that categorization and accentuation 
were normal psychological processes. Through the minimal group 
studies Tajfel and others were also able to show the impact of social 
factors on individual psychological functions. Definition as a group 
member was found to generate behaviour which favoured the ingroup 
and motivated differentiation from the outgroup. The definition of 
oneself as an interchangeable group member was seen to reflect the 
social psychological reality of group behaviour and the salience of 
social identity. 
Self-categorization theory provides a more detailed examination 
of the psychological relationship between the self and the group. A 
completely different conceptualisation of categorization has emerged 
within this framework. Categorization, as outlined in Chapter 5, is 
recognised as a dynamic, meaningful, context-dependent assessment of 
relevant similarities and differences which gives stimuli meaning and 
therefore necessarily forms the basis of all social perception. 
Categorization, based on the principles of perceiver readiness and 
comparative and normative fit, represents reality from the perceiver's 
perspective. 
The approach advanced in this thesis was based on self-
categorization theory and this theory shaped the direction of the 
empirical work. More specifically, the thesis tried to elaborate the 
implications of self-categorization theory for the understanding of 
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impression formation. Two aspects of the categorization process, 
directly related to the thesis, were discussed in Chapter 5: 1) 
categorization is the only mechanism through which stimuli are given 
meaning and as such, 2) the formation of individuated and stereotypic 
impressions of others must be based on the same categorization 
process. Impressions were described as being relative to self-
perception in a specific context which could be based on comparisons 
within groups (interpersonal comparisons where individuated 
impressions are formed) or comparisons between the ingroup and the 
outgroup (intergroup comparisons where stereotypic impressions are 
formed). 
The juxtaposition of the social cognition and self-categorization 
theory approaches, outlined in chapters 3 to 5, framed the empirical 
work of the thesis. Two experiments, reported in chapters 6 and 7, 
empirically investigated whether it is a motivation to pay more 
attention or contextually relevant self-other comparisons, that 
determines when individuated and stereotypic impressions of others 
will be formed. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that individuated 
impressions were formed when interpersonal comparisons within an 
ingroup were relevant and that in intergroup contexts there was 
increased stereotyping. The manipulation of interdependence did not 
systematically impact on the content of impressions, a finding 
inconsistent with the argument that when a motivation exists to pay 
more attention individuated impressions would result. 
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In this first experiment the level of abstraction, interpersonal or 
intergroup, was confounded with whether the target was an ingroup or 
outgroup member. Subjects were told that their opponent had the 
same problem solving style as themselves in the interpersonal 
condition and the opposite problem solving style in intergroup 
conditions. To fully explore the predictions made by self-categorization 
theory regarding context-based variations in impression formation it 
was necessary to design a second experiment where subjects formed 
impressions of an ingroup member in an interpersonal and intergroup 
context (intragroup condition). Accuracy goals were used to 
manipulate the level of attention allocated to the impression formation 
process. The results indicated that an ingroup member could be 
individuated in interpersonal contexts and stereotyped in intergroup 
contexts. 
Provision of an accuracy goal did not straightforwardly motivate 
subjects to form more accurate individuated impressions. It was 
apparent, however, that accuracy goal instructions could interact with 
features of the comparative context to influence the salience of 
interpersonal or intergroup comparisons in the intragroup condition. 
Further, it was suggested that motivational factors such as outcome 
dependence and accuracy goals may contribute to the definition of the 
comparative relations between the perceiver and the perceived in 
implicitly interpersonal or intergroup terms. 
The results of experiments 1 and 2 indicated that individuated 
impressions may not be formed through a distinct resource consuming 
categorization-free process and encouraged more detailed investigation 
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of the relationship between categorization and impression formation. 
Therefore, in experiments 3 and 4 the focus turned to the 
categorization process. In particular it was argued that if it could be 
shown that self-other similarities and differences were accentuated 
when individuated impressions as well as when stereotypic 
impressions were formed, then this would provide evidence that 
categorization underpins variations in impression formation. 
In Experiment 3, it was shown that background information did 
impact on the way the two constant targets were categorized. Further, 
depending on the categorization of the targets, as members of the same 
group, different groups, or as individuals, the pattern of accentuation 
varied. What was learnt in this study was that the dimensions used to 
assess accentuation had to be directly related to the categorization of 
the targets and that in interpersonal conditions a superordinate 
ingroup category needed to be manipulated. It was also concluded, 
that what had to be demonstrated was that the same target could be 
individuated in different ways depending on self-categorization in a 
particular context. 
In Experiment 4 there was evidence that the way we 
differentiate ourselves from others in interpersonal terms varies 
depending on categorization-in-context. In other words, individuated 
impressions are as much based on relative self-other interpersonal 
judgements as stereotypic impressions are based on relative 
intergroup comparisons. In Experiment 4 a constant target was 
defined in terms of two ingroups - as a female science student. In one 
condition subjects' identity as females, and in the other, their identity 
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as science students, was made salient. The comparative context -
interpersonal or intragroup - was also manipulated. Consistent with 
the argument developed in experiments 2 and 3, the target was found 
to be individuated in interpersonal conditions evidenced by greater use 
of counter-stereotypic information. Stereotypic impressions were 
formed in the intragroup condition, where an impression of an ingroup 
member was formed in an explicit intergroup context. 
Predictions regarding accentuation in interpersonal conditions 
were also supported. The way in which similarities and differences 
between self and other were accentuated across conditions was 
consistent with self-categorization theory's predictions. There was 
differential accentuation of self-other distinctiveness depending on the 
salient superordinate categorization. Most importantly, in the 
interpersonal condition it was found that the accentuation of 
differences between the subject and target were on dimensions 
inconsistent with the stereotype of women in the female identity 
condition, and inconsistent with the stereotype of science students in 
the science identity condition. 
In Experiment 4, two different stereotypic and two different 
individuated impressions were formed of the same target depending on 
contextual factors. Individuated impressions were not just 
characterised by the abstract, context-independent use of inconsistent 
information but impressions were formed based on the information 
which would differentiate individuals within the salient superordinate 
category most successfully. 
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The fact that individuated impressions were formed depending 
on self-categorization in a particular context suggests that there is no 
inherent accuracy or stability associated with perceiving others as 
individuals. Individuated impressions are no more context-
independent than stereotypic impressions. It was concluded that there 
was evidence that our impressions of others vary depending on self-
categorization in a particular context, and therefore that both 
individuated and stereotypic impressions are formed through the same 
categorization process but operating at different levels of abstraction. 
10.3 Theoretical implications: What contribution has been 
made in this thesis? 
At a theoretical level the self-categorization theory analysis, that 
all impression formation is categorization, has been investigated. The 
operation of the categorization process at different levels of abstraction 
has been systematically explored. General hypotheses based on the 
theory have been generated and have received strong support. The 
analysis has demonstrated, most significantly, the utility of self-
categorization theory in the area of impression formation. 
In a number of respects the theoretical and empirical insights 
gleaned from the thesis are at odds with current impression formation 
models and the broader social cognition conceptualisation of the 
categorization process. First, the analysis tends to suggest that 
stereotypic impressions are not the simple product of limited cognitive 
capacity. Under conditions argued to motivate perceivers to allocate 
more attention there was no systematic evidence of more individuated 
or less stereotypic impressions being formed. Further, we have 
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suggested that the results achieved in previous research usmg 
motivational factors such as interdependence and accuracy goals may 
in fact be attributable to implicit variations in the comparative context 
rather than attentional resources. 
The second problem that this thesis presents for the social 
cognitive perspective, is that the formation of individuated and 
stereotypic impressions has been shown to reflect meaningful and 
valid, context-dependent variations in self-categorization. Stereotypic 
impressions have only been formed where group-based self-other 
comparisons have been relevant. Individuated impressions have been 
formed when within-group, interpersonal comparisons were 
meaningful. The impressions formed of others at different levels of 
abstraction have not been distorted or inaccurate but have 
appropriately reflected lawful and relevant comparisons between 
people. 
However, the finding which presents the most difficulty for 
recent impression formation models, is that stereotypes may not be 
unique in being formed through categorization. There is evidence that 
the formation of individuated impressions is relative to self-perception 
and higher order superordinate categories. Most significantly though, 
the results suggest that individuated impressions, evidenced by 
increased use of inconsistent information, are based on the 
accentuation of relevant self-others similarities and differences. 
It is this evidence of accentuation when both individuated and 
stereotypic impressions are formed which undermines the idea that 
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one type of impression is more accurate than the other. If two distinct 
individuated impressions are formed of the same target which is the 
accurate impression? Which impression is based on the "actual" 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the person? Which impression is based 
on the true interpretation of the given attributes? The evidence in 
Experiment 4 of this thesis suggests that the same target can be 
individuated in different ways depending on self-categorization. There 
is no sense in which a target is described in some "absolute" accurate 
way. The way in which we individuate others and differentiate 
between people is a relative, comparative, context-dependent 
judgement. 
Pulling these three points together, combined they seem to 
indicate that the formation of individuated impressions has no special 
status relative to stereotypic impression formation. Individuated 
impressions are not formed using a distinct categorization-free process, 
individuated impressions do not set a standard by which the distortion 
of group-based impressions can be evaluated, individuated impressions 
are not based on some absolute "accurate" idiosyncratic attributes. 
The formation of both individuated and stereotypic impressions appear 
to involve categorization and accentuation, and to veridically reflect 
the relational properties between people in the context of interest. All 
impressions are based on relative, comparative judgements that 
depend on the salient self-category of the perceiver which is shaped by 
context. 
10.4 Future directions for research 
There is clearly more work to be done before the role of the 
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perceiver in social perception will be fully realised and understood. A 
number of unresolved issues and future directions for research emerge 
from this thesis. However, two become especially important in light of 
our conclusions that individuated impressions have no special standing 
relative to stereotypic impressions. First, further evidence is needed 
that individuated impressions and interpersonal comparisons are 
made relative to context-dependent self-categorization. Second, the 
"misleading" role of inconsistent information in impression formation 
requires investigation. 
10.4.1 Variability of self-perception 
Clearly, further evidence of the variability and relativity of self-
other perception where interpersonal comparisons are concerned is 
needed. The work in this thesis has focused on the accentuation of 
self-other differences depending on contextual factors. Yet, self-
categorization theory is explicit in arguing that interpersonal 
comparisons are characterised by the accentuation of interpersonal 
differences and intrapersonal similarities. Accentuation of 
intrapersonal similarities is an area which requires attention. It is 
possible, that just as the accentuation of intragroup similarity has 
been found to vary across intergroup and intragroup comparative 
contexts (e.g., Haslam et al., 1995a), the pattern of personal 
accentuation of similarity and difference may vary depending on 
whether the comparison is interpersonal or intra personal. 
For example if an interpersonal companson 1s based on the 
dimension "sociable" the perceiver may see themselves as always being 
"sociable" across situations, in comparison with other relevant ingroup 
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members. There would be limited variability in how they perceive 
themselves in terms of this dimension. Sociability could be interpreted 
as a more stable disposition which describes oneself as an individual in 
the context of interest. On the other hand, where the comparative 
context is intrapersonal, encouraging self versus self comparisons 
across situations, there may be far more variability on the dimension 
"sociable" because the perceiver knows they are not always 
characterised in this way. Situational attributions may be used to 
understand and explain this variability. In interpersonal contexts 
dispositional attributions may be likely but situational explanations 
come to the fore when intrapersonal comparisons are made. 
This analysis based on self-categorization at the interpersonal 
level could help explain two reliable social psychological findings: 1) 
the fundamental attribution error (e.g., Ross, 1977), where others' 
behaviour tends to be explained in dispositional rather than 
situational terms, and 2) the actor/observer effect, where it has been 
consistently found that we explain our own behaviour in situational 
terms whereas others who view the same behaviour will apply 
dispositional causes (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Watson, 1982). 
Rather than fixed effects both of these phenomena could be outcomes 
of experimental procedures which inadvertently define the relationship 
between the subject and target in stable ways. For example, 
explaining one's own behaviour may invoke intrapersonal 
comparisons, but when we explain others' behaviour or other's explain 
our own behaviour interpersonal comparisons are relevant. 
It will be useful in the future to assess whether interpersonal or 
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intra personal explanations are the basis of such results. Investigation 
of the variability in self-categorization and the role of categorization 
and accentuation in intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons 
needs to continue. The understanding of stability and change in the 
self-concept is implicated in such investigations (Onorato, 1996; 
Turner et al., 1994). The self-categorization theory analysis could be 
as influential in our understanding of variables associated with 
individuated perception (e.g., personality, consistency) as it has been 
in the domain of stereotyping and intergroup relations. 
10.4.2 The role of inconsistent information 
The second direction for future work concerns inconsistent 
information. Inconsistent information has played a vital role in the 
impression formation literature. Its use has been taken as evidence 
for; 1) accuracy versus distortion in impression formation; 2) use of 
attributes versus category labels; and 3) the formation of individuated 
versus stereotypic impressions. However, there are clear 
contradictions in the way inconsistent information has been 
interpreted and understood and disagreement about the role of 
inconsistent information in person memory is one current example 
(Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Rothbart et al., 1979; Rojahn & 
Pettigrew, 1992; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Srull, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 
1989). Inconsistent information has to be examined more closely and 
its role in social perception delineated. 
In a recent review of literature examining expectancy-congruent 
and expectancy-incongruent information Stangor and McMillan (1992) 
provided an analysis of factors which may influence the integration, 
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reinterpretation or exclusion of inconsistent information in impression 
formation. Based on a meta-analysis they concluded that there were 
discrepant findings that could not be accounted for by proposed models 
of person memory. They incorporated perceiver motivations into their 
own analysis (see also Ruscher, Hammer & Hammer, 1996). Two such 
motivations were: 1) impression-accuracy and 2) impression-
maintenance. It was argued that the fate of inconsistent information 
in impression formation is distinct depending on the perceiver's 
motivation. If an impression-accuracy goal exists then inconsistent 
information will be integrated into the impression. On the other hand, 
if impression maintenance is relevant then inconsistent information is 
distorted or ignored. 
Three conditions are outlined which specify when one or the 
other goal will be relevant. Stangor and McMillan (1992) argued that 
if the goal is to form "accurate, complete impressions of targets 
inconsistency-resolution motivations should be high" (p. 57, emphasis 
added). Second, inconsistency resolution may also take place where 
new impressions are being formed of a target. If well developed 
expectations about a target already exist then the impression-
maintenance mode may prevail. Another factor which may affect the 
degree to which inconsistent information is incorporated in the 
impression of a target is processing demands. If the processing of 
stimulus information is too complex then it may be difficult to 
integrate the inconsistent information and a shift from the impression-
accuracy to impression-maintenance strategy may result (see also 
Stangor & Ford, 1992). 
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The parallels between Stangor and McMillan's (1992) analysis 
and that of recent impression formation models is clear. But Stangor 
and McMillan do make explicit the idea that the role of inconsistent 
information in impression formation is complex - information can be 
ignored, reinterpreted and integrated (see also Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). However, there is evidence in this thesis that inconsistent 
information is not ignored when processing demands, as manipulated 
through motivation factors, are high. Individuated impressions, 
evidenced by increased use of inconsistent information, were formed in 
both accuracy goal and no accuracy goal conditions when interpersonal 
comparisons were relevant. Also, stereotypic impressions of the same 
target were formed in intergroup contexts even though the subject and 
target were interdependent or an accuracy goal was provided. It 
would, however, be worthwhile to examine Stangor and McMillan's 
(1992) predictions regarding the use of inconsistent information when 
existing and new impressions are being formed. There is a clear need 
to move away from one-off impressions of strangers in impression 
formation work. Generally, though, evidence in this thesis would 
suggest that the role of inconsistent information is not as 
straightforward as popular models like Stangor and McMillan's (1992) 
would suggest. 
There is a need to explore more closely what inconsistent 
information is and its role in impression formation. In fact, it may 
clarify some underlying assumptions in the impression formation 
literature if we moved away from terms like consistent or inconsistent 
information. These terms suggest a fixed, static relationship between 
given group memberships and given attributes. The results of the 
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empirical work reported in this thesis indicate that consistent 
information is used to differentiate ingroup from outgroup and 
inconsistent information differentiates between individuals within 
groups. Therefore, instead of terms such as consistent or inconsistent 
information it may be useful to refer to differentiating information at 
different levels of abstraction. The emphasis on differentiating 
information would also clarify the debate about what is an accurate 
impression. At present, integration of information which differentiates 
between individuals is seen as more accurate than information that 
differentiates between groups. 
Based on the results in this thesis it seems that the information 
used in impression formation is that which makes sense to the 
perceiver given the comparative relationships between people in a 
given context. Dynamic explanations can be developed to form 
integrated, meaningful impressions from what in the abstract could be 
defined as, consistent or inconsistent information (e.g., Asch & Zukier, 
1984; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). The role of inconsistent information from 
the perspective of the perceiver as a meaning seeker needs further 
clarification (Vonk, 1994) otherwise inconsistent information will 
continue to be seen as the panacea through which accurate perception 
and behavioural and attitude change can occur. 
10.5 Final comments 
In the opening paragraph of this thesis a statement made by Mr. 
Jim Bolger was reported. He commented in relation to racism that: 
There are certain politicians, I guess, all around the world, your 
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country and mme included who can't handle the race issue. 
They always go to extremes ... There are people who can't seem 
to understand that you judge people on who they are, not which 
country they've come from, what the colour of their skin is or the 
culture of their origin. (cited in The Australian, 2 October, 1996, emphasis 
added) 
Given the approach advanced in this thesis it is now possible to 
comment on the social psychological validity of Bolger's analysis. 
Impression formation is clearly not as straightforward as Bolger 
suggests. Most significantly, social psychology is divided about what 
"who they are" means. 
The position argued throughout this thesis clearly rejects the 
conventional wisdom that to perceive others as individuals is 
inherently accurate and that to understand others in terms of their 
group affiliations is necessarily misleading and erroneous (e.g., Asch, 
1952; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Vinacke, 1957). It has been explicitly 
argued that individuated impressions are comparative, context-
dependent judgements which have no special status as being more 
accurate, valid and meaningful than impressions based on group 
memberships. The overall message is that all our impressions of 
others are comparative, not absolute, judgements. 
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APPENDIX Ia- SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 (CHAPTER 6) 
Summary statistics from the 2 x 3 ANOV A's on the following measures: impression of ingroup (similar ingroup, cornmon ingroup, rcprc"erltative 
ingroup, like ingroup), impression of opponent (similar opponent, common opponent, agree opponent about probkm solving, agree "l'l"'nent in 
general), general attitude to competition, anticipated performance in competition, type of impression measure, stereotyping score, recall of 
statements score and manipulation check measures (agree problem solving style, concerned opponent's performanc,;, opponent's infl11cncc: on draw 
for the prize). 
Source df Similar ingp Comm ingp Represent ingp Like ingp Sim opp Comm opp Agrec: opp ps Agree opp gen 
MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS I· 
Inter l 3.67 1.79 6.94 3.35 .62 .32 1.80 .61 2.70 .72 1.90 1.25 .I 0 .OJ .05 .Oil 
Comcon 1 .58 .29 5.11 2.46 3.02 1.57 11.00 3.73 31.78 8.50 6.0 I 3.95 2-L5cl K n .Uil .L> l 
Inter x comcon 2 3.93 1.92 4.10 1.98 1.02 .53 5.82 1.97 5.16 1.3H 3.69 2.42 3.66 I .. lll -1.2') :Lil 
error "1 )_ 2.04 2.07 1.92 2.95 3.74 1.52 2.82 -'J-1 
Source df General att Antic perf Type of Imp Stereo score Recall score Agree style Opp influence Opp perform. 
MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F iv!S F MS F 
Inter 1 7.39 2.07 .05 .02 6.00 2.22 3.63 1.14 .02 .01 .00 .00 59.47 l.'UJ 13.Yi 2.3-1 
Comcon ') 33.87 9 53 10.13 4.65 1.43 .53 15.08 4.75 6.14 4.31 3.84 2.97 9.63 2.'67 .05 .UI 
Inter x comcon 2 5.28 1.48 1.09 .50 2.68 .99 .17 .05 1.74 1.22 2.87 2.22 ~.29 2.47 IJ.X8 I. 20 
error -J )_ 3.55 2.18 2.71 3.17 1.43 1.29 3.35 5. 71 
Note underlined p < .05; Inter= Interdependence; Comcon =Comparative context. 
'-' J.J 
c 
APPENDIX lb SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPEIUMENT 2 (CHAPTER 7) 
Summary statistics from the 2 x 3 ANOVA's on judgements of similarity to opponent/team mate (similarity, agreement), ,·untidence in 
performance, effort in impression (effort, attention, difficulty), accuracy of impression, confidence in assessment uf prui>k11t solving 'l) k, 
stereotyping score, recall of total statements, recall of actual statments, rank of informativeness of statements. 
Source df Similar Agreement Confidence Effort A !lent Difficttlty Accuracy ( 'o11l idpo 
MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F IVIS I· MS I' 
Ace I .02 .01 .35 .15 .36 .I I 1.26 .52 .02 .ot 9.20 2. I'! -1.56 I . (>(J .)lJ .'2() 
Comcon 2 12.so 5.6n 17.22 7.58 .()4 .OJ .72 .30 .03 .0 I .35 .0~ 2.4'! .'JO 2. ()I) I I~ 
Ace x comcon 2 5.23 2.37 9.60 4.22 4.36 1.34 4.16 1.72 1.77 .52 I 0.82 2.57 12.04 ::Lr? (>.2 I 2.h 
error ')0 2.21 2.27 3.25 2.43 3.:n 4.20 2.75 ~ . .!h 
Source df Stereo.score Recall total Recall actual Rank inform 
MS F MS F MS F MS F 
Ace I 3.99 .75 .09 .05 .07 .03 .05 .08 
Comcon 1 18.17 341 ~U4 4.32 1.43 .65 3.43 5.71 
Ace x conKon 1 J'l.U 3.59 1.69 .87 .15 .07 .20 .34 
error 90 5.32 L'l3 2.22 .60 
Note <nhkrlined p < .05; Ace= Accuracy; Comcon =Comparative context. 
'-' {.) 
APPENDIX Ib SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 (CHAPTER 7). continued 
Summa~y statistics from the:?_ x 2 ANOVA's on the self-ratings on the four trait measures (imaginative, tnethodi<·al, reasuucd, opo~<taJ<cuuo) 
Source df Self-rating I Self-ratiug2 Self-rating3 Self-rating 4 
lv!S r: MS r: MS r ' MS r: 
Ace I 6.01 2.34 2.17 .98 2.02 .95 5.69 1.73 
Comcon I 1.50 .58 43.65 19.66 23.41 ll.o:l .31 .09 
Ace x conKon I .76 .30 .85 .38 .59 .28 .00 .00 
error 91 2.56 2.22 2.12 3.29 
Note: Missing data for one subject 
'-"' 
'" i..l 
APPENDIX Ic SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPERIMENT 3 (CHAPTER!!) 
Summary statistics for one way ANOV As on measures concerned with the relationship bet ween t M!\d I and target 2 ( si111i Ialit y, a~ 1 ,·c11 1cnt on 
\ideo, agreement in general, similar attitude to success, have things in common, like one another, would get along), success!'ul""'' <>I l<ugd l 
und target 2, and the measures of confidence in responses, difficulty in completing tasks and interest _in study. 
Source df Similar Agree vid Agree gen Sim succ Common Like (Jet along 
MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F 
Gp 1 2.18 -1.57 9.1)2 6.:25 1.26 .88 7.15 3.45 3.01 :2.56 5.1 () ... 1!1 ! l:i I . il, 
error 36 2.67 1.59 1.43 :2.07 1.21) 1.:2-1 lSI 
SourLc df Succ I Succ 2 Confident Difficulty Interest 
!VIS F MS F MS F MS F MS F 
Gp 1 .05 .51 '18 '15 4.39 1.19 .33 .OIJ 6.08 !.60 
CITl)f 36 1.88 1.23 3.70 3.92 3.80 
Note: Gp =anticipated categorization of targets 
APPENDIX Ic SUMMARY STATISTICS EXPERIMENT 3 
; CHAPTER 31 - continued 
Summary statistics r'rom analysis .Jf \Vi thin-Subjects Effects: 
Diirerence self and other: Dimension r faculty, gender. individuaL ws) x 
Background information ;faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.41 
background info. •) 1.37 .77 .47 
"' 
Within Subjects 
within cells ·~'l 
'"'" 
.71 
dimension 2 .74 1.03 .36 
group x dimension 4 1.59 2.23 .07 
Ratings of targets on practical dimension: Target (targetl, target2, 
ws) x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 3.04 
background info. 2 .23 .07 .93 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 2.57 
target l 30.03 11.67 .002 
target x dimension 2 3.98 1.55 .23 
Ratings of targets on warm dimension: Target (targetl, target2. wsl x 
Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 
background info. 2 
Within Subjects 
MS F 
3.71 
5.51 1.49 
p 
.24 
3)' _) 
within cells 
target 
target x dimension 
36 
1 
2 
2.78 
.01 .00 .96 
.92 .33 .72 
Ratings of targets on imaginative dimension: Target ( targetl, target2, 
ws) x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.82 
background info. 2 .39 .14 .87 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 1.86 
target 1 14.73 7.90 .008 
target x dimension 2 4.42 2.37 .11 
Ratings of targets on communicative dimension: Target (targetl, 
target2, ws) x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.80 
background info. 2 5.46 1.95 .16 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 1.85 
target 1 .18 .09 .76 
target x dimension 2 .48 .26 .77 
Ratings of targets on friendly dimension: Target (target1, target2, ws) 
x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.28 
background info. 2 .74 .33 .72 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 2.74 
324 
target 
target x dimension 
1 
2 
1.91 .70 .41 
2.73 1.00 .38 
Ratings of targets on sensitive dimension: Target (target!, target2, ws) 
x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.12 
background info. 2 5.09 2.40 .11 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 4.50 
target 1 2.51 .56 .46 
target x dimension 2 .73 .16 .85 
Ratings of targets on creative dimension: Target (target!, target2, ws) 
x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.31 
background info. 2 .53 .23 .80 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 1.72 
target 1 12.80 7.43 .01 
target x dimension 2 2.22 1.29 .29 
Ratings of targets on methodical dimension: Target (target!, target2, 
ws) x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.95 
background info. 2 .30 .10 .90 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 2.64 
target 1 17.74 6.73 .01 
325 
target x dimension 2 3.69 1.40 .26 
Ratings of targets on successful dimension: Target (target1, target2, 
ws) x Background information (faculty, gender, individual). 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 36 2.33 
background info. 2 .75 .32 .73 
Within Subjects 
within cells 36 1.54 
target 1 .88 .57 .45 
target x dimension 2 3.04 1.97 .15 
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APPENDIX Id SUMMARY STATISTCIS FOR EXPERIMENT 4 (CHAPTER 9) 
Summary statistics from the 2 x 2 AN OVA's on the stereotyping score and other response scale measures (difficulty, confidence, self-other 
similarity, self-other difference, agreement about problem solving, agreement in general, target typical of science, target typical of female). 
Source df Stereo score Difficulty Confidence Similar Difference Agree Agree general Typical Science Typical kmale 
MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F 
context I 18.32 5.89 32.77 7.41 18.09 6.10 2.05 .85 2.05 .86 1.26 .53 .64 .31 5.15 2.73 .3~ .29 
identity I 16.10 5.18 1.39 .31 10.04 3.39 4.39 1.82 1.64 .69 .60 .25 1.20 .58 .41 .22 .05 .05 
con x ident 1 .29 .09 6.32 1.43 4.34 1.46 .04 .02 .12 .05 .60 .25 2.69 uo 2.12 1.12 .. l-1 .29 
error 46 3.11 4.42 2.97 2.42 2.39 2.39 2.07 1.89 1.17 
Note: Context (con)= comparative context; identity (ident) =salient identity 
APPENDIX Id SUMMARY STATISTICS EXPERIMENT 4 
(CHAPTER 9) ·continued 
Summary statistics for analyses involving within subjects factors 
Ratings of self on female and science dimensions: Identity (female/ 
science) x Context (interpersonal or intragroup) x Dimension (female or 
science, ws) 
Source of variation 
Between Subjects 
within cells 
identity 
context 
ident x context 
Within Subjects 
within cells 
dimension 
identity x dimension 
context x dimension 
df 
46 
1 
1 
1 
46 
1 
1 
1 
identity x context x dimension 1 
MS F p 
2.18 
.77 .35 .56 
.29 .13 .72 
1.69 .77 .38 
1.31 
.00 .00 .98 
5.60 4.26 .045 
.08 .06 .81 
.05 .04 .84 
Difference self-other ratings: Identity (female/science) x Context 
(interpersonal or intragroup) x Dimension (female or science, ws) 
Source of variation 
Between Subjects 
within cells 
identity 
context 
ident x context 
Within Subjects 
within cells 
dimension 
df 
46 
1 
1 
1 
46 
1 
MS F p 
1.39 
.24 .17 .68 
3.80 2.73 .11 
.08 .06 .81 
1.92 
.03 .02 .89 
328 
identity x dimension 1 8.94 4.66 .04 
context x dimension 1 1.15 .60 .44 
identity x context x dimension 1 1.09 .57 .46 
Difference self-other ratings: Identity (female/science) x Dimension 
(female or science, ws) for interpersonal conditions only 
Source of variation df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
within cells 22 .89 
identity 1 .02 .02 .88 
Within Subjects 
within cells 22 1.77 
dimension 1 .38 .21 .65 
identity x dimension 1 7.79 4.41 .047 
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